Becker’s theory on crime and punishment provides guidelines for designing an optimal law enforcement policy. In designing such a policy the costs of law enforcement should be traded-off against the benefits that originate in deterring criminal acts. We investigate whether law enforcement policy in the Netherlands is consistent with this guidelines. Since policy makers are not very precise on the goals of law enforcement policy and hardly anything is known about the effectiveness and efficiency of instruments, it turns out to be impossible to say whether law enforcement policy actually contributes to social welfare. This is not necessarily problematic if, in line with the efficient law hypothesis, law enforcement automatically converges to an efficient outcome. Furthermore, Becker’s theory appears to miss a crucial element by not taking account of existing preferences for retribution. If utility is derived from seeing that justice is done, this should be included in the welfare criterion. Assuming policy makers prefer welfare enhancing law enforcement, they would be well-advised to start systematically collecting information on the effectiveness and efficiency of instruments of law enforcement policy.

This article critically evaluates the prevailing factor-oriented (e.g. a priori defined legal and extralegal characteristics of defendants) approach in analyses of judicial decision-making. Rather than assuming such factors, we aim to demonstrate how Dutch judges engage in interpretative work to arrive at various sentence types. In their interpretative work, judges attempt to weigh and compare various legal and extralegal features of defendants. Importantly, they do so in the context of the case as a whole, which means that these features do not have independent or fixed meanings. Judges select and weigh information to create an image of defendants’ redeemability. However, extralegal concerns other than redeemability also inform judges’ decisions. We argue that studying the naturally occurring interpretative work of judges results in a better understanding of judicial decision-making than outcome-oriented studies, which view criminal cases as collections of independent legal and extralegal factors.

Self-regulation not always implies autonomy. Spontaneous self-regulation should be distinguished from commissioned self-regulation. The latter form of self-regulation is nowadays widespread and the result of outsourcing governmental activities. Outsourcing can be conceptualized in terms of Principal-Agent relations, in which the P commissions an A to realize P’s aims. In commissioned self-regulation the A is often constituted by the P and required to make rules in order to advance P’s aims. However, rule-making is not an activity which remains unaltered if it changes hands. In a context of spontaneous self-regulation rules fulfill a variety of functions. They guide actions and decision-making, they serve as both justification and as criticism of actions and decisions, and will thereby limit arbitrariness. In commissioned self-regulation, these manifold functions tend to be reduced to one dominant function: justifying performances towards P. In the latter capacity rules tend to be formalized and presented in a format that enables the P to arrive efficiently at a decision. Moreover, for the P the content of the rules matters less than their existence. The degree in which the external function of rules prevails determines not only how rules are presented but also how they are drafted and selected. The more A anticipates the perspective of P, the more autonomy risks to be undermined.

The Dutch social security is mainly conducted by municipalities (social services), the Dutch Employment Insurance Agencies (UWV) and the Social Insurance Bank (SVB). In order to explore to what extent agents adjust their enforcement style, as stated in the responsive regulation approach (Ayres & Braithwaite), five case studies will be conducted; three studies at social services and two studies at Employment Insurance Agencies.
During this field research I will attend every agency for two months. I will be observing the behavior of agents during their contact moments with beneficiaries. At the same time I will ask for comments on events, opinions and feelings regarding various aspects of the work. I will also conduct in-depth interviews with several agents and beneficiaries. Based on a sample I will make a selection of enforcement cases and I will analyze agreements on enforcement, regulation, directives, guidelines and recommendations.