Since 2014, several countries have introduced legislation to criminalize ‘street harassment.’ In France, this criminalization was framed within a feminist perspective, by conceiving of street harassment as the first level of a ‘continuum of violence against women.’ In the Netherlands, on the other hand, proposals to criminalize these behaviors came from right-wing political parties. They framed ordinances as protecting public order and focused on racialized loitering youth as the main problem group. Despite these differences, proponents of penalization in both countries encountered a similar criticism: according to left-wing politicians, feminists, and anti-racist activists, criminalizing street harassment could lead to disproportionate punishment of racialized men from disadvantaged backgrounds. This article argues for a pragmatic ‘sociology of critique’ within the sociology of law, which provides insight into how actors involved in the introduction of regulation develop reflexivity about the risks of legislation, as well as their blind spots.

Agri-environmental schemes serve to financially compensate farmers for promoting the quality of nature and landscapes on their land. In 2016, the Netherlands implemented a new scheme that is unique in an EU and even global context. Within this model, rule-setting, inspection and enforcement tasks are shared between public actors and private ‘environmental cooperatives’: groups of farmers legally organized as conservation organizations.
With a focus on the theme of inspection, this study adds new empirical insights to emerging scholarship on the interactions public policy and private authority. The study finds that present interactions between government inspectors and inspectors of the cooperatives can mainly be defined as ‘coexistence’, rather than complementary or competitive. A lack of coordination between the two types of actors was found to result in confusion among farmers and missed opportunities for mutual learning by inspectors. The study concludes with three policy recommendations to come to a more constructive relationship between public and private inspectors in the Dutch agri-environmental governance model.

In this essay I problematize the phenomenon of multiple problems. Multiple problems have a threefold complexity: (1) it is complex to deal with for those having these kind of problems, (2) it is complex to deal with for aid workers and others working at problem solving organization, and (3) often the relationship between the aid seeker and the aid worker is full of tension. It is because of this complexity that the role of a judge – as problem solver – is limited. Based on empirical data derived from an (ongoing) socio-legal research on a problem solving court in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, this essay provides insight in what kind of impact a judge’s decision actually can have.