Considerable political pressure is currently being brought to impose severe punishments, and it is frequently suggested that these punishments would enhance the wellbeing of victims and achieve ‘closure’. Populist images, such as ‘victims have a right to revenge’ have gained great influence. To what extent would therapeutic professionals have to support victim needs that are shaped within such punitive contexts? In this paper it is first argued that revenge embraces ambivalent meanings. Although avengers are lauded in the popular imagination, feelings of revenge are still viewed as ethically unacceptable. In recent decades, however, a penal populism has been gaining ground as a result of which revenge was stripped of its pejorative associations. In a punitive climate it is believed that victims would demand harsher penalties and that such penalties would promote closure and peace. Research findings show however that revenge may bring temporary relief, but anger rumination precludes healing. Subsequently the question is discussed whether two different forms of victim participation, victim impact statements and restorative justice conferences, might temper revenge feelings. Because VIS-participants (dealing with high levels of anger and fear) believe that their statements will culminate in longer sentences, they are generally frustrated that the imposed sentence is not tough enough. After the procedure they keep on viewing the offender as a malign person. Restorative procedures generally show an opposite picture. Finally this paper is criticizing the tendency of victim-oriented therapeutization within criminal justice and restorative justice. It is argued that the voice of the victim and the process of emotional healing should be separated strictly.

In this article attention is paid to the thoughts and feelings which underlie criminal law and restorative justice, as well as the question whether those thoughts and feelings have to be regarded as rational or irrational. For this purpose, the author has firstly examined the relationship between thinking and feeling from the perspective of the so-called cognitive emotion theory as put forth by the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum and the Dutch philosopher Mirjam van Reijen. In addition, this contribution also addresses the ideas of the Stoics, Spinoza and Schopenhauer, since the aforementioned theory goes back on the ideas of these philosophers. These philosophers depart from the view on man and world in which interconnectedness plays an important role – as the opposite of separateness. This view which reflects the mystic-religious perspective on man and world forms an important connecting thread in this article, as this turns out to have direct consequences for the idea about the (ir)rationality of certain thoughts and feelings, as well as for the (ir)rationality of criminal law and restorative justice. Special attention is paid to emotions that are relevant within the context of criminal law and restorative justice – which include anger, resentment, hatred, fear and compassion. After having explained – on the basis of the cognitive emotion theory – how thinking and feeling relate to each other and which thoughts and feelings – on the basis of the perspective of interconnectedness – have to be considered as (ir)rational, the article examines whether punishment is (ir)rational and whether the regular theories which legitimate punishment (i.e. retribution and prevention theories) are ‘rationalities of something irrational’. Furthermore, it is assessed whether the thoughts and feelings behind restorative justice are (ir)rational. The article concludes with a suggestion in which the main findings of this contribution are summarized, in order to stimulate discussion.

The tendency to revalorise emotions in the response to offending, seems to face a dilemma. On the one hand, experiencing crime and reacting to it inevitably are imbued by emotion. On the other hand, giving way to emotions in responding to crime entails the risks of disproportionate and unequal justice. This article argues that there is a fundamental difference between the emotions promoted to be included in the response to crime and the emotions feared as a risk to overwhelm good and proportionate jurisprudence. The first ones focus on the needs of the immediate stakeholders of the offence and seek their (re-)inclusion. The second type of emotions focuses on the criminal act and seeks to keep the threat it represents under control through punishment and incapacitation. It is a socio-ethical choice to promote the inclusionary approach. Whereas the rehabilitative approach has addressed the needs of the offenders only, the restorative tendency addresses the needs of both the victim and the offenders in a more balanced way. This balance also helps to avoid that respectful responses to crime degrade into norm erosion. The option for revalorising inclusionary emotions in the response to crime through restorative justice is located as a next phase in the civilisation process, described originally by Elias.