Following a crisis, questions are often raised about how this crisis could have happened and whether someone is to be blamed for the crisis or its bad management. The blame game can become fierce as actors try to avoid, shift or mitigate blame in order to stay in office. In 2014, a festival took place in Haaksbergen where a monster truck drove into the audience, killing three people and injuring many others. Not enough safety measures had been taken to prevent the tragedy. Many actors were to blame for that, including the local authority which had granted the permit. Other actors blamed for the events were the mayor, the monster truck driver, and the organization organizing the festival. In the end, the mayor of Haaksbergen resigned. Instead of becoming more accommodative in his response as his blame levels increased, the mayor continued to be quite defensive, stating that the permit would be granted again – even with today’s knowledge. As one council member stated it, one cannot defend something which cannot be defended.

Since the 1970s social integration of the police has been considered as a key element of the Dutch police. This article focusses on the question of the relevance of social integration of the contemporary police. The article is based on interviews with present and former strategic leaders of the Dutch police. This study shows that social integration is still often considered to be a highly important value for the Dutch police, particularly with regard to the growing polarisation in society. However, some of the police chiefs also express their disapproval of the concept of social integration; in their view the concept reminds us of the past. Also, police chiefs are critical of the value of the concept because of its supposed geographical focus. The paper shows that this criticism can be understood as an interpretation of social integration in terms of ‘neighbourhood policing’ and as an operational police strategy.

This contribution reports on a delimited part of a larger, exploratory study, the main question of which was: How do aldermen perceive threats, what are their behavioral intentions and what is the influence of threats on the process and the outcome of decision-making? This question was answered with the help of Q-methodology, semi-structured interviews and case studies. This article discusses the results of the Q-methodology and the semi-structured interviews. The case studies will be reported separately later on. Through the Q-methodology three patterns in perception were found in dealing with threats: ‘combative and decisive’, ‘vulnerable and thoughtful’ and ‘down-to-earth and accepting’. The interviews show that it usually concerns instrumental threats that are deliberately used to influence decision making, which usually take place in the private sphere and vary from verbal aggression to physical violence. Most threats come from individuals, but some come from groups, in some cases there is a relationship with criminals. In the cases reviewed, the consequences in the private sphere are far-reaching, there are indications for the influence on public functioning (from hardening to great caution). There is almost always a report, a fuss in the media can affect the authority of the official.

The Dutch Regional Fire Services collectively aim at preventing fire, casualties and damage. The main activity is informing citizens about fire risks and the appropriate measures they can take. From both a political and social perspective, it is valuable to know what the return of the Community Fire Safety program is. One way to chart the return of the program is a comparison of the cost of, and society’s willingness-to-pay for, the program. To estimate this willingness-to-pay, this article applies the contingent valuation method to a national representative sample of 806 Dutch citizens. The results show that willingness-to-pay of an average Dutch household is estimated to be between € 25.00 and € 35.67 per year provided the Community Fire Safety program improves the fire safety by 10%. At the national level, this amounts to 200 – 270 million euro annually. This value is seven to ten times more than the approximate costs of the current Community Fire Safety program.