Nowadays the interest in and valuation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is impressive, but when it comes to the effective implementation of CSR in business practices there seems to be a large gap. In order to advance CSR, it is important to know what motivates executives to contribute to CSR. Religiosity may be a motivational driver of CSR. I investigated whether religiosity influences executives’ view of and contribution to CSR. Based on empirical research conducted among 473 executives, I find that traditional religiosity leads to a philanthropic orientation towards CSR and a significant higher contribution to CSR in terms of charity. Otherwise, I find that non-traditional religiosity leads to a financial orientation towards CSR and a significant higher contribution to CSR in terms of diversity.

In cultural criminology, we talk about crimes as secrets and secrets as crimes. There is a close relationship between criminality and secrecy. The unravelling of secrets can help us discover the meaning criminals attach to their actions and contacts. Secrets have always been a topical issue, as they are strongly embedded in our social world. Secrecy used to be functional in times of war and under dictatorships as a symbol of political and/or religious protest. Today, however, secrecy is most often associated with illegality and criminality. It is not easy to study secrets and secrecy, and for this reason criminological research requires specific, mainly ethnographic, research methods.

The upsurge in the use of economic sanctions in the post-Cold War era has prompted much scholarly and policy debate over their effectiveness and humanitarian consequences. Remarkably little attention, however, has been devoted to their criminalizing consequences and legacy for the post-sanctions period. In this article, the author develops an analytical framework identifying and categorizing the potential criminalizing effects of sanctions across place (within and around the targeted country) and time (during and after the sanctions period). This framework is applied and evaluated through an in-depth examination of the case of Yugoslavia. For comparative leverage and to assess the applicability of the argument beyond the Yugoslavia case, the analysis is briefly extended to Croatia. The article suggests that sanctions can unintentionally contribute to the criminalization of the state, economy, and civil society of both the targeted country and its immediate neighbors, fostering a symbiosis between political leaders, organized crime, and transnational smuggling networks. This symbiosis, in turn, can persist beyond the lifting of sanctions, contributing to corruption and crime and undermining the rule of law.

In this article we deal with the role of government in encouraging the decline of radical movements. We use the survey of factors promoting decline reported by Demant et al. (2008a). This overview will be further developed regarding the factor ‘official policy strategies’ on the basis of certain concepts taken from discourse analysis, adapted to counterterrorism and deradicalization strategies by De Graaf in 2009. The question posed is: ‘Which “narrative” can the government tell to encourage the decline of radical groups?’ We will therefore not address the different practical measures in this field, but focus instead on the perception of these official measures by the radicals. We will illustrate this process by means of a case-study: the deradicalization of South Moluccan youths in the 1970s. We will furthermore draw some lines to deradicalization of Jihadist radicals after 2001, also in the Netherlands.