For a common market, a common patent and a common patent litigation seem self-evident. Although efforts to introduce these common market institutions in Europe started early in the history of the Economic Community, they remained unsuccessful. The reconstruction of this legal history is focused on two theoretical issues.The first concerns the question of power and influence in the EU, in particular the configuration of stakeholders responsible for the non-decision making on this policy issue. The basic mechanism underlying the lack of success of this dossier appears to be a balance of power between the two opposing groups of stakeholders (France and European institutions vs. Germany, UK, supported by their patenting industry and legal experts). This suggests that transnational rule making, proceeding under similar conditions, is likely to have a long (if not unsuccessful) ‘issue career’.The second theoretical issue concerns the agenda-setting mechanisms of recent decades. All initiatives on international or transnational patent policy have mainly been the product of ‘high politics’, although the input of patent legal experts (representatives of ‘low politics’) has increased considerably in recent decades. Further, this history would seem to defy simple schemes of agenda setting. There is no simple sequence of issue initiation, specification, expansion and entrance. At best, it is a series of such sequences.

In this article we report on our research which aimed to investigate which fac-tors influence the outcome of pregnancy discrimination cases of the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission (CGB) and the compliance of respondents with this outcome. We studied equal treatment legislation and all 188 cases between the period of September 1994 and March 2008. The results show that equal treatment legislation hardly leaves any room for objections raised by the re-spondents. The arguments made by the employers are often based on financial or other business-related burdens, even though these arguments are legally irrelevant. We assume that the strictness of the legislation might cause the lack of willingness to comply with the outcome. This presumption is confirmed by the fact that the legal representatives of employers put forward these irrelevant arguments as well. Furthermore, the results show that the nature of the relation of the applicant with the respondent has an influence on the compliance of the respondent with the outcome. Respondents are more likely to comply in cases where the applicant is already working for the employer instead of applying for a job. The results also show that non-profit organizations are more likely to comply with the outcome than profit organizations.

Experts may be involved in the trial of various types of legal cases. In most cases, they act as an advisor to the court or to the parties. In this model, the so-called ‘advisor model’, the expert writes a report that is used by the court for decision making. Experts may be called to attend the hearing of cases to answer questions that arise regarding their advise. In the other model, the ‘decision model’, the expert forms part of the panel that is in charge of decision making in a case. Decisions in cases are made in co-operation between judges and experts in this model. This model is not used on a large scale; the advisor model is prevailing in Dutch courts.This article discusses advantages and disadvantages of the ‘decision model’. An empirical study to the operation of this model as it is used in a variety of courts is explained. Panels in which experts are included seem to profit from the direct availability of expertise while making decisions in a case. Respondents state that external acceptance of the court decisions is also increased by the involvement of experts in a panel. Participation by experts in these panels is voluminous and they are considered to exert a large influence on the outcomes of decisions.

Most research on food safety has focussed on direct forms of food safety regulation. This paper explores the opportunities for product liability law to encourage food safety measures within firms. It aims to contribute to the discussion on the role public and private actors could have in providing an effective food safety system. Liability law is assumed to promote food safety. The author distinguishes three ways in which liability law could act as an incentive for firms to implement enhanced food safety controls: liability claims, liability insurance and direct effects of liability law on management strategy. The paper concludes that the assumption that liability laws make firms sensitive to prevention of food safety risks is too optimistic. However, liability law could stimulate a culture within firms to take responsibility for food safety. Existing economic and legal analysis could gain from a sociological analysis of the actual impact of liability on company decisions.