The first national research into church formation among Roman Catholic migrants in the Netherlands dates from the year 2006. Since then many changes took place within these communities. However, there is not a single institution that collects their addresses and data. Policymakers, scholars or journalists do not have access to recent information. Based on questions about their development and composition, this article updates information about these church communities and places them in a broader historical context. One of the most significant findings in this article concerns the stability of their regular parishioners, that contrasts with the national trend in Roman Catholic Church, which is constantly dealing with a declining amount of members.

Politics and law are not in essence about knowledge, good sense and learning, but about wisdom. Good legislation requires wisdom and the wise judge is also the ideal when it comes to good adjudication. But what is wisdom actually and who is the sage? To answer these questions, this article departs from the views of the Stoa (of Seneca especially) which has been of fundamental significance for the development of law and which still continues to influence it. It shows how the philosophical views of the Stoics included an objective view of law and cultivated a subjective impassibility and apathy that were associated with steadfastness or constancy. Stoic wisdom was (and still is): virtuous obedience to the objective laws of nature. In modern Stoics like Spinoza and Justus Lipsius we find these same elements. But in modern times Stoicism is wrapped in the veil of a Christian vision of life, which (as such) serves as a seductive legitimation of its principles. In this guise Stoicism has been of enormous significance in the history of Christianity. However, their historical relationship is based on a major misunderstanding. In fact, Stoicism is Christianity’s most extreme alternative, as Erasmus already pointed out. For the Stoic sage a theoretical and practical wisdom applies that is not (in any way) in accordance with the courageous foolishness of Christianity. It is through the prism of this foolishness that we come to appreciate that the eternal Stoic attitude is odious when it comes to law and politics. Stoicism is a recurring crisis phenomenon: a cultural sickness, for which the wisdom of Christianity still offers a very effective medicine.

On 20 December 2017, the Court of Justice of the EU ruled that an extrajudicial unilateral divorce brought about in Syria does not come within the substantive scope of the European regulation on the law applicable to divorces (Rome III Regulation). In response to this decision, the inequality between men and women in the divorce law of Muslim countries, the developments that are going on in this area, as well as the role the non-discrimination-principle plays in the recognition policies in European states on Islamic repudiations, are discussed in this contribution.

A medical doctor in The Netherlands is not punishable under the law for assisting in a patient’s self-chosen death as long as (s)he has fulfilled the conditions of the Euthanasia Law of 2002. This law regards patients with unbearable and hopeless suffering who request an end to their life. This article will regard euthanasia from the perspective of Roman Catholic church law: if a Catholic doctor in The Netherlands ends the life of a patient in conformity with the Euthanasia Law, could this nevertheless be considered a crime of manslaughter as stipulated in Canon 1397 of the Code of Canon Law (1983)? And is that doctor then punishable under that law? It will be demonstrated that this is not the case, because the church law does not regard a crime similar to euthanasia under Dutch law, even though the killing of an innocent person is considered a sin. Against the background of the logic in church law, this article will make a comparison with the crime of abortion as stipulated in Canon 1398 of the ecclesiastical Code. It will be demonstrated that manslaughter and abortion share a different but illuminating history and topicality.

The question central to this article is whether ‘Islam’ and human rights are compatible and, if not, whether there might be room to come to a minimum standard of human rights that can be shared globally. This article will demonstrate that, from the perspective of Islamic orthodoxy, principles that are fundamental to human rights, like equality and freedom of religion, pose unsurmountable problems, and the adjustment of these principles is theologically nearly impossible. However, a growing number of Muslim intellectuals holds the opposite view, using new theological methods to argue that these Islamic principles and human rights are compatible. Although they are warmly welcomed by human rights lawyers and activists, their methods are not uncontroversial, and they are still very small in number.

The article is a plea to reconsider the new impetus that the second Vatican council in the catholic church has brought about, and to give it shape in the ecclesiastical administration of the catholic church. After a period of strong renewal this movement seems to be evaporated in the Netherlands, whereas this council and the code of 1983 have a lot of opportunities to offer. On the basis of a number of concrete examples of administrative reforms that Pope Francis and some of the newly appointed bishops have realized, the author offers some concrete proposals.

This article analyses the relation between Islam, politics and citizenship. It analyses three currents within Islam: Salafism, Islamism, and modernism. The central argument is that most modern Islamic currents do not have a concept of politics as an independent ‘field’ where compromises can be made concerning societal problems. The only current that provide the space for a pluriform, open political debate is Islamic modernism. Through its humanism and the centrality of the common good and not the text, modernism embraces not only the concept of politics as free space but also the concept of active citizenship.

In this article, the author criticizes a variety of views on the Christian identity of Europe in current discussions on migration. Next, he presents his own view on Christian identity, which consists of belief in a God who becomes present in the brokenness of the life of all. Applied to the issue of migration, this leads to a view of identity which develops in the encounter with migration. Then, the author defends the universal message of the Christian faith, and shows how this messages is violated as long as the suffering of migrants lasts. Thus, he holds a plea for a divine order over against the supposed order of christian identity.

This article investigates the role of ‘implicit religion’ in extremism, including those forms that do not explicitly call upon formal religion. Extremist quasi-religious narratives expose an exclusionary logic, which is mirrored by radical ways of thinking about counter-extremism. This unfailingly leads to more polarization. Extremism can only be countered by radical openness. Resilient democracy requires that citizens, politicians and professionals are willing and able to maintain open hearts and minds. Implicit religion can support this. Spiritual counselors and scientists of religion need to support the creation of spiritual narratives and rituals that strengthen democratic resilience.

For liberals religion is a private matter. This does not mean that a citizen should leave his or her religion at home. It does mean that laws and public services should not be determined by religious beliefs. The article describes how liberals have looked upon religion in their programs of principles since mid 19th century. The educational arrangement in the Netherlands of 1917, favouring religious schools, did not satisfy them. What were the liberal proposals in order to safeguard the religiously neutral, publicly-maintained schools?

Appeals to religion in the public domain, in particular by politicians, prove to be controversial. This is good news, given that the ensuing debate usually uncovers forgotten aspects of religious traditions. Using three cases from the Dutch political discourse, to wit: the appeal to ‘Jewish Christian’ tradition, the claim that Jewish Christian tradition has been of key emancipatory value, and the identification of immigrants as religious, and applying Aleida Assmann’s theory about the dynamics of forgetting (and remembrance), the paper demonstrates that in each of these cases, the public debates surrounding these instances of references to religion and their rhetorical use, were instrumental in uncovering ‘forgotten’ aspects of religion that had disappeared from the ‘memory’ of the political discourse.

Some religious persons refuse to undergo certain medical treatments such as vaccinations or blood transfusions. They refuse treatment not only for themselves but for their children as well. Many fundamental rights may be at stake here: freedom of religion, the right to physical integrity and respect for family life on the one hand, and the duty of public authorities to provide for health care and defend children’s rights on the other. The main topic of this contribution is the extent to which the government is allowed to make certain treatments compulsory.

The liberal stance regarding religious freedom starts from a particular anthropology, which holds that in order to become fully human citizens must be able to build their lives on the foundations of their religious convictions. This starting point leads to distinctive conceptions of constitutionalism and democracy that make it possible for citizens to keep faith in liberal democracy. The so-called new critics of religious freedom, to the contrary, run the risk of eventually eroding trust in government by putting their substantial ideas of liberal democracy first and demanding of citizens and their organizations to act in conformity with these ideas.

Two new rulings by the European Court of Human Rights confirm earlier jurisprudence regarding the ‘burqa ban’, as such ban is justified on the basis of the principle of ‘living together’. Still, two points stand out in these rulings that need discussion. The first is that this is an example of how the Court applies its new ‘qualitative, democracy-enhancing approach’ that pays more consideration to domestic decision-making in the field of human rights. These rulings show the flipside of this laudable endeavour, however, as the Court sees no reason to evaluate, let alone critically assess, the outcome of these domestic decision-making processes. Second, the remarkable ‘concurring opinion’ by the president of the ruling judges, in which he states in very stern wordings that the ruling should not be considered a cart blanche for burqa bans elsewhere. Given the elaborate considerations why such ban would not be admissible, it is surprising that the Court has failed to elaborate why the burqa bans in France and Belgium are admissible.

The term ‘Judeo Christian civilization’ dates from the second half of the twentieth century, but has of recent gained in popularity with politicians and policy makers. It seems to be no coincidence that this has a direct correlation with the debates on the position of Islam in Europe. This article is a critical assessment of the meanings of the various elements of this term: what is so Christian about European civilization, what is Judaism’s part therein, and what role does the Islam play? It is notable that one often considers this Judeo Christian ‘culture’ or ‘civilization’ as an uninterupted historical proces, while the second half of the twentieth century shows a clear rupture when it concerns values or the experience of religion. Also remarkable is that one often fails to make the differentiation between religion as a theological cult and as a culture carrier, or between the principles and the practice of a religion. As a consequence, the term ‘Judeo Christian civilization’ or ‘culture’ is being used in a very sloppy or selective manner, often with the purpose to exclude Islam.

The Dutch freedom to set up schools has become illusory. The foundation standards (the number of students) are high and the current interpretation of the concept of direction (religion or philosophy of life) does not seem to be sufficiently connected with today’s pluriform society. The alternative of direction-free planning of schools had practical and fundamental objections. Parent statements are insufficiently reliable and a school without direction does not have a foundation. An extension of direction is neither without disadvantages: the government will have to test whether there is a sufficiently coherent concept to be able to count as a direction.

Recently the Dutch parliament passed a law that provides the subsidy for religious and humanist education in state schools. The law on primary education gives to the parents the right to ask for it. Religious education in state schools exists in the Netherlands since the beginning of the 19th century, optional and taught by representatives of the church. So it is appropriate for the state school which wish to be a school for everyone. And public funding is appropriate in the Dutch education system.

This article discusses the way in which nominally liberal, secular political parties in the Netherlands refer to religion when describing Dutch national identity with particular emphasis on controversies surrounding the 2017 parliamentary elections. Focussing on the currently ruling liberal party VVD and the populist right-wing party PVV, appeals on ‘judeo-christian roots’ and the importance of christian symbols are analyzed against the backdrop of larger currents of religious-secular developments in (inter)national political discourse. The author suggest using the term ‘postsecular nationalism’ to describe this development. The article ends with speculation on the impact of postsecular nationalism for policy-makers.