Criminologists generally regard below-average intelligence as a robust correlate of delinquency and crime. In this article the author argues that the negative association between IQ and crime could be explained at least in part by a lack of research access to gifted adults who possess wealth, power and privileges. Asking these adults about other types of offending (e.g. white-collar crimes) than usual in self-report studies might uncover a positive relationship between IQ and prevalence rates, in accordance with the results of the exploratory study underlying this article. As a consequence different conclusions about the linkages between intelligence and crime might have to be drawn.

A recent study on the registration of mild intellectual disabilities (MID) in the judicial domain raised various questions regarding the possibilities for and desirability of recognition and registration of MID in the criminal justice system (CJS). There is general unanimity on the necessity to recognize MID. Identifying a MID, however, is not without its pitfalls. That said, not everywhere within the CJS is the same level of exactitude in recognizing MID needed. Sometimes, screening for a MID will suffice. When a (probable) MID has been identified, choices about the desirability of registration have to be made. This raises issues regarding trust, privacy, professional freedom, and the measure of control granted to the delinquent. This article discusses some of the questions raised, not with the aim of solving them, but in order to stimulate the discussion necessary to achieve an aligned criminal justice system.

Drawing on material from her extensive study of Russian organized crime, the author sketches a portrait of Semjon Mogilevitsj. This Russian ‘godfather’ enjoys the reputation of being the smartest and highest educated mafia boss worldwide. Indeed Mogilevitsj obtained a master’s degree in Economics with good results, but this alone doesn’t explain his phenomenal successes in criminal as well as in legal business. Describing the steady expansion of his criminal activities from Russia into Israel, the United States, Eastern Europa, Italy and Canada, the author suggests that the social and economic circumstances in Russia just before and during the collapse of the Soviet Union might have served as an ideal playing ground for Mogilevitsj to develop the specific social intelligence and skills needed to successfully run a criminal organization.

In criminological literature there is an ongoing discussion about the relation between intellectual disability and criminality. Because of differences of definitions and measurement methods prevalence figures may vary. Recent assessment of prevalence in the Netherlands using a valid Dutch screener (the SCIL) reveals a relatively high percentage of people with mild intellectual disability and borderline intelligence in the Dutch criminological system. People with mild intellectual disability and borderline intelligence cannot be considered as belonging to one group. Five typologies with even more subtypes based on mixed characteristics can be distinguished. A need for early detection and personalized interventions is stressed as is treatment based on the specific characteristics of these subtypes.

In recent years, there are signs that young people with a (mild) intellectual disability are overrepresented in the criminal justice system. It turns out that especially a large majority of the repeated offenders have an intellectual disability. Therefore it would be relevant to know whether and when an intellectual disability is recognized by professionals in the criminal procedure. What is the impact of not recognizing the specific disability on the offender in the criminal justice procedure and on recidivism? The author focuses on a rather new accelerated out-of-court settlement of criminal cases, the so-called ZSM method. She concludes that the high speed of this procedure increases the vulnerability of suspects with a (mild) intellectual disability, especially because the various professionals involved in this procedure seem to lack substantial awareness of the problem. This situation increases the risk of false confessions and witnessing and might also contribute to recidivism.

This article describes the subsequent waves of contract killings in the Netherlands since the twentieth century. Contract killings appear to happen especially within ethnic groups which are newcomers to Dutch society. The Chinese community in Amsterdam fought two internal ‘wars’. The first one was from 1918 till 1935 and circled around the trade in opium and arms. The second one took place between 1969 and the mid-seventies and was fueled by conflicts about the heroin trade. Then Turkish criminals took over the heroin trade, which resulted in a wave of Turkish victims of contract killings throughout the second half of the seventies and into the eighties. The cocaine trade came up in the eighties and was run first by Chileans and later by Colombians, which resulted in several murders within the criminal circles of these communities. While contract killings of (by birth) Dutch criminals had always been very rare, this changed from the mid-eighties. These killings not only took place in Amsterdam, but also in the southern provinces of Limburg and Brabant, as well as in Rotterdam. Most Dutch criminals specialized in cannabis growing and trading. In the nineties the number of contract killings reached a peak. By then Yugoslavs had entered the criminal scene in the Netherlands. They cooperated with Dutch criminals and offered their services as hitmen. From 2000 onwards the number of contract killings has been dropping constantly and has now reached a more or less constant level of around twenty yearly. In the last couple of years many young Moroccan Dutch criminals have been killing and killed in conflicts on drugs trade. The author signalizes a lack of ‘professionalism’ in contract killers today and draws a parallel with the period when Chinese criminals were fighting their wars in Amsterdam. The hitmen are young, have little experience, are not intelligent and use far too many bullets to do the job.

More than twenty criminals from Amsterdam were killed since 2012 in fierce conflicts in the criminal scene. The victims, mostly young men, can be divided into four categories. The assassins are young, often with a low intelligence, and easy to contract. They hope to give their criminal career a boost by killing. Their main motives are status and money. If the organization fears that they know too much and might inform the police, this can be a motive to kill them. Sometimes fear of betrayal of the organization is a motive for murder. The middlemen are important, because the ‘high profile targets’ want to stay out of sight of the assassins. The middlemen already have a rather secure position, although subordinate to the top. The motive to have them killed is often distrust and the fear that they know too much and would be able to tell the police too much. Revenge by another group is also an important reason they get killed. The high profile targets are top criminals in their thirties or forties mostly and in charge of the drug trafficking. The motive to have them killed is to gain influence and obtain a stronger, strategic position in the market, or – again – revenge. Rivals who are afraid to be killed, sometimes choose to be the first to act. The final category is formed by the victims killed by mistake. Recently at least three people were killed by assassins who thought they were shooting at a criminal target in the conflict. Just by mistake, because the victim drove the same kind of car, for example.

In this interview the Dutch prosecutor Koos Plooij discusses with criminal lawyer Christian Flokstra on the intention of the Public Prosecution Office to adapt article 46 of the Dutch Penal Law (Sr) in such a way that the burden of proof necessary for a sentence on contract killing is lowered. Plooij argues that many suspects who were clearly up to a very serious deed, have received a relatively low punishment because it was too difficult to prove that they were preparing a contract killing – and were not simply trying to intimidate their target or for instance take this person as a hostage. For the judge it is essential to establish which crime was being prepared, since the latter are completely different crimes and the punishment is much lower compared to the punishment for murder. Flokstra replies by stressing that the limitations of the current article 46 Sr exist to assure that people are not punished for things they didn’t do or were not planning to do. He argues that the prosecution should accept that sometimes there’s just not enough proof to convince the judge that the suspect was preparing a contract killing. A sentence for arms possession or participation in a criminal organization could be an alternative in such cases. Both men agree that the current maximum punishments for these crimes are too low.

This article focuses on witness protection programs for (former) criminals who witness against suspects in criminal procedures. It goes without saying that these witnesses run the risk of becoming the target of a contract killing. The author describes the conditions of admission to a witness protection program, as well as the various existing types of protection. Witnesses themselves are often not very enthusiastic about the program. Since they themselves have a criminal past, they look at the police as their enemy and often prefer to receive a lump sum and arrange their safety themselves, as becomes clear from several examples provided by the author.

The authors reflect on ‘Handelen naar waarheid’ (Acting on truth), an assessment of the state of criminal investigations in The Netherlands, which appeared in May 2016. This report, assigned by the police and public prosecution service and written by four inside experts, caused substantial turmoil in the police organization and beyond. The report addresses six domains: professionalism, attitude and behavior, direction and leadership, capacity for change, organizational structure and business management. The critical and transparent self-reflection by the police received praise from policymakers, journalists and academic observers. It also met with recognition and appreciation in the law enforcement community, in particular among investigators and prosecutors. In the wake of the report, a reform program was organized to modernize both the police and the prosecution service in order to increase the quality and effectiveness of their work. Such reform is deemed necessary because crime problems have become ever more complex and citizens increasingly organize their own (counter-)investigations. The authors conclude that in spite of many recent initiatives, truly innovative practices remain scarce. Also, the crucial ambitions to increase the educational level of investigators and the organizational culture are still far from realized.

In 2013, the government of the Netherlands established a national police force, replacing a system of largely autonomous regional police organizations. This led to an extensive police reform. In this article, I explore the effects of this police reform on the internal dynamics within the police organization. I describe five ‘negative’ effects: anonymization, decoupling, formalization, confusion and de-owning. These effects lead to alienation between police offers and the police organization and hinder the development of the national police force. Beside these negative effects, there are also positive forces that shape the development of the national police force. The top leadership is changing the strategic leadership style and there are many innovative initiatives on the local level contributing to the goals of the reform. However, to make the ambitions of the reform feasible there are adjustments needed in the organizational structure and change approach. The operational core of the organization needs to be the central point of reference for these adjustments.

There have been little to no empirical research conducted on trust of Dutch citizens in the police. This study is a step towards filling this gap. We used semi-structured interviews, questionnaires and observations to examine to what extent citizens’ trust in the police is determined by perceptions of the effectiveness of the police to reduce crime and disorder and perceptions of procedural justice. Research was conducted in Bloemhof, a superdiverse neighbourhood in Rotterdam. The results indicate that in superdiverse neighbourhoods perceived responsiveness is the cornerstone for explaining police trustworthiness. Implications for policy reform are discussed.

This contribution offers a review of the recently published book Sécurité. Ce qu’on vous cache (‘Security. What is being hidden for you’) written by Patrice Bergougnoux (with Frédéric Ploquin). Bergougnoux has had a long career inside the French police organisation. His book comes out at a crucial moment, now the French police has become subject of a fierce debate due to its expanded powers during the state of emergency in place since the terrorist attacks in Paris in november 2016 up to today. Bergougnoux gives an insider’s view on the police organisation and how it became a subject of power struggle between various French political forces. While the French have had a national police for 75 years, the Netherlands only recently formed a national force. This book entails a national vision on how to structure the police services and as such could be inspiring for the Dutch debate on the national police.

In their book on Sharia4Belgium, an organization that during its short existence from 2010 to 2012 criticized what it perceived as anti-Muslim discourse and promoted the introduction of the sharia in Belgium, the authors Pim Aarns and Ineke Roex focus on the use of political humor by the spokespersons of the organization. They offer a nuanced interpretation of the political humor in a large number of online videos, distinguishing between, among other things, the ridicule of right-wing nativist opponents, a ludic critique of sexual mores, and the mockery of other Muslims who do not accept the group’s version of Islam. The focus on humor is refreshing, because in today’s liberal, secular democracy devout believers, and fundamentalist Muslims in particular, are often believed to be lacking a sense of humor. Although failing to offer a broader analysis of political humor in current political discourse, the book successfully shows that radical religious ideology and political humor are not mutually exclusive.

Studying terrorism and radicalization is quite problematic because of a lack of reliable sources. Finding out what motivates terrorists often boils down to educated guessing. The author describes the search for an academic definition of terrorism and summarizes the development of this discipline since the 1970s, thereby distinguishing research on three levels: macro, micro and meso. While before 9/11 few academics were involved in this research field, it ‘exploded’ thereafter. Important factor contributing to this expansion is the greater availability of government funds and relevant data for this type of research. However, the growth of this discipline isn’t just good news, researchers should be aware of a number of pitfalls identified as the proximity to government power, too much self-confidence (hybris) of researchers pretending to have designed a ‘unified theory’, the abundance of funds for this type of research, resulting in a lot of low-quality research, and finally the politicization of the subject, which could limit the academic freedom.

In this contribution the author focuses on the relationship between Islam and terrorism. Based on data from the Global Terrorism Database he argues that Islamic terrorism dominates worldwide since 2002. Paying attention to the creed of the jihadists, Salafism, he argues that it is a continuation of the puritanical tradition within Sunni Islam.