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Artikel

Access_open The Public Conscience of the Law

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2014
Trefwoorden Hobbes, reciprocity, rule of Law, conscience, legality, liberty
Auteurs David Dyzenhaus PhD
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    I focus on Hobbes’s claim that the law is ’the publique Conscience, by which [the individual] (…) hath already undertaken to be guided.’ This claim is not authoritarian once it is set in the context of his complex account, which involves three different relationships of reciprocity: the contractarian idea that individuals in the state of nature agree with one another to institute a sovereign whose prescriptions they shall regard as binding; the vertical, reciprocal relationship between ruler and ruled; and the horizontal relationship between individuals in the civil condition, made possible by the existence of the sovereign who through enacting laws dictates the terms of interaction between his subjects. The interaction of these three relationships has the result that subjects relate to each other on terms that reflect their status as free and equal individuals who find that the law enables them to pursue their own conceptions of the good.


David Dyzenhaus PhD
David Dyzenhaus is a Professor of Law and Philosophy at the University of Toronto, and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. His books include Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: South African Law in the Perspective of Legal Philosophy (now in its second edition) and Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, and Hermann Heller in Weimar.

Dr. Bertjan Wolthuis PhD
Artikel

Access_open Idealized versus Real-Life Reciprocity: How to Strike the Balance?

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2014
Trefwoorden norm of reciprocity, moral obligation, gift exchange, hospitality, intergenerational relations
Auteurs Mrs. Aafke Elisabeth Komter PhD
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Rawls’s ’idealized’ notion of reciprocity is compared with the ’real-life’ concept of reciprocity as it has been developed in social scientific theory. The two perspectives appear to differ significantly as concerns dimensions related to equality, human motivation, the temporal aspects of reciprocity, and the supposed mental origin of reciprocity. Whereas norms of obligation and feelings of moral indebtedness are constitutive for reciprocity in real-life encounters, equality, freedom and rationality are the basis for reciprocity in the hypothetical world of the ’conjectural account’. Rather than being fundamentally incompatible, the idealized and the real-life perspectives on reciprocity seem to apply to different spheres of social life, the first requiring greater formality and universality than the second, which allows for more variation and particularities.


Mrs. Aafke Elisabeth Komter PhD
Aafke Komter is Emeritus Professor of Social Sciences and a Visiting Researcher at the Department of Sociology of the Erasmus University of Rotterdam. She has published many articles on (family) solidarity, reciprocity and the social and cultural meaning of the exchange of gifts.

A. Daniel Oliver-Lalana PhD
Artikel

Access_open The Normative Foundation of Legal Orders: A Balance Between Reciprocity and Mutuality

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2014
Trefwoorden reciprocity, mutuality, social morality of duties, legal morality of rights, intergenerational justice
Auteurs Dorien Pessers PhD
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Reciprocity seems to figure as a self-evident normative foundation of legal orders. Yet a clear understanding of the often opaque role that reciprocity plays in this regard demands drawing a conceptual distinction. This article views reciprocity as a social morality of duties, in opposition to mutuality, which concerns a legal morality of rights. In everyday life these two broad categories of human interaction interfere in a dynamic way. They need to be brought into an appropriate balance in legal orders, for the sake of justice. The practical relevance of this conceptual distinction is clarified by the debate about justice between present and future generations. I argue that this debate should be viewed as a debate about the terms of reciprocity rather than relations of mutuality. Acknowledging the deeply reciprocal nature of the relations between past, present and future generations would lead to a more convincing moral theory about intergenerational justice.


Dorien Pessers PhD
Dorien Pessers is Professor of the Legal and Theoretical Foundations of the Private Sphere at the VU University and at the University of Amsterdam. Her research focuses primarily on the theoretical foundations of the public and private spheres.

Roland Pierik PhD
Artikel

Access_open Reciprocity: a fragile equilibrium

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2014
Trefwoorden reciprocity, exchange theory, natural law theory, dyadic relations, corrective justice
Auteurs Prof. dr. Pauline Westerman PhD
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Reciprocity may serve to explain or to justify law. In its latter capacity, which is the topic of this article, reciprocity is commonly turned into a highly idealized notion, as either a balance between two free and equal parties or as the possibility of communication tout court. Both ideals lack empirical reference. If sociological and anthropological literature on forms of exchange is taken into account, it should be acknowledged that reciprocal relations are easy to destabilize. The dynamics of exchange invites exclusion and inequality. For this reason reciprocity should not be presupposed as the normative underpinning of law; instead, law should be presupposed in order to turn reciprocity into a desirable ideal.


Prof. dr. Pauline Westerman PhD
Pauline Westerman is Professor in Philosophy of Law at the University of Groningen and member of staff at the Academy for Legislation in the Hague. She is editor of The Theory and Practice of Legislation, a journal published by Hart, Oxford. She writes mainly on legal methodology and legislation, especially on alternative forms of legislation. For more information as well as publications, see her personal website: <www.paulinewesterman.nl>.

Wout Cornelissen PhD

Michiel Besters
Michiel Besters is PhD Researcher in Legal Philosophy at Tilburg Law School.

Antony Duff
Antony Duff holds the Russell M and Elizabeth M Bennett Chair in the University of Minnesota Law School, and is a Professor Emeritus of the Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling.

Juan M. Amaya-Castro
Juan M. Amaya-Castro is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law of the VU University of Amsterdam. He is affiliated with the Migration and Diversity Centre.

Thomas Mertens
Thomas Mertens is Professor of Legal Philosophy at Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen.

Stefan Rummens
Stefan Rummens is Associate Professor of Moral Philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy of the KU Leuven (Belgium).
Artikel

Access_open Wat is juridisch interactionisme?

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2014
Trefwoorden interactionism, Lon Fuller, interactional law, legal pluralism, concept of law
Auteurs Wibren van der Burg
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Two phenomena that challenge theories of law in the beginning of the twenty-first century are the regulatory explosion and the emergence of horizontal and interactional forms of law. In this paper, I develop a theory that can address these two phenomena, namely legal interactionism, a theory inspired by the work of Fuller and Selznick. In a pluralist approach, legal interactionism recognizes both interactional law and enacted law, as well as other sources such as contract. We should aim for a pluralistic and gradual concept of law. Because of this pluralist and gradual character, legal interactionism can also do justice to global legal pluralism and to the dynamic intertwinement of health law and bioethics.


Wibren van der Burg
Wibren van der Burg is Professor of Legal Philosophy and Jurisprudence, Erasmus School of Law at the Erasmus University Rotterdam.
Artikel

Access_open Racial Profiling and the Presumption of Innocence

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2014
Trefwoorden racial profiling, stop-and-frisk, presumption of innocence, communicative theories of criminal law, social inequality and criminal law
Auteurs Peter DeAngelis
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    I argue that a compelling way to articulate what is wrong with racial profiling in policing is to view racial profiling as a violation of the presumption of innocence. I discuss the communicative nature of the presumption of innocence as an expression of social trust and a protection against the social condemnation of being undeservingly investigated, prosecuted, and convicted for committing a crime. I argue that, given its communicative dimension, failures to extend the presumption of innocence are an expression of disrespect. I take the New York Police Department’s stop-and-frisk policy as an example of racial profiling and argue that its use of race-based forms of suspicion as reasons for making stops is a violation of the presumption of innocence. I maintain that this systemic failure to extend the presumption of innocence to profiled groups reveals the essentially disrespectful nature of the NYPD policy.


Peter DeAngelis
Peter DeAngelis is Ph.D. Candidate in Philosophy at Villanova University.
Artikel

Access_open What Makes Age Discrimination Special? A Philosophical Look at the ECJ Case Law

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2014
Trefwoorden age discrimination, intergenerational justice, complete-life view, statistical discrimination, anti-discrimination law
Auteurs Axel Gosseries
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    This paper provides an account of what makes age discrimination special, going through a set of possible justifications. In the end, it turns out that a full understanding of the specialness of age-based differential treatment requires that we consider together the ‘reliable proxy,’ the ‘complete-life neutrality,’ the ‘sequence efficiency’ and the ‘affirmative egalitarian’ accounts. Depending on the specific age criteria, all four accounts may apply or only some of them. This is the first key message of this paper. The second message of the paper has to do with the age group/birth cohort distinction. All measures that have a differential impact on different cohorts also tend to have a differential impact on various age groups during the transition. The paper points at the practical implications of anti-age-discrimination law for differential treatment between birth cohorts. The whole argument is confronted all along with ECJ cases.


Axel Gosseries
Axel Gosseries is a permanent research fellow at the Belgian FRS-FNRS and a Professor at the University of Louvain (UCL, Belgium) where he is based at the Hoover Chair in Economic and Social Ethics.
Artikel

Access_open The Right to Have Rights as the Right to Asylum

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2014
Trefwoorden Arendt, asylum, refugeeship, right to have rights, statelessness de facto and de jure
Auteurs Nanda Oudejans
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    This article argues that the right to have rights, as launched by Hannah Arendt, is relative to refugee displacement and hence translates as a right to asylum. It takes issue with the dominant view that the public/private divide is the locus classicus of the meaning of this primordial right. A different direction of thought is proposed, proceeding from Arendt’s recovery of the spatiality of law. The unencompassibility of place in matters of rights, freedom and equality brings this right into view as a claim at the behest of those who have lost a legal place of their own. This also helps us to gain better understanding of Arendt’s rebuttal of the sharp-edged distinction between refugees and stateless persons and to discover the defiant potential of the right to have rights to illuminate the refugee’s claim to asylum as a claim to an own place where protection can be enjoyed again.


Nanda Oudejans
Nanda Oudejans is an independent researcher in philosophy of law and political philosophy.

    In this response to my five critics, I note the strength of the arguments in favour of treating the presumption of innocence as a narrow, legal presumption that operates only within the criminal process; but I then try to make clearer my reasons for talking of different presumptions of innocence (moral, rather than legal, presumptions) outside the criminal process, in other contexts in which issues of criminal guilt or innocence arise – presumptions that guide or are expressed in the conduct of the state’s officials towards its citizens, and of citizens towards each other. Once we look at these other contexts in which criminal guilt and innocence (of past and future crimes) are at stake, we can see the importance of civic trust as a practical attitude that citizens owe to each other; and the fruitfulness of examining the various normative roles that citizens may have to play in relation to the criminal law.


Antony Duff
Antony Duff holds the Russell M and Elizabeth M Bennett Chair in the University of Minnesota Law School, and is a Professor Emeritus of the Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling.


Anne Ruth Mackor
Anne Ruth Mackor is Professor of Professional Ethics, in particular of legal professions, at the University of Groningen.

Vincent Geeraets
Vincent Geeraets is Lecturer at the Faculty of Law of the VU University Amsterdam.
Artikel

Access_open The Meaning of the Presumption of Innocence for Pre-trial Detention

An Empirical Approach

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2013
Trefwoorden pre-trial detention practice, presumption of guilt, incapacitation, presumption of innocence
Auteurs Lonneke Stevens
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    The presumption of innocence (PoI) is considered to be an important principle for regulating pre-trial detention. The idea is that pre-trial detention should be a last resort. However, pre-trial detention practice demonstrates that pre-trial detention does not function on the basis of a presumption of innocence but rather from a presumption of guilt and dangerousness. It must be concluded that, with regard to pre-trial detention, the PoI has a rather limited normative effect.


Lonneke Stevens
Lonneke Stevens is Associate Professor of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure at VU University Amsterdam.
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