I argue that a compelling way to articulate what is wrong with racial profiling in policing is to view racial profiling as a violation of the presumption of innocence. I discuss the communicative nature of the presumption of innocence as an expression of social trust and a protection against the social condemnation of being undeservingly investigated, prosecuted, and convicted for committing a crime. I argue that, given its communicative dimension, failures to extend the presumption of innocence are an expression of disrespect. I take the New York Police Department’s stop-and-frisk policy as an example of racial profiling and argue that its use of race-based forms of suspicion as reasons for making stops is a violation of the presumption of innocence. I maintain that this systemic failure to extend the presumption of innocence to profiled groups reveals the essentially disrespectful nature of the NYPD policy.

Both in punishment theory and sentencing practices, the subjective sentence severity is an important yet neglected area of research. This paper aims to explain differences between inmates in their subjective severity of imprisonment and to contemplate these against the background of important sentencing goals and sentencing principles. Two models commonly used to explain adjustment to prison life were applied: the import and deprivation model. Data from the Prison Project, collected among Dutch inmates staying in pretrial detention, reveal that both import and deprivation characteristics are related to the subjective severity of imprisonment. No support is found for a moderation effect of personality.

Sentencing research focusing solely on unsuspended imprisonment does no justice to the practice of sentencing, where many other punishment types are imposed – often conjunctly. To investigate to what extent this imprisonment bias might have caused incomplete and thereby biased findings, we compare the effects of offender characteristics for imprisonment to those for other sanction types, as well as to a model combining sanction types. Findings suggest that the effects of offender characteristics differ per sanction type. When combinations of sanction types are taken into account, some offender characteristics do no longer have mitigating or aggravating effects, or the effects even inverted. Hence, future sentencing research should aim to include all sentences imposed.

A survey of the literature suggested that low participation rates in prison-based rehabilitation programs in The Netherlands can be explained by a lack of treatment readiness amongst rehabilitation candidates and participants. The current contribution aims to examine treatment readiness amongst detainees that have been assigned a candidate for a prison-based rehabilitation program in the Netherlands. To address these aims, data were used from the fourth wave of a research project studying the effects of imprisonment on the life of detainees in the Netherlands. Results showed that about eighty percent of treatment candidates were not treatment ready. This lack of treatment readiness amongst potential participants will no doubt influence both treatment engagement numbers, which studies have shown to be low, and quite possible treatment effectiveness. Results imply that practitioners should be aware of the absence of treatment readiness amongst a large part of their clients. Assessment and (if necessary) interventions to increase treatment readiness amongst candidates and participants seems of the utmost importance.

The presumption of innocence (PoI) is considered to be an important principle for regulating pre-trial detention. The idea is that pre-trial detention should be a last resort. However, pre-trial detention practice demonstrates that pre-trial detention does not function on the basis of a presumption of innocence but rather from a presumption of guilt and dangerousness. It must be concluded that, with regard to pre-trial detention, the PoI has a rather limited normative effect.

Factors justifying not presuming innocence are generally incorporated into the Presumption of Innocence (PoI). A confusing discourse has resulted: numerous guilt-presuming acts are deemed consistent with the PoI. I argue for an unusually broad PoI: any act that might convey to a reasonable actor that he is not presumed innocent of a punishable offence constitutes a PoI interference. Thus, academic debate need only be about the question what PoI interferences are justifiable or unjustifiable. This question must be answered using pro- and anti-PoI values. I analyse three PoI interferences in relation to Duff’s retributivist punishment theory: presumptions of guilt, vicarious liability of car owners and coercing non-suspects into proving their sobriety. Retributivists tend to castigate such procedures based on their (supposed) consequentialist rationale. I argue, however, that they might also be justified on retributivist grounds. The retributivist anti-PoI duty to punish the guilty may be the worst enemy of innocents.

Antony Duff proposes a comprehensive concept of the presumption of innocence, covering the period before, during and after a criminal process, both in an official (state vs. individual) and a non-official, civic sense. By that broad usage, the concept of presumption of innocence is getting blurred and risks losing its contours. I therefore suggest to keep separate matters separate. The presumption of innocence in the narrow sense that I suggest applies only where there exists a suspicion that an individual has committed a criminal offence. The important function of the presumption of innocence in that situation is to prevent an over-extension of state power against the individual under suspicion before that suspicion has been confirmed to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. A general presumption that all people abide by the law at all times is neither warranted nor necessary. It is not warranted because experience tells us that many people break some laws sometimes. And it is not necessary because a system of civil liberties is sufficient to protect us against official or social overreach based on a suspicion that we may commit crimes.

In my response to Duff I focus mainly on the following two issues. Firstly, I examine what kind of a norm the presumption of innocence (PoI) really is and how it ontologically differs from other types of rules, principles, rationales, etc. My tentative conclusion is that a PoI does not suffice the requirement of being a dogmatic rule and, thus, has less weight than what Duff perhaps assumes.
Secondly, I examine what role the concept of innocence plays in the debate on fundamental (moral and legal) principles and the underlying rationales of a criminal law system. Although I am sympathetic to much of what Duff purports in his plea for civic trust and a parsimonious use of criminal law, I am reluctant to believe that it is really a broader version of a PoI that warrants the kind of morally decent criminal law system that he suggests normatively ought to be. In my view, most of what Duff wants to ascribe to the PoI can be derived from a principle of fairness which, in my view, is already embedded in the fundamentals of criminal law doctrine.

This paper explores the roles that the presumption of innocence (PoI) can play beyond the criminal trial, in other dealings that citizens may have with the criminal law and its officials. It grounds the PoI in a wider notion of the civic trust that citizens owe each other, and that the state owes its citizens: by attending to the roles that citizens may find themselves playing in relation to the criminal law (such roles as suspect, defendant, convicted offender and ‘ex-offender’), we can see both how a PoI protects us, beyond the confines of the trial, against various kinds of coercion, and how that PoI is modified or qualified as we acquire certain roles. To develop and illustrate this argument, I pay particular attention to the roles of defendant (both during the trial and while awaiting trial) and of ‘ex-offender,’ and to the duties that such roles bring with them.

This study examined the prevalence and predictors of male inmates’ mental health problems. Data were used from the Prison Project, a longitudinal study in which 824 prisoners were surveyed twice (three weeks and three months after arrival in prison). Compared with the general population, inmates reported significantly more psychological problems. Except for depressive symptoms, inmates’ mental health problems decreased over time. After controlling for prior mental health problems and a number of import factors, we found that those who shared a cell in the first weeks of their imprisonment and held more positive judgments regarding daytime activities and the relationships with staff, reported fewer psychological problems after three months. Those who were verbally abused by prison staff during their first weeks in prison reported more psychological problems after three months.

Until approximately 1995, the Netherlands had a very low prison rate compared to the surrounding countries. David Downes, who made a comparison between the Dutch and the British penal policy, choose as a title for his book: Contrasts in Tolerance. He attributed the differences between England & Wales and the Netherlands, partly to the tolerant culture in the Netherlands compared to England & Wales (Downes, 1985: 69 e.v.). What exactly did he mean by tolerance in this context and in how far can this characteristic of Dutch penal policy explain the recent downfall of the Dutch prison population.

In 1870 in the Netherlands the death penalty was replaced by the sanction nearest to that effect: lifelong imprisonment. For the government though this penalty was acceptable only in connection with the possibility of mercy. The sanction was to be executed humanely and should not result in torture. The way the sanction was executed since, the administration developed a policy of mercy taking into account the devastating effects of the sanction. This policy resulted in mental care for the convicted and his release after approximately twenty years imprisonment. More than hundred years later, about 2004, the policy of mercy changed. Since then, according to the responsible ministers, life imprisonment should end by the onset of death. In this article the practice under the old and the new policy is illustrated by a case study. The conclusion is that like the death penalty lifelong imprisonment corrodes the prestige of the State.

Life imprisonment is difficult to define. Sentences that are not called life imprisonment may also be indefinite sentences of detention which may result in the detention of offenders in prison until they die there. Even where a sentence is called ‘life imprisonment’ it may be difficult to ascertain for how long the offender will actually be held and what criteria will be applied to considering his eventual release. This paper sketches some recent developments in respect of indeterminate sentences that are not called life imprisonment, even though they amount to it in practice. It then turns to the question of life sentences that are imposed without provision for any fixed period after which they should be reconsidered. Questions are raised about the extent to which such sentences are acceptable in Europe, the United States and elsewhere, particularly in instances where at sentence there is an indication that the offenders may not be considered for release at all. It is argued that human rights law is moving towards requiring that all persons sentenced to life imprisonment should have a reasonable prospect of release. Given the widespread support for life imprisonment this paper seeks to raise some human rights concerns that arise with the use of this sentence. The concerns are essentially twofold. First, the sentence may be imposed in instances where it would be disproportionate punishment to do so. Secondly, the procedures for its implementation, in particular those that relate to the potential release of persons serving life sentences, may not be adequate to meet the requirement of a realistic prospect of release.

In principle a Dutch life sentence is served in full. ‘Lifers’ can benefit from executive clemency. However, over the last 26 years clemency has been applied so sparingly as to call into question whether clemency for ‘lifers’ is a real possibility at all. Recently the European Court of Human Rights has refined its case-law on the compatibility of life sentences with Art. 3 ECHR, in the national context as well as in the context of extradition. This contribution discusses whether under Article 3 ECHR the Dutch practice of executing life sentences in full acts as a bar to extradition or surrender of a person who faces the imposition and/or execution of a life sentence in the Netherlands.

This article provides an overview of the development of the prerogative of mercy. From the outset, the king (now: the Crown) is empowered with this prerogative and the judiciary is appointed as an advisory institution. The author focused on this judicial advisement in the procedure of pardon. First the different competent advisory courts are outlined. Initially, the highest court of justice was the only competent advisory body. For practical reasons the task was eventually shifted to the judge who imposed the sentence. Secondly, the impact and meaning of the advice are valued by researching sixteen pardon cases. In approximately half of the cases the judicial advisement was acknowledged by the Crown. In six of the sixteen studied pardon cases the Crown deviated from the judicial advisement in favour of the convict. According to the author, these deviations are in line with the policy of pardon of the last century.

This article focuses on the ‘de iure’ and ‘de facto’ possibilities in Dutch penal law to reduce a life sentence. The question is whether the current legal framework offers sufficient perspective to life prisoners as required by the European Court of Human Rights. It also addresses the disadvantages of the current procedures. The authors argue that it is desirable that a legal possibility for release on probation of life prisoners is introduced in the Netherlands. They will set out a bill written by the NGO ‘Forum Levenslang’ that would make this possible.

Though small in numbers life and long-term prisoners pose special problems for the Dutch prison administration in terms of their treatment. A new approach is to concentrate these prisoners in three units specially designated for them. It is still unclear however what the regime in those facilities will look like. The author argues for introducing there a ‘compensatory regime’ that can counteract to some degree the harmful effects of life and long-term imprisonment.

This essay examines imprisoned felons’ perspectives and interpretations of ‘doing life’. Prisoners’ and ex-prisoners’ perspectives on the pros and cons of life imprisonment were documented over four decades of ethnographic research in prisons and on urban streets. The author’s research was conducted as a participant observer of street criminals and observing participant in federal prisons. Interviews with violent convicted felons in state and federal prisons and persistent criminals with histories of imprisonment reveal what it means to ‘do time’. Prisoners’ enculturation accommodates their adjustment to prison life and ability to negotiate daily prison life, but prison culture’s and prison programs’ inability to alter the nature of violent criminals pose a continuous threat to the population at large. Life imprisonment benefits prisoners’ physical and social health and protects communities by keeping violent criminals imprisoned.

A comparison between life prisoners and long-term forensic psychiatric inpatients shows, besides differences in legal position, important similarities. Therefore the results of an experiment with regime changes in the long-term ward of Dutch forensic psychiatric institutions might also be relevant for the regime of life prisoners. The experiments are partly based on the ideas of Andrews, Ward and Bonta. The fundamental idea is to give inpatients a sense of control over their life environment by granting them as much responsibility as possible for practicalities, by communicating with their representatives regularly and taking a positive attitude towards inpatients’ preferences and requests. First experiences show that the new approach seems to have a positive impact on inpatients. They suffer less from depression as well as aggressive moods, which contributes to a better atmosphere in the institution. Stressing the tentative nature of this observation the author indicates that the hypothesis on the beneficial effects of active influence on the life environment might be verified by research currently in progress.