This is the second part of the revised translation of ‘Understanding sharia in the West’ that was published in the Journal of Law, Religion and State 2018, 6, p. 236-273. The first part of the translation appeared in Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 2019, 3, p. 17-31.

The notion of ‘sharia in the West’ is by now fairly well established, both in social, political and scientific circles, but both the terms ‘sharia’ and ‘West’ remain difficult to define. It is therefore striking that the combination of these two terms is used with such self-evidence. This article wants to answer the question: what exactly is the sharia that Western Muslims arguably want, and how is this sharia received in the West? To this end, a model is presented that provides a description of the complex interaction between sharia as practiced by Western Muslims on the one hand, and the conditions that the Western environment sets for it on the other. The model shows that ‘sharia’ cannot be compared to a law system, and that the Western environment has a major influence on the extent and ways in which Muslims apply sharia. From a Western perspective, the model shows that sharia issues are mainly discussed in legal terms, while most controversies are not of a legal nature, but rather a cultural one.

In the ruling on Lachiri/Belgium, commentators discern a new development in the ECHR’s jurisprudence on the relationship between the headscarf and freedom of religion. According to the author, that is not the case: in fact, he observes a continued bias of the Court towards the headscarf.

The decision of the Court that Muslims from the Greek province of West Thrace can choose in matters of family law between civil or Islamic law, is not surprising. However, much can be said about the way in which the Court came to that conclusion. Because in doing so it uses principles and considerations that show a lack of insight in the status and functioning of a unique legal system, namely that of interpersonal law, or the coexistence on equal basis of several family laws. Similarly, the Court seems biased towards Islamic family law, which it consistently refers to as ‘sharia’. A critical discussion of this judgment is therefore appropriate.

Illegal weed cultivation is increasingly perceived as an important societal problem. Most of existing research in this area focuses on the criminal organisations active on the cannabis market and the criminal profits that are gained here. The current study however focuses on the actors at the bottom of the cannabis market – the home growers – and aims at answering the following research question: what factors influence the chance of encountering an illegal weed cultivation at a certain residential address? In this study, the risk and protecting factors are taken into consideration on both the individual level (e.g. family composition and financial position of residents) and the neighbourhood level (e.g. social cohesion, physical disorganisation, level of criminality in a certain neighbourhood). In the current study, data of 401 illegal hemp cultivation sites discovered between 2011 and 2016 in homes in Eindhoven, the Netherlands, were analysed. Data from various quantitative data sources – like municipal data (BRP and data from the Social Domain) and data from the municipal neighbourhood monitors – were combined and analysed through a multilevel logistic regression. The results suggest that the likelihood of an illegal weed cultivation site is most prominently influenced by individual factors. Being married for instance seems to decrease the risk, whereas being divorced seems to increase the risk. The housing type also turns out to be of influence. On a neighbourhood level, physical disorganisation and the presence of other hemp cultivation sites in the neighbourhood are the only predictors for hemp cultivation. The results are discussed in the light of criminological theories regarding participation in crime, using the theoretical concepts motivation, opportunity, and control.

When we consider a ‘court’ a judicial institution recognized by the state that renders judgment based on law recognized by the state, then the only ‘sharia courts’ to be found in Europe are located in the eastern province of Greece. Their jurisdiction is limited to Islamic family law, but a recent case before the European Court of Human Rights has rekindled the discussion on the scope of this jurisdiction, and opened the discussion on the desirability of such courts in a European country. This article presents an analysis of this discussion, based on literature study and fieldwork in the region.

The question central to this article is whether ‘Islam’ and human rights are compatible and, if not, whether there might be room to come to a minimum standard of human rights that can be shared globally. This article will demonstrate that, from the perspective of Islamic orthodoxy, principles that are fundamental to human rights, like equality and freedom of religion, pose unsurmountable problems, and the adjustment of these principles is theologically nearly impossible. However, a growing number of Muslim intellectuals holds the opposite view, using new theological methods to argue that these Islamic principles and human rights are compatible. Although they are warmly welcomed by human rights lawyers and activists, their methods are not uncontroversial, and they are still very small in number.

Two new rulings by the European Court of Human Rights confirm earlier jurisprudence regarding the ‘burqa ban’, as such ban is justified on the basis of the principle of ‘living together’. Still, two points stand out in these rulings that need discussion. The first is that this is an example of how the Court applies its new ‘qualitative, democracy-enhancing approach’ that pays more consideration to domestic decision-making in the field of human rights. These rulings show the flipside of this laudable endeavour, however, as the Court sees no reason to evaluate, let alone critically assess, the outcome of these domestic decision-making processes. Second, the remarkable ‘concurring opinion’ by the president of the ruling judges, in which he states in very stern wordings that the ruling should not be considered a cart blanche for burqa bans elsewhere. Given the elaborate considerations why such ban would not be admissible, it is surprising that the Court has failed to elaborate why the burqa bans in France and Belgium are admissible.

The term ‘Judeo Christian civilization’ dates from the second half of the twentieth century, but has of recent gained in popularity with politicians and policy makers. It seems to be no coincidence that this has a direct correlation with the debates on the position of Islam in Europe. This article is a critical assessment of the meanings of the various elements of this term: what is so Christian about European civilization, what is Judaism’s part therein, and what role does the Islam play? It is notable that one often considers this Judeo Christian ‘culture’ or ‘civilization’ as an uninterupted historical proces, while the second half of the twentieth century shows a clear rupture when it concerns values or the experience of religion. Also remarkable is that one often fails to make the differentiation between religion as a theological cult and as a culture carrier, or between the principles and the practice of a religion. As a consequence, the term ‘Judeo Christian civilization’ or ‘culture’ is being used in a very sloppy or selective manner, often with the purpose to exclude Islam.

Islamic scripture provides no definition of the caliphate and the term ‘Islamic state’ was coined for the first time in 1941. Pakistan and Iran call themselves an ‘Islamic republic,’ and ISIS has named itself an ‘Islamic State’ headed by a caliph. For many Muslims the term represents an ideal of a society that is just, peaceful and prosperous. That looks more like a utopian dream. So what is this Islamic state exactly? In this article we will answer that question by means of three approaches: the tenets of Islam, the historical and modern reality, and the wishes of the modern Muslims.

Het omzetten van schuld in aandelenkapitaal, of een debt for equity swap, kan een manier zijn om een onderneming succesvol financieel te herstructureren. In deze bijdrage wordt ingegaan op de mogelijkheden voorschuldeisers om buiten insolventie de zittende aandeelhouder te dwingen medewerking te verlenen aan een omzetting van schuld in aandelenkapitaal.