The author first describes the deontological axioma for the role of the defense counsel in the domain of criminal procedure. Since here the most serious charges are brought against a suspect, who may have all his life-perspectives to lose by severe punishments, the duty of the legal counsel is to be as one-sided in the defense of his clients views and interests as possible and as allowed by professional ethics. He is the guardian of the legitimate interests of the suspect in the context of a legal battle in or out of court about the legal truth of what is said to have happened. In view of the ideals of restorative justice (illustrated by references to Nils Christies Conflicts as property) a new set of rules and customs should be developed that can function as a framework of ‘restorative procedural law’. In the context of restorative justice legal counsel of both the suspect and the victim should be expected and able to function much more as ‘restorative coaches’, seeking co-operation and deliberation between all stakeholders. But, should clients – suspects and victims alike – decide against such an approach and want ‘their day in court’ this should also be possible and be realised. The independent courts should always remain the ultimate refuge for those seeking justice.

In this contribution the author reviews Probleemoplossend strafrecht en het ideaal van responsieve rechtspraak by Suzan Verberk.

The author discusses the proposals done by Richard Korver, a Dutch victim-solicitor, with regard to the legal position of the victim in the Dutch penal procedure. They amount to making the victim a fully equipped party to the procedure with – as it were – the same arms as the offender and his solicitor has. These proposals include an autonomous right to appeal against the verdict in first instance, a right to make a victim statement of opinion, the right to rebuke the bench, and the right to be heard in almost every procedural and substantial decision of any authority in the penal process and in the execution of punishment. The authors comment is that these proposals, when realized, will imply an intensification of the polarized legal debate in the penal procedure, with more risks of secondary victimization. The problem is not that the defendant will oppose two prosecutors, but that the victim will find the public prosecutor not on his side when the latter does his job as he should: serving the interests of justice. The inquisitorial procedure does allow for participation of victims, but only in so far as this participation can serve the interests of establishing the truth of the matter and determining proportionate and equal punishment. Meanwhile the risk of instrumentalising the victim and his needs in interests in punitive strategies exists. Restorative practices offer a much better context for an assertive victim to defend his interests and satisfy his needs, staying out of a debate in which the measure of punishment functions as the yardstick of his suffering. Regular civil law procedures could be the second option and criminal procedures should be relegated again to their rightful place as ultima ratio.

This article gives a complete and detailed overview of research evaluations and outcomes of restorative justice projects in the Netherlands over the past decades. It involves developments where clearly restorative justice inspiration was visible. The author describes restorative practices with juveniles and the so-called project ‘Herstelbemiddeling’ (restorative mediation) that started in the nineties. Most evaluations had positive outcomes, but nevertheless there was no continuation from the political side. The author also examines the introduction of the country wide ‘victim-offender conversations’ which are carried out by the national victim support organization. Although this choice is justified because of the vulnerability of some victims and the chance of revictimisation, the author questions if victim organizations can really - in the best interests of the victims – turn away from problems related to the (hardened) treatment of offenders. Victim-offender conversations are to be respected and to be continued, but they cannot be seen as a restorative justice practice.

Blad responds to Groenhuijsen by showing how political decisions in the Netherlands, after successful experiments with restorative justice for juveniles and adults, were based on the belief that criminal justice would lose its punitive foundation and tenor when restorative justice practices would become integrated in the justice system. Criminal justice should not be about resolving conflicts between victims and offenders and the type of mediation, that could lead to an agreement as an important element to be considered in sentencing, was therefore rejected. In so far as restorative justice ideology took influence, it seems to have been a misconception of restorative justice as merely a new form of penal abolitionism. The fact that restorative justice does not deny the legitimacy of the provisions in the substantive criminal law and that all important restorative projects co-operate with criminal justice agencies was apparently ignored. Against the background of the dominant political culture of ‘punitive populism’ and intensified use of severe punishments it seems highly unlikely that abandoning the ambition to develop a restorative justice paradigm would further the implementation of restorative justice.

The author notes that the growth of restorative justice practices seems to be hampered by the consequences of the effective socialization into the ‘penal equation’ that presents punishment as the necessary consequence of criminal offending. Upbringing in a different conflict-culture may be a fundamental condition for creating more room for restorative justice in the formal sphere of criminal justice. The need for a different socialization is also noted and discussed in the movement for human rights and has resulted in an Action Plan for human rights education of UNESCO in 2005. A satisfactory implementation of this action plan seems to be absent in the Netherlands today and methods of human rights education do not refer at all to the potentials of restorative practices such as peer mediation in schools. On the other hand, authors in restorative justice do not often refer to human rights and how they are promoted. The author claims that it is plausible that making ample room for peer mediation and conferencing in schools can be an effective way, not only to address offending conduct that often implies a breach of basic human rights – the most basic values therein being human dignity and equality – but also to make new generations aware of the meaning of human rights in their daily interactions and the qualities of their own social life.