Het stelsel van jeugdbescherming krijgt veel aandacht. In dit artikel wordt specifiek stilgestaan bij innovatie, de totstandkoming hiervan en hoe deze innovatie leidt tot overwegingen voor een volgende stap richting de toekomst van jeugd- en gezinsbescherming.

Few legal theorists today would argue that the domain of law exists in isolation from other normative spheres governing society, notably from the domain of ‘politics’. Nevertheless, the implicit norm that judges should not act ‘politically’ remains influential and widespread in the debates surrounding controversial court cases. This article aims to square these two observations. Taking the Miller v. Secretary of State and Urgenda cases as illustrative case studies, the article demonstrates that what it means for judges to adjudicate cases ‘apolitically’ is itself a matter of controversy. In reflecting on their own constitutional role, courts are forced to take a stance on substantive questions of political philosophy. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the ‘norm of judicial apoliticality’ should therefore be rejected. The norm’s coherence lies in its intersocial function: its role in declaring certain modes of judicial interpretation and intervention legitimate (‘legal’/‘judicial’) or illegitimate (‘political’).

Wat is de te verwachten impact van de coronavirusuitbraak op de ontwikkeling van het EU-gezondheidsrecht en -beleid? Wat kunnen we verwachten in de toekomst van de rol van de EU in de bestrijding van grensoverschrijdende ziekten?

Criminology, as an inherently interdisciplinary field, has built on anthropology (and other social sciences) in its development. This contribution addresses the question which insights in criminology have most been inspired by anthropology. First, it looks into the ‘criminal anthropology’ of Lombroso; then it embarks on an appreciation of the ethnographic research design within criminology (as first adopted by the Chicago School); and, finally, it assesses the link between anthropology, and cultural and global criminology. I conclude that anthropology has been valuable to our discipline on four levels: methodologically (in the importance of the ethnographic research design), theoretically (in its role in the development of symbolic interactionism and structuralism, for example), geographically (in the global scope of anthropological research), and analytically, in its experience with ‘doing ethnography’ in economically, politically and culturally embedded ways.

Claims have been made that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is more lenient in accepting age discriminating measures affecting older people than in those affecting younger people. This claim is scrutinised in this article, first, by making a quantitative analysis of the outcomes of the CJEU’s case law on age discrimination cases, followed by a qualitative analysis of the line of reasoning of the CJEU in these cases and concluding with an evaluation of the Court’s reasoning against three theoretical approaches that set the context for the assessment of the justifications of age discrimination: complete life view, fair innings argument and typical anti-discrimination approach. The analysis shows that the CJEU relies more on the complete life view approach to assess measures discriminating old people and the fair innings argument approach to assess measures discriminating young people. This results in old people often having to accept disadvantageous measures and young workers often being treated more favourably.

Confessional secrecy is inviolable under Catholic canon law, and violations of it are severely sanctioned. Some people see this secret as an obstacle to the legal process in society and advocate a limitation in its use. This article argues that this form of confidentiality also can be defended in civil law because of the protection of spiritual care. Confessional secrecy is analyzed here and compared with forms of official secrecy that are recognized in society. Finally, there is a plea for a clear legal framework for the application of this confessional secret by Catholic priests.

Het gebeurt regelmatig dat de opdrachtgever van een bankgarantie probeert uitbetaling door de bank te beletten, maar deze pogingen zijn zelden succesvol. Naar aanleiding van een aantal recente uitspraken, waarin de opdrachtgever wél succes had, wordt in deze – in twee delen te verschijnen – bijdrage aan de hand van een systematische behandeling van rechtspraak en literatuur ingegaan op rechtsmaatregelen die de opdrachtgever kan nemen.

Met de inwerkingtreding van de Wet normalisering rechtspositie ambtenaren op 1 januari 2020 hebben de meeste overheidssectoren de overstap gemaakt naar het cao-stelsel. De Ambtenarenwet 2017 bevat geen wettelijke grondslag meer voor een regeling ter beslechting van collectieve arbeidsconflicten. In de ambtelijke cao’s keert de (Lokale) Advies- en Arbitragecommissie (AAC) terug in de vorm van een derdeninterventieclausule. In deze bijdrage wordt ingegaan op de rol van de AAC voor en na 1 januari 2020, mede in het licht van de wijze waarop derdeninterventie bij cao-conflicten gestalte heeft gekregen in de marktsector. Ook wordt de vraag gesteld of de wijze waarop een voorziening ter beslechting van collectieve arbeidsgeschillen is verwezenlijkt, invloed heeft op het collectief actierecht. Daarbij spreekt de auteur een sterke voorkeur uit voor (her)invoering van een wettelijke grondslag voor een geschillenregeling voor sectoren die essentiële diensten leveren, zowel in de publieke als in de private sector.

Op 21 februari 2020 wees de Hoge Raad een tweetal beschikkingen waarin de vraag naar de mogelijkheid van gedeeltelijke ontbinding en het toetsingsmoment van ontbindingsbeschikkingen in hoger beroep centraal stond. Op beide punten was nadere richting gewenst. De Kolom-beschikking kon vermoeden dat een belangrijke stap gezet was richting de mogelijkheid van een gedeeltelijke ontbinding. Niets blijkt minder waar, getuige het oordeel in de Victoria-beschikking, of toch…? Ook de vraag naar het toetsingsmoment van ontslagzaken in hoger beroep heeft de gemoederen beziggehouden. De Hoge Raad komt niet tot een uniform antwoord. Gaat het om een afgewezen ontbindingsbeschikking, dan is de toetsing in hoger beroep ex nunc; gaat het om een toegewezen ontbindingsbeschikking, dan is de toetsing ex tunc. Deze bijdrage onderwerpt de twee beschikkingen aan een nadere analyse.

De waarheidsplicht komt in procedures steeds vaker aan de orde, ofwel omdat een partij om sanctionering ervan vraagt, dan wel omdat de rechter ambtshalve oordeelt dat sanctionering nodig is. Deze bijdrage behandelt de ontwikkelingen aan de hand van de typen gevolgtrekking die rechters sinds 2014 aan schendingen hebben verbonden.

Citizens investigating crimes themselves is a growing trend, because of democratization of information (e.g. social media), tools (e.g. apps) and knowledge (e.g. explanimations on YouTube). More and more citizens do their own research as modern Sherlocks. The police has to handle these trends in line with participant wishes and the law, but does not yet have concrete tools to do so. This article explores how the police participate in contemporary citizen criminal investigations, including the difficulties and benefits experienced. The obtained insights of the presented research serve as guidance, which can help police officers understand how to participate with citizens who have started, or want to start, a criminal investigation. The presented model explains how police can use it to better guide and stimulate, but also stop or protect citizens in their investigative activities. An app with professional guidance was piloted in four police units to participate with citizens that do their own research and learn from expectations and experiences. Citizens need guidance, but more importantly expect a certain degree of reciprocity in collaborating with police in criminal investigations.

Dit artikel behandelt de positie van de zekerheidshouder na herstructurering van de groep vennootschappen waartoe de zekerheidsgever(s) behoort (behoren). Herstructurering kan leiden tot wijziging van de kredietovereenkomst, tot een ‘wijziging’ van de schuldenaren of zekerheidsgevers (door bijvoorbeeld fusie of splitsing), of tot een herschikking van de goederen binnen de groep. Vanuit kosten-, tijds- en juridisch oogpunt vermijdt zowel de zekerheidshouder als de zekerheidsgever bij voorkeur dat zekerheden hergevestigd moeten worden. De auteur bespreekt of, en in welke gevallen, hervestiging nodig of gewenst is in het geval van wijziging van de kredietovereenkomst, fusie, splitsing of omzetting van een zekerheidsgever, schuldoverneming en overdracht van goederen binnen de groep.

In this article we elaborate on the place of religion in the workplace. Does the individual freedom of religion imply that employers must always accommodate the religious claims of employees or can they boast a number of arguments allowing them to legitimately limit that freedom? And, conversely, do employers not also have a right to freedom of religion and a right to formulate certain religious expectations for their employees? In this contribution, we deal with these and related questions from a legal-philosophical perspective. The overall aim is to illustrate the extent to which univocal answers are jeopardized because of conceptual ambiguities. We first make a normative distinction between two strategies (i.e. difference-blind approach and difference-sensitive approach) and subsequently illustrate and elaborate on how and why these strategies can lead to different outcomes in legal cases. We illustrate the extent to which a contextual and proportional analysis can be a way out in theoretical and practical conundrums.

Increasingly often, it is stated that the universal values underpinning Western liberal democracies are a product of a ‘Judeo-Christian’ tradition. This article explores the legitimacy of this claim from the perspective of liberal-democratic theory. It argues that state-endorsed claims about the historical roots of liberal-democratic values are problematic (1) if they are promoted as though they are above democratic scrutiny and (2) if they insinuate that citizens who belong to a particular (majority) culture remain the ‘cultural owners’ of the core values underpinning the state. More pragmatically, the paper suggests that the claim carries the risk of failing to facilitate all citizens becoming or remaining committed to nurturing fundamental rights and a shared society based on norms of democratic equality.

In countries like Belgium and The Netherlands, there seems to be overwhelming public acceptance of transplantation and organ donation. Yet, paradoxically, part of the public refuses post-mortal donation of their own organs or of those of family members. It is customary within the transplantation context to accept the refusal of organ donation by family members “in order to accommodate their feelings”. I argue that this attitude does not take seriously what is really behind the refusal of donation by (at least some) family members. My hypothesis is that even in very secularized societies, this refusal is determined by cultural-symbolic attitudes vis-à-vis the (dead) human body (and some of its parts). The blind spot for this reality, both in the practice of and discussions around organ donation, prevents understanding of what is producing the paradox mentioned.

In this article the question is reviewed whether two by the EU Commission proposed financial instruments to stimulate ‘green’ ship scrapping, (i) a Ship Recycling Fund (SRF) and (ii) a Ship Recycling License (SRL), might be qualified as a ‘tax’ under Article 192(2) TFEU. Qualification as such a “tax” would mean that the EU Commission can only introduce such a financial instrument with unanimity voting. The authors first explore the concept of ‘tax’ in the TFEU in general and in Article 192(2) TFEU in particular. Based on this analysis, the authors conclude that levies paid to an SRF might be qualified as an ‘earmarked tax’ falling within the definition of a ‘fiscal provision’ in the meaning of Article 192(2) TFEU, which means that levies to such a fund can only be introduced by unanimity voting. The SRL fee consists of two elements: (i) a fee to cover administrative expenses and (ii) a contribution to a savings account. The fee to cover administrative expenses is qualified by the authors as a retribution that should not be qualified as a fiscal provision in the meaning of Article 192(2) TFEU. The contribution to a blocked savings account can neither be qualified as a tax nor as a retribution. Therefore, the SRL fee can be introduced without unanimity voting by the EU Council.