The nexus between religion and law is an important subject of comparative law. This paper, however, finds that the majority of comparative theorists rely on the immanent frame; that legal legitimacy can and should be separated from any objective truth or moral norm. But the fact of the matter is many constitutional systems were founded based on a complicated mixture between the transcendent and immanent frame. Whereas in the immanent frame, human actions are considered self-constituting, in the transcendent frame, human actions were judged in light of their correspondence to higher, divine laws and purposes.
This article argues that it is not sufficient for comparative theorists to offer a perspective from the immanent frame. Comparative theorists in law and religion should understand at least basic religious doctrines and know how to systematize those doctrines. In other words, comparative theorist of law and religion should work within the transcendent frame. By using a transcendent frame, comparative theorists will be able to excavate the underlying structure of religion, and so they will understand better how theological ideas influence law. Furthermore, this paper will also present a thought experiment in applying the transcendent frame in comparative constitutional studies.

The Dutch universities founded in the 16th and 17th century were public state universities with theological faculties. During the 19th century the debate about the status of theology as an academic discipline resulted in the so-called duplex ordo arrangement: the public state university followed the design of religious studies and the ‘ecclesial chairs’ in the university (systematic and practical theology) followed a Christian perspective. In the last two decades a major shift has taken place: many faculties of theology were closed and new arrangements for the academic education of the ministry were created. This article describes these developments.

Een bekende uitzondering op het uitgangspunt van toezicht in twee feitelijke instanties is het appelverbod bij de ontbinding van de arbeidsovereenkomst. Krachtens art. 7:685 lid 11 BW kan tegen een ontbindingsbeschikking hoger beroep noch cassatie worden ingesteld. Dit roept vragen op met betrekking tot de rechtsbescherming van werknemers en werkgevers, mede gegeven de eisen die daaraan vanuit art. 6 EVRM gesteld kunnen worden. De auteur onderzoekt of het appelverbod in overeenstemming is met de voornoemde hogere norm en of eventuele misslagen in de ontbindingsbeschikking, ondanks het wettelijk appelverbod, hersteld kunnen worden. Aandacht wordt besteed aan de mogelijkheden van doorbreking van het appelverbod, herstel, herroeping en het leerstuk van de onrechtmatige rechtspraak. Onderzocht wordt of, en zo ja, voor welke gebreken in de ontbindingsbeschikking en de ontbindingsprocedure deze acties uitkomst kunnen bieden.

De kantonrechtersformule, welke formule wordt gebruikt voor het berekenen van de vergoeding bij ontbinding van de arbeidsovereenkomst, is herzien. In dit artikel wordt stilgestaan bij de grondslag van de ontbindingsvergoeding en de uitwerking van de nieuwe formule in de praktijk.