De coronapandemie in het voorjaar van 2020 had grote gevolgen voor de toegankelijkheid en kwaliteit van de gezondheidszorg. In dit artikel worden enkele thema’s vanuit een juridisch perspectief besproken: het verbod op contactberoepen, het tegengaan van ziekenhuisopnames en het selecteren van patiënten bij een tekort aan IC-bedden.

Van oudsher is in Nederland het vaccinatiebeleid bij jonge kinderen gebaseerd op vrijwilligheid. Onder meer naar aanleiding van een dalende vaccinatiegraad wordt er in toenemende mate voor gepleit in het vaccinatiebeleid elementen met een verplicht karakter op te nemen. Dit zien we ook terug in een wetsvoorstel dat de Tweede Kamer in februari 2020 aanvaardde. In deze bijdrage wordt de discussie over vrijwillig versus verplicht in kaart gebracht en besproken.

Increasingly often, it is stated that the universal values underpinning Western liberal democracies are a product of a ‘Judeo-Christian’ tradition. This article explores the legitimacy of this claim from the perspective of liberal-democratic theory. It argues that state-endorsed claims about the historical roots of liberal-democratic values are problematic (1) if they are promoted as though they are above democratic scrutiny and (2) if they insinuate that citizens who belong to a particular (majority) culture remain the ‘cultural owners’ of the core values underpinning the state. More pragmatically, the paper suggests that the claim carries the risk of failing to facilitate all citizens becoming or remaining committed to nurturing fundamental rights and a shared society based on norms of democratic equality.

Do religious motives result in greater freedom of action? This question cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. First of all, a distinction must be made between conduct that falls within the scope of the right to freedom of religion as opposed to other conduct. This distinction in turn needs some qualification. The aforementioned right can, after all, be restricted. The conduct in question could moreover fall within the purview of another fundamental right, as a result of which persons without religious motives are entitled to invoke another fundamental right. All these distinctions will be reviewed in this article. Special attention will be given to religiously motivated statements condemning homosexuality and the religiously motivated refusal to have children vaccinated.

In this article, we discuss a particular form of interdisciplinary legal research. We focus on a discipline that may be fruitfully combined with doctrinal research, namely philosophy. The aim of this article is to give an account of the methods of philosophy that are most relevant and useful for doctrinal legal scholars. Our focus is therefore mostly on legal philosophy and the philosophical subdisciplines closely related to it, such as political philosophy and ethics. We characterize legal philosophy in three complementary ways: as an activity, as insights, and as theories. We then discuss three methods of legal philosophy: argumentation analysis and construction, author analysis and reflective equilibrium. In the practice of research these three methods are usually combined, as we will show with various examples.

Al jaren daalt in Nederland de vaccinatiegraad, waardoor ziekten als mazelen en de bof opnieuw dreigen de kop op te steken. Om dit tegen te gaan zijn recent in de Nederlandse politiek twee meer verplichtende maatregelen voorgesteld. Dit artikel analyseert de juridische mogelijkheden en onmogelijkheden van deze voorstellen, met name in de context de van de grondrechten waarmee ze zouden kunnen botsen: artikel 2 EVRM (recht op leven), artikel 8 EVRM (onaantastbaarheid van het lichaam) en/of artikel 9 EVRM: (vrijheid van godsdienst en levensovertuiging) en het daaruit volgende Nederlandse gelijkebehandelingsrecht.

Some religious persons refuse to undergo certain medical treatments such as vaccinations or blood transfusions. They refuse treatment not only for themselves but for their children as well. Many fundamental rights may be at stake here: freedom of religion, the right to physical integrity and respect for family life on the one hand, and the duty of public authorities to provide for health care and defend children’s rights on the other. The main topic of this contribution is the extent to which the government is allowed to make certain treatments compulsory.

This paper is largely an endorsement and a further elaboration of Cohen’s critical discussion of the Hobby Lobby and Hosanna-Tabor cases and the conceptual overstretch of religious freedom they embody. I disagree with Cohen, however, on the proper interpretation of this debate. Cohen construes the ominous Court cases as an anti-liberal attack on the liberal state order. My main thesis is that the root of this dispute can be traced back to a fault line within liberalism between a more tolerance-leaning and a more equality-leaning tradition. I argue that the ominous cases are instances of the tolerance-leaning tradition in liberalism, which once was characteristic of the liberal tradition. Still, I agree with Cohen that this tradition should be rejected because it reverts to an obsolete interpretation of religious freedom that defends unwarranted privileges for certain groups that are out of sync with the egalitarian underpinnings of contemporary liberal political orders.

In deze bijdrage worden de resultaten gepresenteerd van een uitgebreid jurisprudentieonderzoek naar de wijze waarop religie en cultuur betrokken worden in de overwegingen van de rechter in familierechtelijke beslissingen over kinderen in Nederland. Naast een kwantitatief overzicht van de gepubliceerde jurisprudentie worden de uitspraken inhoudelijk ontsloten en geanalyseerd aan de hand van thema's zoals bloedtransfusies, cultuurverschillen en identiteitsontwikkeling, rituelen (besnijdenis en doop) en schoolkeuze. Bij de analyse wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen de rechten van het kind en de rechten van ouders, en wordt ingegaan op de vraag welke criteria de rechter hanteert voor de afweging van de rechten van het kind en diens ouders. Ook wordt besproken in hoeverre internationale normen herkenbaar zijn in de overwegingen van de rechter. Uit de 79 rechtszaken waarin de rechter overwegingen wijdt aan religie en cultuur, blijkt dat deze aspecten zowel positieve als negatieve effecten kunnen hebben op het belang van het kind en met name op de identiteitsontwikkeling van het kind. De rechter hanteert hierbij criteria zoals: schade voor de gezondheid van het kind, sociale aansluiting met anderen van dezelfde religieuze of culturele achtergrond, en praktische overwegingen.
This contribution presents the results of an extensive Dutch case law study on the way in which religion and culture play a role in the considerations of judges in family law decisions regarding children. In addition to a quantitative overview of the published case law in the Netherlands, the decisions are analysed on the basis of themes such as blood transfusion, culture differences and identity development, rituals (circumcision and baptism), and choosing a school. In the analysis, a distinction is made between the rights of the child and the rights of parents. Furthermore, the criteria which the judge deploys to balance the rights of the child and the rights of its parents are addressed. Finally, the extent to which international legal standards can be identified in the considerations of the judge is discussed. From the 79 cases in which the judge consider to religion and culture, it appears that these aspects can have both positive and negative effects upon the best interests of the child, and in particular upon the identity development of the child. In these cases, the judge uses criteria such as: harm to the health of the child, social connections with others of the same religious and cultural background, and practical day-to-day considerations.

This article analyzes the relation between law and citizenship on the basis of five modalities. This analysis is premised on the observation that citizenship plays a central role in the contemporary debate about the development of political communities. Furthermore it is obvious that citizenship is inextricably linked to law, but it is not easy to get a clear and complete picture of this link. This is due to, on the one hand, the versatility of the concept of citizenship, and the versatility of the phenomenon law on the other. In short, the relation between law and citizenship is multifaceted, which the typology of modalities is meant to reveal.

Citizenship is a notoriously complex and an essentially contested concept which has been defined in many different ways. The only stable element in all these definitions seems to be that citizenship is primarily described in terms of the relationship between the political community and the citizen. This article aims to explain why citizenship is such a contested concept by showing that it is embedded in three very different normative traditions: the liberal conception of citizenship as a (legal) status, the republican conception of citizenship as an activity and the communitarian conception of citizenship as identity. Each approach emphasizes an important element of citizenship, but none of the three is comprehensive enough to provide a complete picture of what citizenship implies in contemporary constitutional democracies. At the same time they cannot simply be merged because they come from different normative traditions among themselves at odds with each other.This article starts by illustrating the three conceptions of citizenship on the basis of the underlying theoretical models: liberalism, republicanism and communitarianism. Section 3 discusses two mutual tensions between different conceptions of citizenship: first between the liberal and republican conception and then between the liberal and republican conception on the one hand and the communitarian conception on the other. In Section 4, this conceptual analysis is used to analyze a policy terrain that is explicitly embedded in the idea of citizenship, namely the integration of immigrants through naturalization policy. Section 5 concludes.

The author argues that normative questions in social law are in need of a more philosophical approach. This is particularly true for the evaluation of Work-first arrangements. She proposes to evaluate workfare policies from the perspective of the reciprocity principle as it is deployed in the work of the liberal egalitarians John Rawls and Stuart White. While Rawls’ interpretation of the reciprocity principle seems to be at odds with Dutch jurisprudence on workfare policies, which allows for Work-first arrangements within the boundaries that are set by article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights (a prohibition on compulsory labor), White’s approach rather encourages work obligations for welfare recipients, on the condition that citizens acquire individual drawing rights on collective participation funds.

This article presents an overview of cyberwar from an international law perspective, in particular from the framework of the laws of war. It discusses some of the difficulties in applying these laws to cyberattacks, further complicated by the characteristics of the Internet. A distinction is made between cyberwar, -crime, -espionage and -terrorism, and the different fields of law that apply to these distinct ‘cyberevents’. Next to discussing several historic cyberattacks, the question is raised whether cyberwar is merely a hype or whether we should be taking this threat seriously. Rather than answering this question, the authors feel that the actual threat posed by ‘cyber’ is less important than the political and military prominence gained by this phenomenon in these past few years. The authors conclude by stating that a lot of work has yet to be done to address the issues raised by the occurrence of cyberwar.

Edwin Nijhof, book review of Roland Pierik en Wouter Werner, Cosmopolitanism in Context

For many legal scholars it goes without saying that legal and legal-philosophical theories originate in specific societal contexts and that this contextual character should always be taken into consideration. This implies, for example, that we should take the differences between the common law and civil law tradition seriously. This paper acknowledges the importance of such differences for legal analysis in general, but argues that this acknowledgement is less urgent for legal-philosophical analyses, since they primarily focus on what both traditions share, namely, a foundation in liberal-democratic principles.

(1) De auteur bespreekt het consultatiedocument houdende wijziging van het Besluit openbare biedingen Wft en een aantal andere recente wetgeving(sinitiatieven) met relevantie voor de openbare-overnamepraktijk.