This article adopts German philosopher Hans Vaihinger’s Philosophy of “as if” as a vehicle to sketch the main features of the emerging research domain of narrative victimology, as well as address some of its limitations. Vaihinger emphasizes the importance of useful untruths, i.e. things we know to be untrue, but nevertheless behave as if they are not, if that strengthens their use as instruments for us to find our way more easily in the world. This applies to our daily lives, but also to our societal institutions and the models and metaphors that underlie our approaches to (social) science. The paper argues that the narrative metaphor of the historical event is often more apt to enhance our understanding of victimological phenomena than that of the mechanism, which is the default metaphor of (social) science. The paper subsequently describes four areas of inquiry of narrative victimology: victimisation’s impact on (life) stories; narratives in the aftermath of victimization; narratives of victim’s experiences with justice processes and the coincidence and juxtaposition of the victims’ narrative with narratives of other significant parties. For all its merits however, the narrative metaphor is also a “useful untruth”, equipped with its own limitations, for instance the difficulty of language in describing first hand experiences of victims and the possibility that narrative structures will be imposed upon victim experiences.

Whereas the starting point of victimisation is clearly marked by a co-occurence of harm and wrong, the end of victimhood is not as straightforward. What is more, because victimisation is a social construct, the label of ‘victim’ is established in social interaction, meaning that third party observers have a role in the understanding of the (limits of) victimisation. In this article, I suggest that third party observers may understand attempts at restorative justice, more specifically, an apology, as an indicator of recovery of the victim. If this is true, they may expect the victim to decrease emotional display that signals victimisation after receiving an apology. If the victim continues to display similar signals of victimisation, this may result in negative victim-oriented responses. In an exploratory repeated measures vignette study, I show that third party observers evaluate the victim less positively after the victim received an apology than before they received this apology. The results imply that in understanding the (limits of) victimhood, we should consider the dynamics between victim and offender but also a broader circle of third-party observers. This is also important for restorative justice.