The article presents the status quo of the law of retrial in Germany and gives an overview of the law and practice of the latter in favour of the convicted and to the disadvantage of the defendant. Particularly, the formal and material prerequisites for a successful petition to retry the criminal case are subject to a detailed presentation and evaluation. Because no official statistics are kept regarding successful retrial processes in Germany, the actual number of judicial errors is primarily the subject of more or less well-founded estimates by legal practitioners and journalists. However, there are a few newer empirical studies devoted to different facets of the subject. These studies will be discussed in this article in order to outline the state of empirical research on the legal reality of the retrial procedure. Against this background, the article will ultimately highlight currently discussed reforms and subject these to a critical evaluation as well. The aim of the recent reform efforts is to add a ground for retrial to the disadvantage of the defendant for cases in which new facts or evidence indicate that the acquitted person was guilty. After detailed discussion, the proposal in question is rejected, inter alia for constitutional reasons.

In deze bijdrage wordt onderzocht in hoeverre het Nederlandse aansprakelijkheidsrecht is toegerust op toenemende autonomie van drones en verdergaande miniaturisering in dronetechnologie. Na korte uitleg van relevante luchtvaartwetgeving voor dronegebruik wordt ingegaan op de onrechtmatige daad en productaansprakelijkheid. Daarna wordt besproken in hoeverre het huidige stelsel van aansprakelijkheid aanpassing behoeft.

In dit artikel zijn de mogelijkheden van rechterlijke controle op de afdoening buiten geding in strafzaken onderzocht. Gepleit wordt voor een aparte raadkamerprocedure voor hoge en bijzondere transacties, waarbij toetsingscriteria werden ontleend aan de jurisprudentie van het EHRM en de internationale straftribunalen. De raadkamer toetst de overeengekomen transactie aan drie criteria. Ten eerste of de verdachte de transactie vrijwillig heeft geaccepteerd. Ten tweede of de verdachte voldoende geïnformeerd is over de procedurele gevolgen en over het bewijs dat tegen hem vergaard is. Ten derde toetst de raadkamer of er prima facie voldoende bewijsmateriaal in het dossier voorhanden is. Een door de raadkamer in het openbaar uitgesproken gemotiveerde beschikking maakt controle mogelijk op het overeenkomen van hoge en bijzondere transacties.

I argue that a compelling way to articulate what is wrong with racial profiling in policing is to view racial profiling as a violation of the presumption of innocence. I discuss the communicative nature of the presumption of innocence as an expression of social trust and a protection against the social condemnation of being undeservingly investigated, prosecuted, and convicted for committing a crime. I argue that, given its communicative dimension, failures to extend the presumption of innocence are an expression of disrespect. I take the New York Police Department’s stop-and-frisk policy as an example of racial profiling and argue that its use of race-based forms of suspicion as reasons for making stops is a violation of the presumption of innocence. I maintain that this systemic failure to extend the presumption of innocence to profiled groups reveals the essentially disrespectful nature of the NYPD policy.

In this article the German concept of accessory prosecution (Nebenklage) is discussed. The Nebenklage was implemented in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1877. It had merely an accessory function in conjunction with the private prosecution and the Klageerzwingungsverfahren, two legal institutions which had little practical relevance. Nowadays, in the course of the modern victim movement, the Nebenklage has radically changed into an instrument that is clearly provided as the main participatory option for victims interested in actively contributing to the trial of ‘their’ criminal. Previous research findings are outlined and the results of an explorative survey are presented. The findings suggest that the mere presence of the victim lawyer can significantly change the atmosphere in the courtroom, thus enhancing the willingness of the defence to treat the victim more respectfully.

In this response to my five critics, I note the strength of the arguments in favour of treating the presumption of innocence as a narrow, legal presumption that operates only within the criminal process; but I then try to make clearer my reasons for talking of different presumptions of innocence (moral, rather than legal, presumptions) outside the criminal process, in other contexts in which issues of criminal guilt or innocence arise – presumptions that guide or are expressed in the conduct of the state’s officials towards its citizens, and of citizens towards each other. Once we look at these other contexts in which criminal guilt and innocence (of past and future crimes) are at stake, we can see the importance of civic trust as a practical attitude that citizens owe to each other; and the fruitfulness of examining the various normative roles that citizens may have to play in relation to the criminal law.

Antony Duff proposes a comprehensive concept of the presumption of innocence, covering the period before, during and after a criminal process, both in an official (state vs. individual) and a non-official, civic sense. By that broad usage, the concept of presumption of innocence is getting blurred and risks losing its contours. I therefore suggest to keep separate matters separate. The presumption of innocence in the narrow sense that I suggest applies only where there exists a suspicion that an individual has committed a criminal offence. The important function of the presumption of innocence in that situation is to prevent an over-extension of state power against the individual under suspicion before that suspicion has been confirmed to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. A general presumption that all people abide by the law at all times is neither warranted nor necessary. It is not warranted because experience tells us that many people break some laws sometimes. And it is not necessary because a system of civil liberties is sufficient to protect us against official or social overreach based on a suspicion that we may commit crimes.