Door middel van een grootschalige digitale infiltratieoperatie werd de dark market ‘Hansa’ in 2017 door de Nederlandse politie en het Openbaar Ministerie opgerold. De politie maakte gebruik van de bevoegdheid die haar op grond van artikel 126h Sv toekomt: de ‘klassieke’ infiltratiebevoegdheid. Kan deze infiltratiebevoegdheid zonder meer worden aangewend in een digitale context, of klinkt in dat geval een roep om meer waarborgen?

In the aftermath of the 2007 global financial crisis, regulators have agreed a substantial tightening of prudential regulation for banks operating in the traditional banking sector (TBS). The TBS is stringently regulated under the Basel Accords to moderate financial stability and to minimise risk to government and taxpayers. While prudential regulation is important from a financial stability perspective, the flipside is that the Basel Accords only apply to the TBS, they do not regulate the shadow banking sector (SBS). While it is not disputed that the SBS provides numerous benefits given the net credit growth of the economy since the global financial crisis has come from the SBS rather than traditional banking channels, the SBS also poses many risks. Therefore, the fact that the SBS is not subject to prudential regulation is a cause of serious systemic concern. The introduction of Basel IV, which compliments Basel III, seeks to complete the Basel framework on prudential banking regulation. On the example of this set of standards and its potential negative consequences for the TBS, this paper aims to visualise the incentives for TBS institutions to move some of their activities into the SBS, and thus stress the need for more comprehensive regulation of the SBS. Current coronavirus crisis forced Basel Committee to postpone implementation of the Basel IV rules – this could be perceived as a chance to complete the financial regulatory framework and address the SBS as well.

In this article, the authors draw on a netnographic study conducted between May and July 2019 on phishing on Telegram Messenger. The results indicate that Telegram, just like cryptomarkets and online forums, seems to function as a criminal marketplace. In the groups analyzed the authors see users who both offer and are looking for specific goods and services related to the crime script of phishing. Furthermore, the information on Telegram contains specific modi operandi that are offering comprehensive and step-by-step guides to successfully complete specific financial cybercrimes. Therefore, based on this explorative study the authors argue that Telegram can be seen as a digital offender convergence setting.

This article relies on the premise that to understand the significance of Open Access Repositories (OARs) it is necessary to know the context of the debate. Therefore, it is necessary to trace the historical development of the concept of copyright as a property right. The continued relevance of the rationales for copyright interests, both philosophical and pragmatic, will be assessed against the contemporary times of digital publishing. It follows then discussion about the rise of Open Access (OA) practice and its impact on conventional publishing methods. The present article argues about the proper equilibrium between self-interest and social good. In other words, there is a need to find a tool in order to balance individuals’ interests and common will. Therefore, there is examination of the concept of property that interrelates justice (Plato), private ownership (Aristotle), labour (Locke), growth of personality (Hegel) and a bundle of rights that constitute legal relations (Hohfeld). This examination sets the context for the argument.

In 2019, the Dutch government presented a New Model Investment Agreement that seeks to contribute to the sustainability and inclusivity of future Dutch trade and investment policy. This article offers a critical analysis of the most relevant parts of the revised model text in order to appraise to what extent it could promote sustainability and inclusivity. It starts by providing an overview of the Dutch BIT (Bilateral Investment Treaty) programme, where the role of the Netherlands as a favourite conduit country for global FDI is highlighted. In the article, we identify the reasons why the Netherlands became a preferred jurisdiction for foreign investors and the negative implications for governments and their policy space to advance sustainable development. The 2019 model text is expressly set out to achieve a fairer system and to protect ‘sustainable investment in the interest of development’. While displaying a welcome engagement with key values of sustainable development, this article identifies a number of weaknesses of the 2019 model text. Some of the most criticised substantive and procedural provisions are being reproduced in the model text, including the reiteration of investors’ legitimate expectation as an enforceable right, the inclusion of an umbrella clause, and the unaltered broad coverage of investments. Most notably, the model text continues to marginalise the interests of investment-affected communities and stakeholders, while bestowing exclusive rights and privileges on foreign investors. The article concludes by hinting at possible reforms to better align existing and future Dutch investment treaties with the sustainable development goals.

De Commissie-Koops heeft onderzocht of het conceptwetsvoorstel Boek 2 voldoende rekening houdt met het digitale tijdperk anno 2018 en in de nabije toekomst. Dit artikel is een beschouwing op het rapport van de Commissie, waarbij de aanbevelingen met betrekking tot openbronnenonderzoek en het beslag op gegevensdragers uitgebreid besproken worden. Daarnaast wordt ingegaan op het fenomenen van de ‘dataficering’ van het opsporingsproces. In het artikel wordt antwoord gegeven op de vraag welke bijdrage het rapport heeft geleverd aan de modernisering van het Wetboek van Strafvordering.

Botnets, banking malware and other high-tech crimes are increasingly analyzed by criminological scholars. Their distributed and automated nature poses however various theoretical challenges. This article presents an alternative approach, denoted as the ‘cyborg crime’ perspective, which adopts a more hybrid view of networks and also assigns an active role to technology. The value of this approach is demonstrated by reflecting on findings from earlier empirical work that analyzes conversations between cybercriminals involved in botnets and related activities. The research shows that technological nodes can take an important position in the organizational structure of cybercriminal networks and do not merely have a functional role. Viewing technology as an actor within a criminal network might offer new criminological insights in both the composition of these networks and how to disrupt them.

In 2018 the Dutch parliament accepted new cybercrime legislation (the Cybercrime III Act) that creates several new online criminal offences and gives law enforcement agencies new investigative powers on the Internet. This article describes the background of Dutch cybercrime legislation and the contents of the Cybercrime III Act. The newly introduced cybercrimes are discussed as well as the new investigative competences. Particularly the legitimacy and the necessity of the investigative power of the police to hack computer systems of suspects may significantly interfere with the right to privacy.

In this article the authors present the lessons learned from previous research efforts into dark markets. First the important features of dark markets are discussed, i.e. anonymity and trust, as well as the question how data on dark markets can be collected. Next, the authors illustrate how this data can be used to study the phenomenon of dark markets itself as well as the impact of police interventions on dark markets.

Human traffickers are usually depicted in public discourse as evil villains: the crème de la crème of organized crime. Although this image has also been dominant among scholars for a long time, it has become increasingly controversial. On the one hand, this debate is fueled by discussions amongst criminologists on criminal networks, on the other hand by the expansion of the legal definition of the crime since 2005. Apart from exploitation in the prostitution sector, various other forms of human trafficking are distinguished now, including labor exploitation. This article explores the question of which organizational forms play a role in labor exploitation. Through a review of the empirical research literature on labor exploitation, the authors show that in the field of labor exploitation, there is probably less involvement in criminal syndicates or criminal networks that maintain contacts with other criminal networks. In many cases, labor exploitation is committed by individuals or family businesses, or smaller loosely organized networks that are not necessarily embedded in other criminal networks. For researchers and policy makers alike, it is therefore advisable not to approach labor exploitation exclusively from the perspective of transnational organized crime.

Generally, large listed companies and banks immersed in a ‘risk and win’-culture do not have to deal with ‘deprivation of resources’ which may trigger violations of the law. The anomie-theory of Merton does not seem to fit in this context. It is more obvious that the pressure to realize lofty ambitions is the trigger for potential violations of the law. I therefore work out a ‘post-Mertonian’ anomie-concept using the ‘European Durkheim’ to examine some excessive tendencies of an originally American ‘risk and win’-culture. The aim is to work towards an anomie-theory of power illusions that makes sense in the context of corporate crime. The leading question is: which anomic attitudes prevail in an over-ambitious corporate culture and which aspirations and rationalizations can be distinguished? It is argued that an approach focused on CEO-personality traits is too limited and that the sociological approaches of Durkheim and Shover offer many points of departure to construct a plausible anomie-theory. The dimensions of that theory have been taken from studies which focus at two criminogenic norm-systems: an ‘ethos of winning at any price’ and an ‘ethos of entitlement’.

Bitcoin is mede vanwege zijn anonieme karakter een populair betaalmiddel van criminelen geworden. In opsporingsonderzoeken van de FIOD en de politie komen de aan bitcoin gerelateerde fenomenen ‘de bitcoinhandelaar’ en ‘de bitcoinmixer’ in relatie met witwassen voor. Deze fenomenen worden uitgelegd in dit artikel. Het artikel eindigt met de drie nieuwe, door de FIU gevalideerde witwastypologieën over de aan- en verkoop van virtuele betaalmiddelen.

Criminal groups have traditionally been the focus of criminological research because of the collective dimension of many criminal activities or deviance. However, what constitutes a ‘criminal group’ or how specific criminal groups, like gangs, should be defined, remains open for discussion in the scientific literature. This introductory article highlights a number of recent developments illustrating the blurring boundaries between various criminal groups as defined by both insiders and outsiders. In addition, it suggests that the rise of social media and smartphones is changing the structure and dynamics of criminal groups. Future research should focus on how these (new) criminal groups originate, develop and function, but should also address the role of the group in criminal activities.

In this article notions from literature on covert and illegal networks are applied to business cartels. Comparable to most criminal networks, cartel participants need to communicate in order to coordinate their activities, whilst under the risk of getting caught. Previous studies however show cartels can remain hidden from outsiders for long periods of time. Based on an analysis of fourteen Dutch cartel cases, this article addresses the question how cartels can remain hidden from outsiders for long periods of time. The analysis shows cartel participants communicate predominantly centralized and frequent. Moreover, the results show that not concealment but social embeddedness provides a strong explanation for the longevity of secrecy regarding cartels.

The international tax system is the result of the interaction of different actors who share the responsibility for its integrity. States and multinational corporations both enjoy to a certain extent freedom of choice with regard to their tax behaviour – which entails moral responsibility. Making, interpreting and using tax rules therefore is inevitably a matter of exercising responsibility. Both should abstain from viewing tax laws as a bunch of technical rules to be used as a tool without any intrinsic moral or legal value. States bear primary responsibility for the integrity of the international tax system. They should become more reticent in their use of tax as regulatory instrument – competing with one another for multinationals’ investment. They should also act more responsibly by cooperating to make better rules to prevent aggressive tax planning, which entails a shift in tax payments from very expert taxpayers to other taxpayers. Here, the distributive justice of the tax system and a level playing field should be guaranteed. Multinationals should abstain from putting pressure on states and lobbying for favourable tax rules that disproportionally affect other taxpayers – SMEs and individual taxpayers alike. Multinationals and their tax advisers should avoid irresponsible conduct by not aiming to pay a minimalist amount of (corporate income) taxes – merely staying within the boundaries of the letter of the law. Especially CSR-corporations should assume the responsibility for the integrity of the tax system.