‘Illiberal’ is an adjective that is commonly used by scholars. For example, they might speak of ‘illiberal cultures’, ‘illiberal groups’, ‘illiberal states’, ‘illiberal democracies’, ‘illiberal beliefs’, and ‘illiberal practices’. Yet despite its widespread usage, no in-depth discussions exist of exactly what it means for someone or something to be illiberal, or might mean. This article fills this lacuna by providing a conceptual analysis of the term ‘illiberal practices’, which I argue is basic in that other bearers of the property of being illiberal can be understood by reference to it. Specifically, I identify five ways in which a practice can be illiberal based on the different ways in which this term is employed within both scholarly and political discourses. The main value of this disaggregation lies in the fact that it helps to prevent confusions that arise when people use the adjective ‘illiberal’ in different ways, as is not uncommon.

Terrorism can only be brought to an end if Islam and the Muslim community are enlisted as allies in combating it. Underlying militant jihadism is a violent interpretation of Islam which can best be challenged with the assistance of Islam and the Muslim community. Since the effects of the current state-led approach are questionable, while its criminal law component is close to exceeding the limits set by the rule of law and turns Muslims into a suspect community, it is important to test by way of a pilot whether an approach based on Islam can reap more promising results.

This article explores the intersection of two criminological perspectives—cultural criminology and narrative criminology. Taking inspiration from Mills and Fleetwood’s article, ‘Prepping and verstehen: A narrative criminological perspective’, where the authors contend that stories complement the pursuit of criminological verstehen, this article draws attention to other ways in which cultural criminology and narrative criminology are imbricated, taking notice of commonalities in cultural criminology’s analysis of media looping and narrative criminology’s identification of cycles of storytelling practice and lived experiences. A consideration of Donald Trump’s attempts to control narrative is used to develop an argument regarding cultural criminology’s and narrative criminology’s joint questioning of linear sequencing and mutual recognition of circulating fluidity

This article argues that it is legitimate for the state to practice soft paternalism towards changing hearts and minds in order to prevent behaviour that is discriminatory. Liberals accept that it is not legitimate for the state to intervene in order to change how people think because ideas and beliefs are wrong in themselves. It is legitimate for the state to intervene with the actions of a person only when there is a risk of harm to others and when there is a threat to social coexistence. Preventive action of the state is legitimate if we consider the immaterial and material harm that discrimination causes. It causes harm to the social standing of the person, psychological harm, economic and existential harm. All these harms threaten peaceful social coexistence. This article traces a theory of permissible government action. Research in the areas of behavioural psychology, neuroscience and social psychology indicates that it is possible to bring about a change in hearts and minds. Encouraging a person to adopt the perspective of the person who has experienced discrimination can lead to empathetic understanding. This, can lead a person to critically evaluate her prejudice. The paper argues that soft paternalism towards changing hearts and minds is legitimate in order to prevent harm to others. It attempts to legitimise state coercion in order to eliminate prejudice and broader social patterns of inequality and marginalisation. And it distinguishes between appropriate and non-appropriate avenues the state could pursue in order to eliminate prejudice. Policies towards eliminating prejudice should address the rational and the emotional faculties of a person. They should aim at using methods and techniques that focus on persuasion and reduce coercion. They should raise awareness of what prejudice is and how it works in order to facilitate well-informed voluntary decisions. The version of soft paternalism towards changing minds and attitudes defended in this article makes it consistent with liberalism.

This article critically examines the prospects of restorative justice in Brussels from the perspective of urban youth work. The insights issue from action research on the topic of ‘radicalisation’. The authors develop two arguments. The first tempers restorative optimism. It shows how restorative interventions are not necessarily the most adequate response to tensions and conflicts in urban settings. The second argument points out that resistance from urban youth workers regarding the implementation of restorative interventions should not be seen as a regrettable obstacle for academics who are eager to experiment with these interventions. Such a resistance can lead to new insights and fresh opportunities to radically rethink Restorative Justice. One of the ideas that the article brings to the surface comes down to this. In a city like Brussels, characterised by superdiversity, and clearly marked by social inequalities, academic researchers only gain credibility in initiating restorative interventions if they undeniably denounce these inequalities and fully express their engagement for social justice.

The first part of this article presents three academic theories on radicalisation: Moghaddam’s staircase model of radicalisation, Galtung’s typology of violence (direct, structural and cultural violence), and Staub’s psycho-educative approach. The core of Staub’s approach is that in conflict periods, people can be psychologically manipulated through their own fears, insecurities and unresolved traumas. Therefore, psycho-education and the empowerment of people are highly necessary to stimulate citizens to function as active bystanders when they are confronted with wrongdoing. In the second part of this article some promising approaches are pres­en‍ted which might increase personal and social resilience. The role of narratives in understanding experiences and changing identities is discussed. Radio La Benevolencija in Rwanda uses the power of storytel­l‍ing to stimulate resilience among the population. In the concluding paragraph a two-pronged strategy on radicalization is presented. This positive criminological perspective aims to promote active bystandership, participation and resilience.

Organizing restorative justice practices around crimes involving extremist violence remains a difficult task. It is not self-evident to bring perpetrators with very specific and radical ideas into contact with their victims. Nevertheless, interesting initiatives have been made in a number of European countries. In Spain, Italy and Northern Ireland, among others, initiatives were taken in response to the extremist violence that these countries experienced at the end of the 20th century. These initiatives have a very specific context and praxis, initiated ad hoc with attention to the specific needs of those involved. In no case can they be considered standard models or generalized practices. This contribution describes some of these initiatives in Spain, Italy and Northern Ireland and reflects on the potential uses of these dialogues in general.

In this article, some of the findings of a practice and policy oriented research project on ‘radicalisation’ are discussed. The research was carried out in a partnership between three Belgian universities and two field organisations during the years 2017-2019. The project aimed at a ‘Constructive analysis on the attitudes, policies and programmes that relate to “radicalisation”’ (CONRAD). Restorative justice offered the initial framework to design and to set up the project. This article offers some findings and reflections on the opportunities (and the limits) that were found in the project with respect to the relevance of restorative justice. This part of the research was done on the basis of a frame-analysis on the one hand, and field work on the other. The article first presents the restorative justice assumptions that formed the backbone of the project. Then, the method of ‘inductive frame-analysis’ is presented as this was applied to a sample of media and policy documents that reported about ‘radicalisation’ and ‘de-radicalisation’ related issues in Belgium. This resulted in the identification of four frames and eight counterframes. The field work in the form of ‘participatory action research’ with young persons and their organisations in the cities of Brussels and Verviers is then discussed, revealing a complex situation of social tensions. It is argued then that the use of frames and counterframes can help those involved in, or concerned about, social problems to look at these issues from another perspective, through another lens. Based on the method of photo-elicitation, cartoons related to frames and counterframes were designed in the project as a tool to facilitate talking about ‘radicalisation’ from different perspectives. The article ends with reflections on the relevance of restorative justice in dealing with ‘radicalisation’ and violent extremism. A broad relational and participatory approach to respond to these ‘phenomena’ at societal level is proposed.

This contribution advocates a fresh look at counteracting radicalization. Two frameworks are used for this. In the first place, that is the restorative justice that we have coined here as ‘making amends’. We need this normative framework because it provides clues for the prevention of ‘transgressing’ forms of radicalization, which can lead to extremism and terrorism. Secondly, we use an Activism of Hope framework, which states that we may and must resist social deprivation and injustice. After all, deprivation and injustice are the breeding ground for radicalization.

This article focuses on the ways the NVU, Pegida and Voorpost - three far-right groups from the Netherlands - make use of social media platforms in the year 2017. Our results show that these extreme right-wing groups use social media to spread their ideology, to construct a group identity, and to call for (democratic) forms of resistances. In addition, our findings illustrate that these far-right groups seem to adjust to their digital surroundings: they do not change or conceal their extremist ideas, but rather manage their online content to ensure that their ideologies can be disseminated through social media.

Attempting to understand the Greek narrative of crisis, this paper examines the most prominent forms of violence that emerged in the period of acute economic recession and political upheaval in Greece namely structural, institutional and anti-institutional violence. This paper aims to highlight existing theoretical gaps and avoid common fallacies of the current body of knowledge. In contrast to some of the more common features of the discussion on violence, this note sets out to: a) acknowledge that violence is not necessarily a physical act, b) acknowledge that the outcomes of violence performances might not be physical either, c) specify and adequately distinguish agency and structural dynamics and d) address the cultural and contextual aspects of violence. Vital to this endeavor is to acknowledge, identify and understand the interactive relation between different forms of violence that emerge during the same period of time in a context in which conflict escalates.

This article focusses on the question whether quantitative modelling and simulation is useful for judicial forecasting, ex-ante testing of judicial policies, and (re)designing chains of organisations like the judicial chain. Specific attention is given to methods that can be used in the face of complexity and deep uncertainty. That is, when facing many substantial uncertainties. Complexity and uncertainty are first of all focused on. Subsequently, modelling methods for dealing with complexity and uncertainty are discussed in more detail, examples are given, and the process needed to build such models in a participatory way is discussed.

Between 2013-2017 there were many ISIS videos circulating. It was generally assumed that these videos would encourage young Muslims to radicalize and join ISIS. But what do we actually know about the imaginary world of young people? Do sociological aspects such as the economic, cultural and religious background play a decisive role in this? Can we use the films and TV series that young people see as an entry into their imaginary world? To what extent can image analysis provide knowledge that contributes to safety issues? Commissioned by the Department of Counterterrorism, Radicalization and Extremism (CTER) of the Dutch National Police, the IVMV Foundation invited, in a comparative pilot study, twenty Dutch youngsters (10 with a Muslim background and 10 police students) to share their viewing experiences with five trailers (3 Hollywood, 1 Netflix, 1 not explicit violent ISIS video) that touched on the ISIS issue. This resulted in a research report and a film (in Dutch as well as in English) that was presented in November 2017 (De Mare et al. 2017a; De Mare 2017b). A remarkable result was that their viewing experiences and feelings showed a lot of similarity.

Extremism is a phenomenon that bothers various EU member states. It is difficult to define, and difficult to study. In this contribution we look at extremism from the perspective of the Dialogical Self Theory (DST). This theory is well-known in personality psychology. Recently is has got a development that could make it relevant for understanding, predicting and preventing extremism. The issue at stake is the relation between diversity, dialogue and democracy.

Terrorism could be regarded as an extreme type of (violent) criminal behaviour. Against this background, there is much to gain if criminological attention would be extended to terrorism. In this overview, the authors describe how and to what extent criminological theories may provide a significant contribution to underlying causes of terrorism. Previous criminological contributions to the field of terrorism have primarily taken a theory-extended approach, including routine activity theory, rational choice theory and strain theory. However, so far such studies lacked empirical data. Further, to this day, not much is known about the empirical applicability of other criminological theories, including desistance theories, which warrant particular attention. In order for criminology literature to contribute effectively to our understanding of terrorism and to pursue better counter-terrorism policies, empirical evidence should first be obtained. In this way, terrorism researchers, in close collaboration with criminologists, can deepen our theoretical and empirical understanding of this relatively underexplored field.

The present article examines the financial life of 131 jihadi travellers (JTs), also known as foreign terrorist fighters, from the Netherlands. For the purpose of the research, access was acquired to all their banking transactions in the year preceding their departure: over 60,000 transactions in total. Their income from work or employment, various forms of social assistance, student grants, and other income or expenditure were examined. The data provided a good picture of their financial independence, i.e., the extent to which they were capable of making their own living or needed to claim assistance from the authorities. The analysis shows that it is highly exceptional for Dutch JTs to be financially independent. Only 5 percent have sufficient income from work or employment without making any claims on the government for financial assistance, and are free of mounting debts. The low score can for a large part be explained by the fact that almost half of the JTs are under 23 years of age and/or receive a student grant. Their financial picture largely resembles ordinary students. Older JTs (over 22 years of age, and not having received a student grant for at least one year) underperform, however. Only 9 percent are financially independent. Financial support could perhaps be used to monitor or steer recipients’ role in society.

According to the Coalition Agreement 2017-2021, the Dutch government intends to develop policy to prevent religious communities from receiving support from abroad if this support comes from so-called ‘unfree countries’. In the article, the author argues that restrictive measures in this area touch upon the collective freedom of religion, which is protected by the ECHR, measures that can only be justified under strict conditions in the light of religious freedom as guaranteed in article 9 ECHR.