Since society was secularized, the values of democracy based on the rule of law seem to have the best (potential) binding force for social cohesion. These values are linked to Christianity however. The relation between both will be explained by a critical review of Larry Siedentops Inventing the individual and Olivier Roy’s l’Europe est-elle chrétienne?

In deze bijdrage wordt ingegaan op de huidige positie van het slachtoffer gedurende het strafproces. Daarbij wordt beschreven welke zorg er voor het slachtoffer is en welke hiaten er zijn in de uitvoering hiervan en in de maatregelen zelf. Ten slotte wordt een korte vooruitblik gedaan naar de betekenis van het wetsvoorstel uitbreiding slachtofferrechten voor de zorg op het slachtoffer.

Een rechtsstaat is gebaseerd op zelfbinding van de overheid aan het recht. Deze zelfbinding moet verankerd zijn in regels die onder meer de onafhankelijkheid van de rechterlijke macht vastleggen. De ontwikkelingen in Polen en elders tonen echter aan dat juridische regels van zelfbinding geen blokkades maar verkeersdrempels zijn op de weg naar despotisch bestuur. Een rechtsstaat vereist vooral een cultuur van zelfbinding. De conceptualisering van deze rechtsstaatcultuur staat nog in de kinderschoenen.

Socio-political concepts are not singularities. They are, instead, complex and evolving contextures. An awareness of the latter and of what we need to do when we handle concepts opens up space for the resolution of political disagreements and multiplies opportunities for constructive dialogue and understanding. In this article, I argue that the concepts-as-contextures perspective can unravel conceptual connectivity and interweaving, and I substantiate this by examining the ‘contexture’ of liberty. I show that the different, and seemingly contested, definitions of liberty are the product of mixed articulations and the development of associative discursive links within a contexture.

When it comes to learning, mapping turns out to be an effective tool. There is a wide variety of information maps, such as mind maps, argument maps and concept maps. This paper develops a teaching method that puts mapping at the centre of a seminar. It builds upon ideas of cognitivism and constructivism. The proposed didactic method incorporates a new variant of mapping, Basic Building Blocks Map (BBB Map), with a specific style of teaching. It is argued that this teaching method leads to engaged and active student participation. By dividing the subject up into small pieces and searching for answers to questions interactively, the student will learn more effectively. The paper concludes by providing teachers tools to put the method of BBB Mapping into practice.

This article builds upon the work of James Boyd White as well as on Shelley’s ‘A defence of Poetry’ (1840) and reports upon an experiment in which students use poetry as a means to understand philosophical texts. The experiment had a double goal: first, I sought to challenge students in reading a philosophical text differently with an aim to better understand the text. The second goal was to challenge students to think about the text differently, more critically and analyse its relevance for the contemporary world. In the end, using imagination, is the claim, contributes to students finding their own ‘voice’.

A central ambition that Griffiths expressed rather frequently was to realize progress in the sociology of law by formulating informative theoretical propositions and testing them empirically according to the maxim of the critical-rational metatheoretical program of Karl Popper. Our analysis of Griffiths’s contributions suggests, however, that he actually refrained from following Popper’s path: to put a Problem – formulate a Theory – testing that provisional answer by empirical Observation. Instead, Griffiths focussed mostly on the rigorously clear formulation of concepts accordingly to his strong philosophical inclination.

This contribution focuses on John Griffiths’ relentless attempt at developing a general theoretical perspective for socio-legal studies. Hence, attention to Griffiths’ important contributions to legal pluralism and the social working of law approach is paid only in passing. Similar to a much earlier assessment, the analysis of Griffiths’ proposal in this contribution is quite critical. Measured against five criteria this author deems important for any socio-legal theoretical framework, the verdict is that Griffiths’ proposal falls short of all of them. The analysis itself focuses primarily on Griffiths’ attempt to redefine the subject for socio-legal studies in terms of social control, the way he uses the concept ‘law’, and his primary focus on rules and rule following. One overall conclusion is that Griffiths remained a legal scholar to a much greater extent than he would have liked.

Trationally, the term “enemy of all humanity” (hostis generis humani) referred to pirates. In contemporary international criminal law, it refers to perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other core. This essay traces the evolution of the concept, and then offers an analysis that ties it more closely to ancient tyrants than to pirates. Some object that the label is dehumanizing, and justifies arbitrary killing of the “enemy of humanity.” The essay admits the danger, but defends the concept if it is restricted to fair trials. Rather than dehumanizing its target, calling the hostis generis humani to account in a court of law is a way of recognizing that radical evil can be committed by humans no different from any of us.

‘Sovereignties’ provides clear insights in various aspects of sovereignty, but Waltermann’s approach hides certain issues from view.

Shoot-out clausules kunnen een nuttig mechanisme zijn voor de doorbreking van impasses bij BV’s met twee aandeelhouders die ieder 50% van de aandelen houden. Dit artikel bespreekt verschillende varianten van shoot-out clausules, enkele specifieke kenmerken per variant en voor- en nadelen van het gebruik van shoot-out clausules in het algemeen.

In dit artikel presenteer ik een nieuwe ‘nominalistische’ theorie van de rechtssubjecten en laat ik zien waarom geen van de tot nu gepresenteerde theorieën de toets der kritiek kan doorstaan. Het artikel valt uiteen in een constructief en een kritisch deel. In het constructieve deel presenteer ik eerst de nominalistische theorie van de rechtssubjecten. Deze theorie richt zich op de persoonlijke elementen van het rechtssysteem en begrijpt rechtspersonen en organen als namen die uitsluitend bestaan binnen het rechtssysteem. In het kritische deel presenteer ik vervolgens een overzicht van de tot nu toe verdedigde theorieën van de rechtspersoon. Het gaat daarbij respectievelijk om de sociaal-biologische of organische leer, de sociologische leer, de sociologisch-juridische leer, de fictieleer en de leer van het (gepersonifieerde) normencomplex. Aan de hand van enkele algemeen geaccepteerde kenmerken van de rechtspersoon laat ik ten slotte zien waarom geen van deze alternatieve theorieën de toets der kritiek kan doorstaan.

Aesthetics of law entails a philosophical inquiry into the art and beauty of jurisprudence. In respect to this field of inquiry, Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy (1872) has been largely ignored. Since Socrates’ ‘emancipation’ of the apollonian from the Dionysian element, the art of politics and law, has been founded almost exclusively on logic and scientific knowledge. This tradition of nihilistic ‘socratism’, culminated eventually in legalism and legal positivism that have subdued the acknowledgement of life, subjectivity and creativity. In line with Nietzsche, this article explores the prospective of a ‘rebirth of tragedy’. But in difference to him, it designates this rebirth to develop from out of the spirit of Christianity and Christian existentialism. Paul Scholten in particular, is interpreted as one whose biblical personalist approach resounds this tragic sense of law.

The authors establish that in the West mercy in public life, in particular as acts of judges and governors, underwent a wrongful decline. This decline is an effect of the tension between mercy and justice that grew during the transition of medieval, Christian into modern, secular law and justice. To prove this, the authors present a broad historical overview. Eventually, they argue in favour of an incidental application of mercy in public life, under strict conditions. However, in a secular society and law system mercy can be made acceptable only for the political and public debate. In this situation, an appeal to a more neutral sounding virtue such as compassion will be more convincing.

This article presents an account of sovereignty as a concept that signifies in jural terms the nature and quality of political relations within the modern state. It argues, first, that sovereignty is a politico-legal concept that expresses the autonomous nature of the state’s political power and its specific mode of operation in the form of law and, secondly, that many political scientists and lawyers present a skewed account by confusing sovereignty with governmental competence. After clarifying its meaning, the significance of contemporary governmental change is explained as one that, in certain respects, involves an erosion of sovereignty.

This article investigates and classifies the different meanings of the term sovereignty. What exactly do we try to convey when using the words “sovereign” or “sovereignty”? I will argue that, when saying that X is sovereign, we can mean five different things: it can mean that X holds the capacity to force everyone into obedience, that X makes the laws, that the legal and political order is created by X, that X holds the competence to alter the basic norms of our legal and political order, or that X is independently active on the international stage. These different usages of the term are of course related, but they are distinct and cannot be fully reduced to one another.