The public health systems of liberal states systematically fail to meet the goals and obligations of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which aims to facilitate full societal participation and independent life choices by all impaired persons, as well as the unburdening of their private caretakers. This failure does not stem from a lack of money or effort by governments and other societal institutions, but flaws in the anatomy of these systems. As these systems confine institutional assistance to the needs of persons with certain delineated disabilities, they neglect the needs of other persons, whose disabilities do not fit this mould. The responsibility for the latter group thus falls to their immediate social circle. These private caretakers are in turn seldom supported. To remedy this situation, I will present the alternative paradigm of vulnerability theory as the possible foundation for a more inclusive approach to public health.

Voor veel mensen met een functiebeperking geldt dat zij op wettelijk geregelde voorzieningen moeten vertrouwen voor hun basale levensbehoeften. De aannames van de wetgever betreffende welke noden van deze groep tot de verantwoordelijkheid van de maatschappij behoren, bepalen dus de mate waarin zij in deze behoeften kunnen voorzien en hoe zij – en hun omgeving – hun leven kunnen inrichten. In dit artikel wordt onderbouwd waarom de huidige aannames van de wetgever een grote groep mensen met een functiebeperking in de steek laten. In de participatiemaatschappij staan deelname aan de reguliere arbeidsmarkt en vertrouwen op het eigen netwerk namelijk centraal. Dientengevolge schiet de huidige sociale zekerheid voor mensen die niet of niet gedeeltelijk kunnen werken en geen daadkrachtig netwerk te hebben, veelal tekort. Een begin van de oplossing van dit probleem, zo wordt voorgesteld, is het opnieuw waarderen van bijdragen buiten de reguliere arbeidsmarkt en het uitbreiden en bestendigen van de voorzieningen voor mensen met een functiebeperking.

Deze bijdrage richt zich op de mogelijkheden en beperkingen om voor- en nadelen van een duurzaamheidsafspraak te kwantificeren onder artikel 6 lid 3 Mededingingswet gebaseerd op de kosten-batenanalyse, de welzijnsanalyse en de capaciteitenbenadering.

Since society was secularized, the values of democracy based on the rule of law seem to have the best (potential) binding force for social cohesion. These values are linked to Christianity however. The relation between both will be explained by a critical review of Larry Siedentops Inventing the individual and Olivier Roy’s l’Europe est-elle chrétienne?

Criminology has traditionally focused on urban areas where crime visibly concentrates. However, since the 1990s, attention for ‘rural criminology’ has steadily increased. First, rural areas are confronted with partly different and less visible crime problems, such as environmental crimes. Second, public actors such as enforcement and other agencies are less present and ‘available’ in rural areas, and people on average trust the government less to provide support when necessary. This chronicle presents an overview of international and Dutch research in the context of rural criminology. The paper addresses cultural differences between urban and rural areas, high-volume crimes, gender-related violence, alcohol and drug abuse, environmental crime, and enforcement in rural areas.

This article argues that it is legitimate for the state to practice soft paternalism towards changing hearts and minds in order to prevent behaviour that is discriminatory. Liberals accept that it is not legitimate for the state to intervene in order to change how people think because ideas and beliefs are wrong in themselves. It is legitimate for the state to intervene with the actions of a person only when there is a risk of harm to others and when there is a threat to social coexistence. Preventive action of the state is legitimate if we consider the immaterial and material harm that discrimination causes. It causes harm to the social standing of the person, psychological harm, economic and existential harm. All these harms threaten peaceful social coexistence. This article traces a theory of permissible government action. Research in the areas of behavioural psychology, neuroscience and social psychology indicates that it is possible to bring about a change in hearts and minds. Encouraging a person to adopt the perspective of the person who has experienced discrimination can lead to empathetic understanding. This, can lead a person to critically evaluate her prejudice. The paper argues that soft paternalism towards changing hearts and minds is legitimate in order to prevent harm to others. It attempts to legitimise state coercion in order to eliminate prejudice and broader social patterns of inequality and marginalisation. And it distinguishes between appropriate and non-appropriate avenues the state could pursue in order to eliminate prejudice. Policies towards eliminating prejudice should address the rational and the emotional faculties of a person. They should aim at using methods and techniques that focus on persuasion and reduce coercion. They should raise awareness of what prejudice is and how it works in order to facilitate well-informed voluntary decisions. The version of soft paternalism towards changing minds and attitudes defended in this article makes it consistent with liberalism.

Few legal theorists today would argue that the domain of law exists in isolation from other normative spheres governing society, notably from the domain of ‘politics’. Nevertheless, the implicit norm that judges should not act ‘politically’ remains influential and widespread in the debates surrounding controversial court cases. This article aims to square these two observations. Taking the Miller v. Secretary of State and Urgenda cases as illustrative case studies, the article demonstrates that what it means for judges to adjudicate cases ‘apolitically’ is itself a matter of controversy. In reflecting on their own constitutional role, courts are forced to take a stance on substantive questions of political philosophy. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the ‘norm of judicial apoliticality’ should therefore be rejected. The norm’s coherence lies in its intersocial function: its role in declaring certain modes of judicial interpretation and intervention legitimate (‘legal’/‘judicial’) or illegitimate (‘political’).

This article argues in favour of lowering the voting age to 16. First, it outlines a respect-based account of democracy where the right to vote is grounded in a respect for citizens’ autonomous capacities. It then outlines a normative account of autonomy, modelled on Rawls’s two moral powers, saying what criteria must be met for an individual to possess a (pro tanto) moral right to vote. Second, it engages with empirical psychology to show that by the age of 16 (if not earlier) individuals have developed all of the cognitive components of autonomy. Therefore, since 16- and 17-year-olds (and quite probably those a little younger) possess the natural features required for autonomy, then, to the extent that respect for autonomy requires granting political rights including the right to vote – and barring some special circumstances that apply only to them – 16- and 17-year-olds should be granted the right to vote.

This article considers Christopher D. Marshall’s proposal to draw a connection between the ethics of care and restorative justice. The ethics of care tradition is critical of the modern liberal interpretation of morality as a rational endeavor based on universal principles. The article attempts to spell out the ethical and political implications of adopting this fundamental viewpoint in the context of restorative justice. On the ethical level, the ethics of care may remind the tradition of restorative justice of its essential reliance on the concrete moral practices and competences of people that precede any conceptualized normative ethics. On the political level, an ethics of care approach to restorative justice seems to lead to a certain deadlock in that it fails (and refuses) to offer a rational justification of restorative justice practices. On a closer look, the ethics of care can provide such a justification, be it a ‘communitarian’ one.

‘Illiberal’ is an adjective that is commonly used by scholars. For example, they might speak of ‘illiberal cultures’, ‘illiberal groups’, ‘illiberal states’, ‘illiberal democracies’, ‘illiberal beliefs’, and ‘illiberal practices’. Yet despite its widespread usage, no in-depth discussions exist of exactly what it means for someone or something to be illiberal, or might mean. This article fills this lacuna by providing a conceptual analysis of the term ‘illiberal practices’, which I argue is basic in that other bearers of the property of being illiberal can be understood by reference to it. Specifically, I identify five ways in which a practice can be illiberal based on the different ways in which this term is employed within both scholarly and political discourses. The main value of this disaggregation lies in the fact that it helps to prevent confusions that arise when people use the adjective ‘illiberal’ in different ways, as is not uncommon.

In this article we elaborate on the place of religion in the workplace. Does the individual freedom of religion imply that employers must always accommodate the religious claims of employees or can they boast a number of arguments allowing them to legitimately limit that freedom? And, conversely, do employers not also have a right to freedom of religion and a right to formulate certain religious expectations for their employees? In this contribution, we deal with these and related questions from a legal-philosophical perspective. The overall aim is to illustrate the extent to which univocal answers are jeopardized because of conceptual ambiguities. We first make a normative distinction between two strategies (i.e. difference-blind approach and difference-sensitive approach) and subsequently illustrate and elaborate on how and why these strategies can lead to different outcomes in legal cases. We illustrate the extent to which a contextual and proportional analysis can be a way out in theoretical and practical conundrums.

Increasingly often, it is stated that the universal values underpinning Western liberal democracies are a product of a ‘Judeo-Christian’ tradition. This article explores the legitimacy of this claim from the perspective of liberal-democratic theory. It argues that state-endorsed claims about the historical roots of liberal-democratic values are problematic (1) if they are promoted as though they are above democratic scrutiny and (2) if they insinuate that citizens who belong to a particular (majority) culture remain the ‘cultural owners’ of the core values underpinning the state. More pragmatically, the paper suggests that the claim carries the risk of failing to facilitate all citizens becoming or remaining committed to nurturing fundamental rights and a shared society based on norms of democratic equality.

Socio-political concepts are not singularities. They are, instead, complex and evolving contextures. An awareness of the latter and of what we need to do when we handle concepts opens up space for the resolution of political disagreements and multiplies opportunities for constructive dialogue and understanding. In this article, I argue that the concepts-as-contextures perspective can unravel conceptual connectivity and interweaving, and I substantiate this by examining the ‘contexture’ of liberty. I show that the different, and seemingly contested, definitions of liberty are the product of mixed articulations and the development of associative discursive links within a contexture.

The proposed Act on Citizenship Education requires fundamental reflection from several angles. The article provides a perspective from remarks describing the current age and a possible list of values for a democratic state. Important is also the perspective from educational freedom, on which topic several publications from the Onderwijsraad were issued in December 2019. The proposed Act (with the different versions of its explanation by the Minister) are critically evaluated and confronted with an alternative proposal.

This is the second part of the revised translation of ‘Understanding sharia in the West’ that was published in the Journal of Law, Religion and State 2018, 6, p. 236-273. The first part of the translation appeared in Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 2019, 3, p. 17-31.

Multi-national corporations are increasingly facing attention and disapproval by different actors, including authorities, public and (non-) commercial organizations. Digital globalization and especially social media as a low-cost, highly interactive and multidirectional platform shape a unique context for this rising attention. In the literature, much attention has been devoted to top-down approaches and strategies that corporations use to avoid stigmatization and sanctioning of their behaviour. Reactions to corporate harm are, however, seldom researched from a labelling perspective. As a result, corporations are not considered as objects towards whom labelling is targeted but rather as actors who hamper such processes and who, as moral entrepreneurs, influence which behaviour is labelled deviant. Based on theoretical analysis of literature and case studies, this article will discuss how the process of labelling has changed in light of the digitalized, late-modern society and consequently, how the process should be revisited to be applicable for corporate deviance. Given a diversification of moral entrepreneurs and increasingly dependency of labelling and meaning-making on the online sphere, two new forms of labelling are introduced that specifically target institutions; that is bottom-up and horizontal labelling.

The Dutch social-liberal party D66 was founded in 1966, in the aftermath of the pillarisation (on religious grounds) of Dutch society. The founders of D66 wanted to ‘blow up’ the pillarised political system. They strongly took distance from religions that were in their views oppressing. A certain anti-religion attitude was a part of the DNA of the party. For decades it was ‘bon ton’ to criticise religion. A turning point has recently been observed by the writer. There is still a discomfort in relation to religion, but this discomfort is more related to not-knowing than being against. The writer pleads for going beyond the discomfort. Religion – in the broad sense of the word – has a lot to offer to society. We indeed can’t live without binding stories, places that are loaded with meaning and festivities that reminds ourselves of who we are and who we would want to be. Finally the modernity and religion can strengthen each other: where modernity is skilled in criticising religion, the Christian religion can make a contribution by criticising modernity.

The increasing volume of waste generated globally is one of the most prominent environmental issues we face today. Companies responsible for the treatment or disposal of waste are therefore among the key actors in fostering a sustainable future. Yet the waste industry has often been characterised as a criminogenic one, causing environmental harm which disproportionately impacts the world’s most vulnerable regions and populations. In this article, we illustrate how companies operating in global supply chains exploit legal and enforcement asymmetries and market complexities to trade waste with countries where facilities for environmentally sound treatment and disposal of waste are lacking. We draw on two contemporary cases of corporate misconduct in the Global South by companies with operating headquarters in the Global North: Seatrade and Probo Koala. We compare these cases building on theories about corporate and environmental crime and its enforcement. This explorative comparative analysis aims to identify the key drivers and dynamics of illegal waste dumping, while also exploring innovative ways to make the waste sector more environmentally responsible and prevent the future externalisation of environmental harm.

In dit artikel wordt de waarde van het instituut parlement verkend. Daartoe analyseert de auteur eerst een lezing die de Nederlandse staatsrechtsgeleerde C.W. van der Pot in 1925 over dit thema hield bij de VWR. Vervolgens wordt Van der Pots opvatting gecontrasteerd met de diametraal tegengestelde benadering van Carl Schmitt, die zich, rond dezelfde tijd, over dit vraagstuk boog in Duitsland. Tot slot schetst de auteur, via een alternatieve, wellicht excentrieke, interpretatie van Schmitt waar een belangrijke waarde van het moderne parlement zou kunnen liggen.

Exile and migration are once more central issues in the contemporary European predicament. This short article intends to discuss these questions elaborating on the ideas of two Spanish authors, a novelist, Max Aub, and a philosopher, María Zambrano, both marked by the tragic events of civil war and forced expatriation. Exile and migration in their existential perspective are meant as a prologue to the vindication of citizenship.