Zoekresultaat: 74 artikelen

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Artikel

Access_open Moet de strafrechter ook de scheidsrechter zijn van het publieke debat?

De scheiding der machten in het licht van de vrijheid van meningsuiting voor volksvertegenwoordigers

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2020
Trefwoorden Freedom of speech, Separation of powers, Criminal law, Hate speech, Legal certainty
Auteurs Jip Stam
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    This article contains a critical review of the provisions in the Dutch penal code regarding group defamation and hate speech. It is argued that not only these provisions themselves but also their application by the Dutch supreme court, constitutes a problem for the legitimacy and functioning of representative democracy. This is due to the tendency of the supreme court to employ special constraints for offensive, hateful or discriminatory speech by politicians. Because such a special constraint is not provided or even implied by the legislator, the jurisprudence of the supreme court is likely to end up in judicial overreach and therefore constitutes a potential – if not actual – breach in the separation of powers. In order to forestall these consequences, the protection of particularly political speech should be improved, primarily by a revision of the articles 137c and 137d of the Dutch penal code or the extension of parliamentary immunity.


Jip Stam
Jip Stam is onderzoeker en docent bij de afdeling Encyclopedie van de rechtswetenschap aan de Leidse rechtenfaculteit.
Artikel

Access_open Restraint as a Source of Judicial ‘Apoliticality’

A Functional Reconstruction

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2020
Trefwoorden Urgenda, Miller v. Secretary of State, Norm of judicial apoliticality, Ronald Dworkin, Judicial restraint
Auteurs Maurits Helmich
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Few legal theorists today would argue that the domain of law exists in isolation from other normative spheres governing society, notably from the domain of ‘politics’. Nevertheless, the implicit norm that judges should not act ‘politically’ remains influential and widespread in the debates surrounding controversial court cases. This article aims to square these two observations. Taking the Miller v. Secretary of State and Urgenda cases as illustrative case studies, the article demonstrates that what it means for judges to adjudicate cases ‘apolitically’ is itself a matter of controversy. In reflecting on their own constitutional role, courts are forced to take a stance on substantive questions of political philosophy. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the ‘norm of judicial apoliticality’ should therefore be rejected. The norm’s coherence lies in its intersocial function: its role in declaring certain modes of judicial interpretation and intervention legitimate (‘legal’/‘judicial’) or illegitimate (‘political’).


Maurits Helmich
Maurits Helmich is promovendus aan de afdeling Sociologie, Theorie en Methodologie van het Recht aan de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam.

Elaine Mak
Elaine Mak is hoogleraar Rechtstheorie en Enclyopedie van de rechtswetenschappen aan de Universiteit Utrecht.

Anne Ruth Mackor
Anne Ruth Mackor is hoogleraar Hoogleraar professie-ethiek, in het bijzonder van juridische professies aan de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen.

Iris van Domselaar
Iris van Domselaar is universitair hoofddocent aan de Amsterdamse rechtenfaculteit.
Article

Access_open Too Immature to Vote?

A Philosophical and Psychological Argument to Lower the Voting Age

Tijdschrift Erasmus Law Review, Aflevering 1 2020
Trefwoorden voting age, children’s rights, youth enfranchisement, democracy, votes at 16
Auteurs Tommy Peto
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    This article argues in favour of lowering the voting age to 16. First, it outlines a respect-based account of democracy where the right to vote is grounded in a respect for citizens’ autonomous capacities. It then outlines a normative account of autonomy, modelled on Rawls’s two moral powers, saying what criteria must be met for an individual to possess a (pro tanto) moral right to vote. Second, it engages with empirical psychology to show that by the age of 16 (if not earlier) individuals have developed all of the cognitive components of autonomy. Therefore, since 16- and 17-year-olds (and quite probably those a little younger) possess the natural features required for autonomy, then, to the extent that respect for autonomy requires granting political rights including the right to vote – and barring some special circumstances that apply only to them – 16- and 17-year-olds should be granted the right to vote.


Tommy Peto
University of Oxford.
Artikel

De wil van de wilsonbekwame dementiepatiënt

Tijdschrift Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht, Aflevering 4 2020
Trefwoorden euthanasie, dementie, wilsonbekwaamheid, schriftelijk euthanasieverzoek, contra-indicaties
Auteurs Mr. M.J.J. de Bontridder
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Iemand heeft schriftelijk een verzoek gedaan hem euthanasie te verlenen mocht hij diep-dement worden. In deze toestand gekomen maakt hij door uitingen of gedragingen kenbaar niet te willen sterven. Is verlenen van euthanasie dan toegestaan? Bepleit wordt dat een hierop gerichte clausule in de euthanasieverklaring voor de arts leidinggevend is.


Mr. M.J.J. de Bontridder
Miriam de Bontridder is raadsheer plaatsvervanger bij het Gerechtshof Amsterdam en was tot 2019 bestuurslid van Stichting De Einder.
Artikel

Access_open Religie op het werk?

Over positieve en negatieve godsdienstvrijheid bij private ondernemingen en tendensondernemingen

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2020
Auteurs Leni Franken en François Levrau
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    In this article we elaborate on the place of religion in the workplace. Does the individual freedom of religion imply that employers must always accommodate the religious claims of employees or can they boast a number of arguments allowing them to legitimately limit that freedom? And, conversely, do employers not also have a right to freedom of religion and a right to formulate certain religious expectations for their employees? In this contribution, we deal with these and related questions from a legal-philosophical perspective. The overall aim is to illustrate the extent to which univocal answers are jeopardized because of conceptual ambiguities. We first make a normative distinction between two strategies (i.e. difference-blind approach and difference-sensitive approach) and subsequently illustrate and elaborate on how and why these strategies can lead to different outcomes in legal cases. We illustrate the extent to which a contextual and proportional analysis can be a way out in theoretical and practical conundrums.


Leni Franken
Leni Franken is senior researcher and teaching assistant at the University of Antwerp.

François Levrau
François Levrau is senior researcher and teaching assistant at the University of Antwerp.

Klaas Rozemond
Klaas Rozemond is universitair hoofddocent strafrecht aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
Artikel

Access_open Recht en politiek in de klimaatzaken

Een sleutelrol voor het internationaal recht in de argumentatie van de nationale rechter

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2020
Auteurs Vincent Dupont
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Ever since it was published in 2015, the judgment of the The Hague court in the so-called Urgenda-case, and the subsequent decisions of the appellate and cassation courts confirming it, have been met with repeated and vivid critiques. By recognizing the necessity of the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, and furthermore imposing a certain reduction level on the Dutch state, the judgments in the cases at hand gave rise to many questions concerning the position of the judiciary in the matter, and in Dutch society as a whole. This article attempts in the first place to situate the positions of the different actors intervening in the Urgenda-case within a legal-theoretical framework. The contribution subsequently explores the strategic possibilities that an alternative understanding of law could offer to the judges, focusing specifically on the use of legal instruments stemming from international law, brought into the reasoning of the national judge.


Vincent Dupont
Vincent Dupont studeerde in 2017 af als Master of Laws aan de KU Leuven en volgt momenteel een opleiding sociologie aan de Université libre de Bruxelles, Unicamp in São Paulo en de École des hautes études en sciences sociales in Parijs.

Irawan Sewandono
Irawan Sewandono is universitair docent staats- en bestuursrecht aan de Open Universiteit.
Artikel

Access_open Legal Philosophy as an Enrichment of Doctrinal Research Part I: Introducing Three Philosophical Methods

Tijdschrift Law and Method, januari 2020
Trefwoorden interdisciplinary research, reflective equilibrium, argumentation, philosophical analysis
Auteurs Sanne Taekema en Wibren van der Burg
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    In this article, we discuss a particular form of interdisciplinary legal research. We focus on a discipline that may be fruitfully combined with doctrinal research, namely philosophy. The aim of this article is to give an account of the methods of philosophy that are most relevant and useful for doctrinal legal scholars. Our focus is therefore mostly on legal philosophy and the philosophical subdisciplines closely related to it, such as political philosophy and ethics. We characterize legal philosophy in three complementary ways: as an activity, as insights, and as theories. We then discuss three methods of legal philosophy: argumentation analysis and construction, author analysis and reflective equilibrium. In the practice of research these three methods are usually combined, as we will show with various examples.


Sanne Taekema
Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam

Wibren van der Burg
Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam.

    In legal education, criticism is conceived as an academic activity. As lecturers, we expect from students more than just the expression of their opinion; they have to evaluate and criticize a certain practice, building on a sound argumentation and provide suggestions on how to improve this practice. Criticism not only entails a negative judgment but is also constructive since it aims at changing the current state of affairs that it rejects (for some reason or other). In this article, we want to show how we train critical writing in the legal skills course for first-year law students (Juridische vaardigheden) at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. We start with a general characterization of the skill of critical writing on the basis of four questions: 1. Why should we train critical writing? 2. What does criticism mean in a legal context? 3. How to carry out legal criticism? and 4. How to derive recommendations from the criticism raised? Subsequently, we discuss, as an illustration to the last two questions, the Dutch Urgenda case, which gave rise to a lively debate in the Netherlands on the role of the judge. Finally, we show how we have applied our general understanding of critical writing to our legal skills course. We describe the didactic approach followed and our experiences with it.


Bart van Klink
Bart van Klink is Professor of Legal Methodology, Department of Legal Theory and History, Faculty of Law, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Lyana Francot
Lyana Francot is Associate Professor of Legal Theory, Department of Legal Theory and History, Faculty of Law, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Artikel

Access_open De rechtsfilosofische grondslagen van John Griffiths’ rechtssociologie

Tijdschrift Recht der Werkelijkheid, Aflevering 2 2018
Trefwoorden sociology of law, Hart, Dworkin, Legal Realism, Black
Auteurs Jeroen Kiewiet
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    The topic of this article is the legal philosophical foundation of John Griffiths’s sociology of law. Griffiths has developed his foundation of sociology of law in discussion with three positions: legal realism, Hart and Dworkin. These three positions give three different answers on the question ‘what is law?’. In the first part Griffiths’s discussion of legal realism is analyzed. From the outset, a legal realistic approach to law has the benefit of its strong focus on the empirical determinants of predicting the outcomes of cases. Problematic, according to Griffiths, is a naïve instrumentalism, often related to legal realism. The second part on Hart’s theory discussed Hart’s notion of rule-following as the core of Griffiths’s sociology of law. Also the different perspectives on law are discussed. According to Griffiths, Black’s extreme external perspective is problematic, but Hart’s moderate external perspective is also not suitable for the external comparative purpose of sociology of law. In the third part, Dworkin’s theory is discussed. Griffiths, in my opinion, unsuccessfully, tried to reconcile Dworkin’s theory with legal positivism. Dworkin’s theory is an interpretive theory from the participant’s point of view, which makes it hard to use it as an adequate foundation of an empirical theory of law. For a sociologist of law, choosing an adequate conception of law is just as important as the choice for an empirical method. The contribution of Griffiths to sociology of law is in this sense unique and of great value for the sociology of law.


Jeroen Kiewiet
Jeroen Kiewiet was student-assistent bij John Griffiths in de collegejaren 2003/2004 en 2004/2005. In 2002 maakte hij met Griffiths en de rechtssociologie kennis tijdens de ‘contractwerkgroep’ van het vak Inleiding rechtssociologie. Het onderwijs tijdens de ‘contractwerkgroep’ ervoer hij als zeer inspirerend; hij zag een échte wetenschapper aan het werk die de inbreng van studenten uiterst serieus nam. Sinds augustus 2015 werkt Jeroen als universitair docent aan de afdeling Staatsrecht, Bestuursrecht en Rechtstheorie van het departement Rechtsgeleerdheid van de faculteit Recht, Economie, Bestuur en Organisatie van de Universiteit Utrecht.
Artikel

Access_open Personhood and legal status: reflections on the democratic rights of corporations

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2018
Trefwoorden Corporations, democracy, legal personality, personhood, inclusion
Auteurs Ludvig Beckman
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Corporations can have rights but whether they should also have democratic rights depends among other things on whether they are the kind of entities to which the democratic ideal applies. This paper distinguishes four different conceptions of “the person” that can have democratic rights. According to one view, the only necessary condition is legal personality, whereas according to the other three views, democratic inclusion is conditioned also by personhood in the natural sense of the term. Though it is uncontroversial that corporations can be legal persons, it is plausible to ascribe personhood in the natural sense to corporations only if personhood is conceptualized exclusively in terms of moral agency. The conclusion of the paper is that corporations can meet the necessary conditions for democratic inclusion but that it is not yet clear in democratic theory exactly what these conditions are.


Ludvig Beckman
Ludvig Beckman is professor of political science at Stockholm University.

    Legal doctrinal scholarship engages with the problems of legal practice: it systematizes, comments on, evaluates and debates what goes on in law. These activities do not occur in a vacuum: they are embedded in scholarly traditions and theories. This paper discusses the role of the theoretical frameworks used in legal research and has two related aims. First, it aims to provide some practical conceptualizations and guidelines regarding theoretical and normative frameworks that are useful to understand and conduct legal research. Second, it aims to investigate the relationships between different kinds of normative frameworks and their relationship to empirical work. In the second part, an argument is made for a pragmatist understanding of the interplay between normative theorizing and empirical study. How do these work together in judgments about the state of the law?


Sanne Taekema
Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam; taekema@law.eur.nl.
Article

Access_open An Empirical Study of the Voting Pattern of Judges of the International Court of Justice (2005-2016)

Tijdschrift Erasmus Law Review, Aflevering 3 2017
Trefwoorden voting pattern, ICJ judges, empirical research
Auteurs Xuechan Ma en Shuai Guo
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    The Statute of the International Court of Justice stipulates that judges shall exercise their powers impartially. We question the practicability of this statement and examine whether the voting pattern of the judges are biased. In this light, empirical research is conducted on cases adjudicated from 2005 to 2016. We find strong evidence that (1) judges favour their home States or appointing States; and (2) judges favour States that speak same majority language with their home States.


Xuechan Ma
Xuechan Ma, Ph.D. candidate at Leiden University, LL.M. and LL.B. at Peking University. Email address: x.ma@law.leidenuniv.nl.

Shuai Guo
Shuai Guo, Ph.D. candidate at Leiden University, LL.M. and LL.B. at China University of Political Science and Law. Email address: s.guo@law.leidenuniv.nl.
Artikel

Access_open Dworkin’s Rights Conception of the Rule of Law in Criminal Law

Should Criminal Law be Extensively Interpreted in Order to Protect Victims’ Rights?

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2017
Trefwoorden Klaas Rozemond, Ronald M. Dworkin, Legality in criminal law, Rights conception of the rule of law, Legal certainty
Auteurs Briain Jansen
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    The extensive interpretation of criminal law to the detriment of the defendant in criminal law is often problematized in doctrinal theory. Extensive interpretation is then argued to be problematic in the light of important ideals such as democracy and legal certainty in criminal law. In the Dutch discussion of this issue, Klaas Rozemond has argued that sometimes extensive interpretation is mandated by the rule of law in order to protect the rights of victims. Rozemond grounds his argument on a reading of Dworkin’s distinction between the rule-book and the rights conception of the rule of law. In this article, I argue that Dworkin’s rights conception, properly considered, does not necessarily mandate the imposition of criminal law or its extensive interpretation in court in order to protect victims’ rights.


Briain Jansen
Briain Jansen is als promovendus rechtstheorie verbonden aan de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam.

    Both H.L.A. Hart and John Searle repeatedly refer to games in their work on the concept of law and the construction of social reality respectively. We can argue that this is not a coincidence, Hart’s analysis of law as a system of primary and secondary rules bears close resemblances to Searle’s analysis of social reality as a system of regulative and constitutive rules and the comparison to games leads to interesting insights about the ontology of law and legal epistemology. The present article explores both the institutional theory of law that can be devised on the basis of the work of Hart and Searle, the method of analytical philosophy they employ and the particular consequences that can be deduced for legal research from the resulting legal theory.


Arie-Jan Kwak
Dr. A.J. Kwak, Faculty of Law, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands.

    The purpose of this article is to investigate whether the notion of an interest should be taken more seriously than the notion of a right. It will be argued that it should; and not only because it can be just as amenable to the institutional taxonomical structure often said to be at the basis of rights thinking in law but also because the notion of an interest has a more epistemologically convincing explanatory power with respect to reasoning in law and its relation to social facts. The article equally aims to highlight some of the important existing work on the notion of an interest in law.


Geoffrey Samuel
Professor of Law, Kent Law School, The University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, U.K. This article is a much re-orientated, and updated, adaption of a paper published a decade ago: Samuel 2004, at 263. The author would like to thank the anonymous referees for their very helpful criticisms and observations on an earlier version of the manuscript.

François Levrau
Dr. François Levrau studeerde klinische psychologie en moraalfilosofie en promoveerde in de sociale wetenschappen aan de Universiteit van Antwerpen.
Boekbespreking

Access_open Barmhartigheid in het publieke domein onder druk

Tijdschrift Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid, Aflevering 3 2016
Trefwoorden barmhartigheid, Wereldgodsdiensten, Rechtvaardigheid, publiek domein
Auteurs Dr. Frans Jespers
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    The authors establish that in the West mercy in public life, in particular as acts of judges and governors, underwent a wrongful decline. This decline is an effect of the tension between mercy and justice that grew during the transition of medieval, Christian into modern, secular law and justice. To prove this, the authors present a broad historical overview. Eventually, they argue in favour of an incidental application of mercy in public life, under strict conditions. However, in a secular society and law system mercy can be made acceptable only for the political and public debate. In this situation, an appeal to a more neutral sounding virtue such as compassion will be more convincing.


Dr. Frans Jespers
Dr. F.P.M. Jespers is universitair hoofddocent Vergelijkende godsdienstwetenschap aan de Faculteit Filosofie, Theologie en Religiewetenschappen van de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, met als onderzoeksgebied nieuwe religieuze en spirituele bewegingen.
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