In each youth justice system, several age limits exist that indicate what type of reaction can and may be connected to the degree of responsibility that a person can already bear. Civil liability, criminal responsibility and criminal majority are examples of concepts on which age limits are based, but whose definition and impact is not always clear. Especially as far as the minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR) is concerned, confusion exists in legal doctrine. This is apparent from the fact that international comparison tables often show different MACRs for the same country. Moreover, the international literature often seems to define youth justice systems by means of a lower and upper limit, whereas such a dual distinction is too basic to comprehend the complex multilayer nature of the systems. This contribution therefore maps out and conceptually clarifies the different interpretations and consequences of the several age limits that exist within youth justice systems. To that extent, the age limits of six countries are analysed: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Northern Ireland. This legal comparison ultimately leads to a proposal to establish a coherent conceptual framework on age limits in youth justice.

The victim’s position in Dutch criminal law has been strengthened. There has been an emancipation of the victim in criminal law. However, not much attention is being paid on the role and position of the victim in the Dutch administrative procedure. This article explores the scope of what is called ‘Administrative victimology’. Administrative victimology is an empirical science that deals with the position and legal role of the victim in the administrative procedure. It is expected that this ‘new’ type of victimology will become more important in the years to come.

Incidents involving persons with ‘confused behavior’ are an important and topical theme in Dutch society. The police are often the first to be involved in these incidents because they are the only public organization that has a 24/7 presence on the streets. In 2019, the police registered 96,000 reports of persons who showed confused behavior. It is therefore not surprising that the police have repeatedly drawn political-administrative attention to this situation and indicated that the limits have been reached. That raises the question of how police officers deal with a situation that has actually grown above their heads in daily practice. In this research, based on the theory of street-level bureaucracy introduced by Lipsky, it was investigated how police officers in The Hague use their discretion to cope with this difficult reality.

In 2014, the Dutch government abolished its ban on blasphemy, which had laid dormant in its criminal code for decades. Similar laws have been abolished in nine other jurisdictions in the West since an international campaign to this end started in 2015. This article first describes the tension between blasphemy laws and the freedom of expression. It then examines the Dutch position on blasphemy in its international context. This article argues against bans on blasphemy and specifically against a potential reintroduction of a de facto ban on blasphemy in the Netherlands. Moreover, it argues in favour of applying political pressure to abolish bans on blasphemy around the world as well as giving diplomatic support to those affected by these laws.

In previous observational studies among operational police officers, some officers stated that if a victim is not willing to (officially) report a crime to the police, they are not able to police these cases. This rather cynical and fatalistic statement raises several questions. What do police officers mean when they say this? What do they actually do in those cases and why? In this paper we try to answer these questions based on explorative qualitative interviews with several police officers in two police teams in the Netherlands. The results show that even though police officers recognize these statements among their colleagues, they do not agree with them and in practice police officers show a lot of effort and involvement in these cases. In fact, police officers have several possible strategies available to deal with these cases. Which strategy they opt for depends on various pragmatic, organisational and moral considerations.

In Nederland is de herziene vierde anti-witwasrichtlijn (AMLD5) geïmplementeerd in onder andere de Wet ter voorkoming van witwassen en terrorismefinanciering (Wwft). De herzieningen zijn per 21 mei 2020 van kracht geworden. Een van de belangrijkste wijzigingen die in de Wwft is doorgevoerd betreft de uitbreiding van de reikwijdte van de wet naar twee typen aanbieders van cryptodiensten, te weten aanbieders van wisseldiensten voor het wisselen tussen crypto’s en fiat geld en aanbieders van custodian wallets. De Nederlandse Bank (DNB) is toezichthouder op deze nieuwe aanbieders en heeft er daarmee een nieuwe taak bij.

De Inspectie Justitie en Veiligheid (Inspectie JenV) houdt toezicht op de politie. In dit artikel kijken we of dat toezicht voldoet aan daaraan te stellen eisen van selectiviteit, responsiviteit en prudentie. Aan de hand van de zaak Hümeyra concluderen we dat de Inspectie JenV kennelijk niet heeft overwogen om de evaluatie over te laten aan interne of (andere) externe toezichthouders en zich ook niet heeft gebaseerd op een voorafgaande risicoanalyse (selectiviteit). Daarnaast heeft de Inspectie JenV haar onderzoek maar zeer beperkt in dialoog en interactie met de politie uitgevoerd en niet (ook) het perspectief vanuit de politie in beeld gebracht (responsiviteit). Bovendien heeft de Inspectie JenV geen rekening gehouden met de bijzondere positie van de politie (prudentie).

In deze notenkraker staat een uitspraak centraal over de vraag, of een franchisegever (de Drie Notenboomen B.V.) in de zorg, verantwoordelijk kan worden gehouden voor handelingen van de franchisenemers (de zorglocaties). Aanleiding vormde een veiligheidsincident op één van de zorglocaties. De Afdeling oordeelt dat in deze situatie de franchisegever niet als overtreder kan worden aangemerkt, omdat deze – kort gezegd – voornamelijk zou toezien op de franchiseformule en niet op de feitelijke zorglevering. Naast een bespreking van de uitspraak wordt ingegaan op de mogelijkheid om een partij, wanneer die niet geldt als overtreder, als ‘medepleger’ aan te merken.

The judgment ‘NGK/Gort’ from the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (04-10-2019, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:1531) gives an important explanation about the church-state relation in general and the ecclestiacal service law-position concerning the pastor in particular. The legal starting point is not in civil law, but in church law. This is the consequence of the right of selfregulation (autonomy) of the church and the non-interference from the state, as recognized by article 2:2 Dutch Civil Code and article 9 jo. 11 ECHR. This principle stands against normal civil mandatory law, for example labor law. It will only be overruled in exceptional cases by civil law of fundamental nature. Than a judicial consideration is necessary taking into account the fundamental rights of the church and the opposant.

Confessional secrecy is inviolable under Catholic canon law, and violations of it are severely sanctioned. Some people see this secret as an obstacle to the legal process in society and advocate a limitation in its use. This article argues that this form of confidentiality also can be defended in civil law because of the protection of spiritual care. Confessional secrecy is analyzed here and compared with forms of official secrecy that are recognized in society. Finally, there is a plea for a clear legal framework for the application of this confessional secret by Catholic priests.

This article considers Christopher D. Marshall’s proposal to draw a connection between the ethics of care and restorative justice. The ethics of care tradition is critical of the modern liberal interpretation of morality as a rational endeavor based on universal principles. The article attempts to spell out the ethical and political implications of adopting this fundamental viewpoint in the context of restorative justice. On the ethical level, the ethics of care may remind the tradition of restorative justice of its essential reliance on the concrete moral practices and competences of people that precede any conceptualized normative ethics. On the political level, an ethics of care approach to restorative justice seems to lead to a certain deadlock in that it fails (and refuses) to offer a rational justification of restorative justice practices. On a closer look, the ethics of care can provide such a justification, be it a ‘communitarian’ one.

As an approach to law and justice, restorative justice focuses squarely on addressing human needs; it acknowledges the equal dignity of all parties, irrespective of their role in the harmful act; it accepts responsibilities for addressing the disadvantages or inequities that crime has bequeathed to victims and that often have contributed to offending on the part of the perpetrator; and it derives its creative potential from the shared vulnerability and reciprocal exchange of concern that occurs through respectful face-to-face encounter. Therefore restorative justice constitutes a relational justice of care.

This paper examines moral injury, in relation to recovery from this kind of psychic damage and to restorative justice. In recent research the concept is developed in distinction from the psychiatric diagnosis PTSD. Whereas PTSD is rooted in anxiety, as it occurs during or after life-threatening situations, people suffering from moral injury are disruptively affected by guilt and shame, in the slipstream of which they may be tormented by remorse, self-loathing, anger and self-disgust – with symptoms similar to PTSD. Unlike PTSD, however, the risk of moral injury is part of ordinary life. It may happen to anyone. Therefore, this paper takes an ‘existential’ perspective by relating moral injury to the fundamental human condition of relationality. Moral injury is interpreted as the disturbance of the responsibility, the confidence and the security that fundamentally sustain the human relationships to the world, to each other, and to oneself. One way of recovering from moral injury is through empathy, primarily performed by caregivers or chaplains who guide the morally injured, and consequently accomplished by the injured themselves, in a narrative way.