This article deals with the legislative proposal in the Netherlands to criminalise staying (without permission) in an area controlled by a terrorist organisation. The discussion surrounding the proposal is focused, amongst other things, on possible exemptions for journalists and providers of humanitarian assistance. This article analyses the newest version of the proposal in light of the rights to freedom of movement and freedom of expression.

This article investigates if and in what manner international human rights treaties provide a mandate for state parties to combat hateful homophobic and transphobic speech. It is concluded that under the ICCPR, the path to inclusive readings of its incitement provision is principally paved by state parties. The UN Human Rights Committee welcomes states’ going beyond the codified (Art. 20) prohibition grounds of ‘national, racial or religious hatred’, thus including such grounds as sexual orientation and gender identity. Within the regional context of the ECHR, it is the European Court of Human Rights that functions as a catalyst. In recent jurisprudence, the latter court has developed a positive duty to investigate instances of hateful homophobic speech. Under both regimes a similarly steadfast approach to combating transphobic speech cannot yet be detected.

Compensation funds in different jurisdictions have varying functions and objectives to remedy loss. This doctoral research addresses the significant knowledge gap in relation to no-fault comprehensive compensation funds. These are a single publicly-managed structure that provides a wide, compulsory and complete replacement for tort remedies.
The research identifies the hallmarks of these funds’ successful establishment, administration, operation and further development. This includes analysis of the functional harms covered, compensation quantum and funding. There is also a novel first principles analysis of the interaction between large funds and human rights law. These analyses inform concrete recommendations for the legislative improvement of existing funds, new funds, and the framework’s application to contemporary liability problems.

Many doctrinal legal research questions require making use of other academic disciplines or perspectives. This article explains the relevance of legal philosophy for doctrinal research projects. Often legal research questions have conceptual or evaluative dimensions that presuppose philosophical understanding. For research on the concept of democracy, the function of constitutional rights, or the possible introduction of a referendum in the Netherlands, questions of a philosophical nature need to be answered. Legal philosophy can supplement and enrich doctrinal research in various ways. In this article, we present seven purposes that legal philosophy may serve in the context of a doctrinal research project: conceptual clarification, exposition and reconstruction of fundamental normative principles and values, theory building, providing creative perspectives, structural critiques, evaluation, and recommendations. For each objective, we illustrate how to use relevant philosophical methods. Thus, this article complements our earlier publication ‘Legal Philosophy as an Enrichment of Doctrinal Research – Part I: Introducing Three Philosophical Methods’.¹x http://www.lawandmethod.nl/tijdschrift/lawandmethod/2020/01/lawandmethod-D-19-00006.

Noten

• * This text has been presented to classes at the University of Zagreb, Queen Mary University of London and Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam; we profited from the feedback of our students. We also want to thank Irma Bluijs, Machteld Geuskens, Tamar de Waal and the reviewers for their helpful comments on previous versions of this article, and Jacqueline Brand and Robert Poll for providing research assistance.

• 1 http://www.lawandmethod.nl/tijdschrift/lawandmethod/2020/01/lawandmethod-D-19-00006.

What is at stake in invoking solidarity in legal-political contexts? The guiding hypothesis of this article is that solidarity is always and necessarily linked to the concept of community. A plea for solidarity will, in other words, directly lead one to the question: solidarity with whom? On the one hand, solidarity may be understood as extending only to those who belong to the same community as us. In this reading, solidarity builds upon an already existing community and applies to members only. On the other hand, invoked by those who aim to question the status quo, solidarity also plays a key role in practices of contestation. In these contexts, it focuses on collective action and the reimagination of political community. The article ends by articulating how this second interpretation of solidarity might prove helpful in making sense of our current predicament of a global pandemic.

Populism is a somehow intractable notion, since its reference is much too wide, comprising phenomena that are indeed in conflict between them, and moreover blurred, by being often used in an instrumental, polemical way. Such intractability is then radicalized through the two alternative approaches to populism, one that is more or less neutral, rooting in the political science tradition, and a second one, fully normative, though fed by political realism, founding as it does on a specific political theory and project. In the article an alternative view is proposed, that of populism as the politics that is congruent with the increasing role played by ‘screens’, icons, and images in social relationships and indeed in political representation. In this way populism is approached as the specific way politics is done within the context of a digitalized société du spectacle.

Litigation funding has become synonymous with class action litigation in Australia with third-party funders being a key source of financing. This article addresses the rise and regulation of litigation funding in Australia through three pathways: judicial oversight of litigation funding, government regulation of litigation funding and competition from lawyers. Initially, litigation funding was subject to minimal regulation in an effort to promote access to justice. However, concerns about the size of profits made by funders which in turn impacted Australian businesses and reduced the compensation available for group members saw the adoption of a more detailed and restrictive regulatory approach. Further regulation has been proposed and criticised for hampering funding of class actions. This article concludes with a middle or compromise position that recommends a base level of regulation and empowers the courts to act as a check on excessive fees.

The right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights) provides one of the procedural guarantees of access to justice. One of the elements on which access to justice under Article 6 ECHR depends is party resources. The concern for equality of arms is that both parties should be able to effectively argue their case before a court, not being impeded by a lack of resources that undermines the tools of their pleading. Such an equality is subject to case-specific analysis. The Lawrence ruling is a ruling on the compatibility of the regime of recoverability of conditional fee agreement (CFA) additional liabilities under the Access to Justice Act 1999 with Article 6 ECHR. The majority in the UK Supreme Court (UKSC) ruled, under a proportionality test, that there was no infringement of Article 6 ECHR because the introduction of the recoverability of CFA additional liabilities was a necessary measure for England to adopt in the pursuit of access to justice under its margin of appreciation. In this article, I will argue that a more holistic view of the procedural guarantees provided for by Article 6 ECHR is called for to properly assess its infringement, considering mainly the principle of equality of arms. The aim of this article is, therefore, to investigate how the principle of equality of arms should have informed the UKSC’s decision in Lawrence.

Contemporary critical analyses of legal education indicate that legal education is undemocratic as it is based on a discipline that produces subjects who obey hierarchies, are free from the habit of criticism and are ready to self-sacrifice for promotion in the social hierarchy. At the same time, critical analyses offer the very passive vision of the law student as merely ‘being processed’ through the educational grinder. Paradoxically, in doing so they confirm the vision they criticize. This article argues that, by adopting a pragmatic philosophical perspective, it is possible to go beyond this one-sided picture. Over the past few decades, there has been an increase in ‘practical’ attitudes in legal education. Socrates’ model of didactics, clinical education and moot courts are giving rise to institutionalized ideas as structural elements of legal education, owing to which a purely disciplinary pedagogy may be superseded. All these practices allow students to accept and confront the viewpoints of others. Education completed in harmony with these ideas promotes an active, critical member of community, who is ready to advance justified moral judgements, and as such is compliant with pragmatic ethics of democracy.

The Court of Justice has ruled that the Flemish complete prohibition of the unstunned slaughter of animals according to religious laws is not contrary to EU law, notwithstanding the exception in Regulation1099/2009 and Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (religious freedom). The Court used the concept of the interpretation of human rights in the light of present day conditions, not to extend the scope of the freedom concerned, but to restrict the religious freedom of Jews and Muslims. Religious rules that have existed for millenniums may give way to very recent views on animal welfare. This contribution is a critical appraisal of the judgment.

This article focuses on the ways in which animal activists that are affiliated with the Dutch branch of Anonymous for the Voiceless – a rapidly growing animal rights organization – shape their movement and actions in the context of the Anthropocene. Drawing on qualitative data, the results show that there are tensions between the way in which the organization presents itself to its audiences and the internal dynamics within the movement. In their frontstage performance, they highlight the open and non-coercive nature of their movement, which they describe as new activism. However, this performance contrasts with the abolitionist vision and internal dynamics within the movement, which is characterized by a clear hierarchy, strict rules for a vegan lifestyle and far-reaching consequences when not complying with those rules.

In recent years, there has been a shift within animal ethics, in which animals are no longer seen purely as passive suffering subjects, but attention is also being paid to their role as agents. In this essay, we look at what that agency means and argue that in the Anthropocene animals are actually victimized in two ways: because their agency is literally curtailed by human actions and because at the knowledge level agency is taken away from them: we see them as victims even when they are not. In this text, we focus on zoo animals to illustrate how this works.

Climate litigation is an understudied phenomenon in criminology. In this article we will discuss the rise of climate change litigation and growing recognition of global environmental harms from a green criminological perspective. More specifically, we will discuss both the legal reasoning and the impact of the Urgenda case in the Netherlands in the context of environmental, ecological and climate justice. We will conclude with how this case contributes for the recognition of diverse climate victims and strengthening of climate justice in the near future.

‘Antropocene’ is a wellknown concept among those that are concerned about the Earth’s future. Nevertheless, there is a heated scientific debat about the start of this era in history and the name ‘antropocene’in itself. In this contribution it is stated that that debate is helpful in raising important questions about the desatrous influence of mankind on live on this planet. Criminologists should take a stance and address these questions as well. This contribution includes a manifest that contains points for further action for criminologists.

Various of our academic board analysed employment law cases from last year. However, first, we start with some general remarks.

Classic pragmatists like John Dewey entertained an encompassing notion of science. This pragmatic belief in the continuities between a scientific, ethical and cultural understanding of the world went into decline in the middle of the 20^th century. To many mid-century American and English philosophers it suggested a simplistic faith that philosophy and science could address substantive questions about values, ethics and aesthetics in a rigorous way. This critique of classic pragmatism has lost some of its force in the last few decades with the rise of neo-pragmatism, but it still has a hold over disciplines like economics and law. In this article I argue that this criticism of pragmatism is rooted in a narrow conception of what science entails and what philosophy should encompass. I primarily focus on one facet: John Dewey’s work on art and aesthetics. I explain why grappling with the world aesthetically, according to Dewey, is closely related to dealing with it scientifically, for instance, through the poetic and aesthetic development of metaphors and concepts to come to terms with reality. This makes his theory of art relevant, I argue, not only to studying and understanding law, but also to teaching law.

In law enforcement animal assisted interventions have become popular. Unfortunately in evaluation studies often animal welfare is not included. The question rises to what extent this work might be harmful for participating animals and what alternatives we may offer. In this contribution we describe how robots have been introduced and are being used in the world of care. Might robots be a good alternative for animal participation in risky situations in law enforcement? We conclude by raising a number of pertinent questions for further research.

Teruggeblikt wordt op de ontwikkelingen in het omgevingsrecht, zijnde natuur, milieu en ruimtelijke ontwikkeling, gedurende de laatste twintig jaar van de Caribische delen van het Koninkrijk.

International human rights law (IHRL) was established in the aftermath of the Second World War to prevent a reoccurrence of the atrocities committed in the name of fascism. Central to this aim was the recognition that out-groups are particularly vulnerable to rights violations committed by the in-group. Yet, it is increasingly apparent that out-groups are still subject to a wide range of rights violations, including those associated with mass atrocities. These rights violations are facilitated by the dehumanisation of the out-group by the in-group. Consequently, this article argues that the creation of IHRL treaties and corresponding monitoring mechanisms should be viewed as the first step towards protecting out-groups from human rights violations. By adopting the lens of dehumanisation, this article demonstrates that if IHRL is to achieve its purpose, IHRL monitoring mechanisms must recognise the connection between dehumanisation and rights violations and develop a positive State obligation to counter dehumanisation. The four treaties explored in this article, the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, all establish positive State obligations to prevent hate speech and to foster tolerant societies. These obligations should, in theory, allow IHRL monitoring mechanisms to address dehumanisation. However, their interpretation of the positive State obligation to foster tolerant societies does not go far enough to counter unconscious dehumanisation and requires more detailed elaboration.