This article argues in favour of lowering the voting age to 16. First, it outlines a respect-based account of democracy where the right to vote is grounded in a respect for citizens’ autonomous capacities. It then outlines a normative account of autonomy, modelled on Rawls’s two moral powers, saying what criteria must be met for an individual to possess a (pro tanto) moral right to vote. Second, it engages with empirical psychology to show that by the age of 16 (if not earlier) individuals have developed all of the cognitive components of autonomy. Therefore, since 16- and 17-year-olds (and quite probably those a little younger) possess the natural features required for autonomy, then, to the extent that respect for autonomy requires granting political rights including the right to vote – and barring some special circumstances that apply only to them – 16- and 17-year-olds should be granted the right to vote.

This article engages in a comparison of the regulation of PR in the Netherlands and the UK (specifically England and Wales). The latter is a good comparator as it operates a similar regulatory approach to the Netherlands, that of conditional acceptance of PR, the condition being (prior) consent. Furthermore, the UK boasts a more detailed and mature legal framework that continues to be tested through caselaw, and thus offers insight into how a regulatory approach conditional upon the (prior) consent of the deceased can fare.
The article starts with a brief exposition of the new Dutch guidelines and the current legislative position in the Netherlands vis-à-vis posthumous reproduction (part II). Likewise, the relevant UK guidelines and legislative position are summarized (part III). This article draws out the similarities and differences between the two regimes, as well as engaging in a critical analysis of the regulations themselves. It then looks at how the UK regime has been challenged in recent years through caselaw in anticipation of the issues that might confront the Netherlands in future (part IV). The article concludes (part V) that the key lesson to be drawn from the UK experience is that clarity and consistency is crucial in navigating this ethically, emotionally, and time sensitive area. Further, that both the UK and the Netherlands can expect demand for more detailed and precise regulatory guidance as requests for the procedure increase, and within evermore novel circumstances.

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Dit artikel vergelijkt de regulering van postume reproductie (PR) in Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk (in het bijzonder Engeland en Wales). Laatstgenoemde is daarvoor zeer geschikt, aangezien het VK een vergelijkbare reguleringsbenadering heeft als Nederland, namelijk de voorwaardelijke acceptatie van PR, waarbij (voorafgaande) toestemming de voorwaarde is. Bovendien beschikt het VK over een gedetailleerder en volwassener juridisch kader dat continu wordt getoetst door middel van rechtspraak. Dit kader biedt daarmee inzicht in hoe een regulerende benadering met als voorwaarde (voorafgaande) toestemming van de overledene kan verlopen.
Het artikel vangt aan met een korte uiteenzetting van de nieuwe Nederlandse richtlijnen en de huidige positie van de Nederlandse wetgever ten opzichte van postume reproductie (deel II). De relevante Britse richtlijnen en het wetgevende standpunt worden eveneens samengevat (deel III). Vervolgens worden de overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen de twee regimes naar voren gebracht, met daarbij een kritische analyse van de regelgeving. Hierop volgt een beschrijving van hoe het VK de afgelopen jaren is uitgedaagd in de rechtspraak, daarmee anticiperend op vraagstukken waarmee Nederland in de toekomst te maken kan krijgen (deel IV). Tot slot volgt een conclusie (deel V) waarin wordt aangetoond dat de belangrijkste les die uit de Britse ervaring kan worden getrokken, is dat duidelijkheid en consistentie cruciaal zijn bij het navigeren door dit ethische, emotionele en tijdgevoelige gebied. En daarnaast, at zowel het VK als Nederland een vraag naar meer gedetailleerde en precieze regelgeving kunnen verwachten naarmate verzoeken om deze procedure toenemen, met daarbij steeds weer nieuwe omstandigheden.

Data driven innovation holds the potential in transforming current business and knowledge discovery models. For this reason, data sharing has become one of the central points of interest for the European Commission towards the creation of a Digital Single Market. The value of automatically generated data, which are collected by Internet-connected objects (IoT), is increasing: from smart houses to wearables, machine-generated data hold significant potential for growth, learning, and problem solving. Facilitating researchers in order to provide access to these types of data implies not only the articulation of existing legal obstacles and of proposed legal solutions but also the understanding of the incentives that motivate the sharing of the data in question. What are the legal tools that researchers can use to gain access and reuse rights in the context of their research?

For social scientists undertaking critical research on elites in organisational contexts securing access is a challenging exercise that may rely on the use of several access strategies over extended periods. This process is further complicated by the existence of research ethics frameworks that establish boundaries to access strategies, posing dilemmas on how to best balance access needs with a commitment to ethical practices. This article focuses on such dilemmas – or the ‘ethics of access’ – through a reflection on PhD fieldwork during 2016-2017 in Luxembourg spent researching the European Investment Bank. The paper will conclude by calling for an overhaul of existing frameworks in order to foster more research on elites.

A narrative review was conducted to develop more coherent awareness and knowledge regarding emotional experiences of qualitative researchers studying sensitive topics or vulnerable groups, as discussions about this topic are currently fragmented and scattered. Qualitative researchers experience many painful as well as enjoyable emotions, which can influence their personal, social and professional lives. These emotions are recurrently reported in relation to the unpredictability of qualitative research and the different roles of qualitative researchers. More structural and individual attention for emotional experiences of qualitative researchers is necessary, for instance, in academic (doctoral) training and general handbooks on qualitative research.

This article draws on a piece of ethnographic research carried out with outreach workers in London working with street-based sex workers (SBSWs). The aim of the research was to determine the efficacy of the services offered to this hard-to-reach client group. The charitable organization has a long history (20+ years) working with SBSWs in the Kings Cross area; we evaluated their drop-in and outreach services for this client group, many of whom have high-level needs due to substance misuse and mental health issues. We initially conducted semi-structured interviews with women at the drop-in services, but encountered a number of ethical and logistical issues that prompted us to consider alternative methodological approaches. This article explores our use of mobile interviews with SBSWs and the outreach team who encounter them, which we argue gives us unique insights into the realities and lived experiences of both women who work (and sometimes live) on the street and the outreach team members who engage with this hard-to-reach group. We argue that mobile interviews offer a highly effective way of conducting research with a vulnerable population, and enabled us to gain a unique perspective into best practice around effectively and ethically researching hard-to-reach groups. Critically, we maintain that these walking interviews gave detailed insights into the lives of SBSWs that would not have been possible using more traditional methods. We provide empirical data in this article from these walking interviews, including fieldnote excerpts, and consider the value of using mobile and innovative methods for criminological research with hard-to-reach populations.

In 2016 the Dutch Government Commission of Reassessment of Parenthood (GCRP) proposed a wide array of legal changes to Family Law, e.g. with regard to legal multi-parenthood and legal multiple parental responsibility. Although the commission researched these matters thoroughly in its quest towards proposing new directions in the field of Family Law, multi-parents themselves were not interviewed by the commission. Therefore, this article aims to explore a possible gap between the social experiences of parents and the recommendations of the GCRP. Data was drawn from in depth-interviews with a sample of 25 parents in plus-two-parent constellations living in Belgium and the Netherlands. For the most part the social experiences of parents aligned with the ways in which the GCRP plans to legally accommodate the former. However, my data tentatively suggests that other (legal) recommendations of the GCRP need to be explored more in depth.
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In 2016 stelde de Nederlandse Staatscommissie Herijking ouderschap voor om een wettelijk kader te creëren voor meerouderschap en meeroudergezag. Ondanks de grondigheid van het gevoerde onderzoek ontbraken er gegevens omtrent de ervaringen van de meerouders zelf. Dit artikel levert een bijdrage in het vullen van deze leemte door inzage te geven in de (juridische) ervaringen van 25 ouders in meerouderschapsconstellaties in België en Nederland.

In legal education, criticism is conceived as an academic activity. As lecturers, we expect from students more than just the expression of their opinion; they have to evaluate and criticize a certain practice, building on a sound argumentation and provide suggestions on how to improve this practice. Criticism not only entails a negative judgment but is also constructive since it aims at changing the current state of affairs that it rejects (for some reason or other). In this article, we want to show how we train critical writing in the legal skills course for first-year law students (Juridische vaardigheden) at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. We start with a general characterization of the skill of critical writing on the basis of four questions: 1. Why should we train critical writing? 2. What does criticism mean in a legal context? 3. How to carry out legal criticism? and 4. How to derive recommendations from the criticism raised? Subsequently, we discuss, as an illustration to the last two questions, the Dutch Urgenda case, which gave rise to a lively debate in the Netherlands on the role of the judge. Finally, we show how we have applied our general understanding of critical writing to our legal skills course. We describe the didactic approach followed and our experiences with it.

This article discusses how the law has approached disparate socio-technological innovations over the centuries. Precisely, the primary concern of this paper is to investigate the timing of regulatory intervention. To do so, the article makes a selection of particular innovations connected with money, windmills and data storage devices, and analyses them from a historical perspective. The individual insights from the selected innovations should yield a more systematic view on regulation and technological innovations. The result is that technological changes may be less momentous, from a regulatory standpoint, than social changes.

For quite some years now, crimes of ‘the powerful’ have been studied by criminologists. While researching crimes of ‘the powerful’, researchers aim to maintain and safeguard their integrity and ethics. However, there seems to be a friction between, on the one hand, ethics of the researchers themselves and on the other hand, ethics (policies) of universities. Obviously, not only do they have to justify their actions and decisions to themselves and ‘science’ as a whole, they must justify their research to ethics committees (EC’s) of universities. It could result in complex and difficult situations when researchers suspect that EC’s themselves may be instruments and products of the powerful groups they are studying. In that case, EC’s might undermine ethics and research integrity themselves. What do certain EC- ‘conditions’ look like for research ethics and to which extent do they have to be adjusted or reconsidered when criminologists are researching ‘the powerful’? The key question that will be answered in this contribution is as follows: how can criminologist (re)act ethically responsibly when confronted with (un)ethical committees? To answer this and other relevant questions, after reviewing literature, we reflect on a biographical study of a legal arms trader. We then elaborate on the ‘ethics creep’ (Haggerty, 2004) that seems to haunt social sciences nowadays.

Studies have shown that the effects of scientific research on law and policy making are often fairly limited. Different reasons can be given for this: scientists are better at falsifying hypothesis than at predicting the future, the outcomes of academic research and empirical evidence can be inconclusive or even contradictory, the timing of the legislative cycle and the production of research show mismatches, there can be clashes between the political rationality and the economic or scientific rationality in the law making process et cetera. There is one ‘wicked’ methodological problem, though, that affects all regulatory policy making, namely: the ‘jump’ from empirical facts (e.g. there are too few organ donors in the Netherlands and the voluntary registration system is not working) to normative recommendations of what the law should regulate (e.g. we need to change the default rule so that everybody in principle becomes an organ donor unless one opts out). We are interested in how this translation process takes place and whether it could make a difference if the empirical research on which legislative drafts are build is more quantitative type of research or more qualitative. That is why we have selected two cases in which either type of research played a role during the drafting phase. We use the lens of the proportionality principle in order to see how empirical data and scientific evidence are used by legislative drafters to justify normative choices in the design of new laws.

This paper starts by reviewing empirical research that threatens law and economics’ initial success. This research has demonstrated that the functioning of the law cannot be well understood based on the assumption of the rational actor and that policies which are based on this assumption are likely to be flawed. Subsequently, three responses to this criticism are discussed. Whereas the first response denounces this criticism by maintaining that the limitations attributed to the rational actor can easily be incorporated in rational choice theory, the second response welcomes the criticism as an opportunity to come up with an integrative theory of law and behavior. The third response also takes the criticism seriously but replaces the aspiration to come up with such an integrative theory by a context-sensitive approach. It will be argued that the first two responses fall short while the third response offers a promising way to go forward.

Drones en drone-gerelateerde cybertechnologieën nemen een vlucht in het veiligheidsdomein in de vorm van toepassingen door het leger, de politie, brandweer, private beveiligingsbedrijven, en ook deurwaarders, agrariërs en burgerinitiatieven. Drones werden in eerste instantie ontwikkeld voor militaire doeleinden. Hun aanpassingsvermogen als universele platforms voor beeldregistratie en goederenvervoer leidt tot hoge verwachtingen rond toepassing in het civiele domein. Dit artikel onderzoekt de ethische aspecten van “dual use” van drones en gerelateerde technologieën. Verschillende dimensies van dual use worden verkend: de technologisch ontwikkeling, maar ook de ontwikkeling van wet- en regelgeving in Amerika en Europa. Voor het Nederlandse veiligheidsdomein is relevant dat dit artikel bijdraagt aan het signaleren van de noodzaak om de ontwikkeling en toepassing van drones in breder perspectief te bezien. Drones en hun toepassingen maken deel uit van de internationale markt van militaire organisaties en van veiligheidsorganisaties in het publieke en private domein. Bovendien maken ze veelal deel uit van geïntegreerde systemen en van wereldwijde platforms voor consumentenelektronica. Dit artikel is een van de resultaten uit het door NWO gefinancierde project 'Responsible Design of Drones and Drone Services: Towards an Ethical and Juridical Tool For Drone Design and Risk Assessment' (Project no. 313-99-318). Het project was gericht op het ontwikkelen van een instrument voor ontwikkeling en gebruik van dronetoepassingen uitgaande van methoden als Responsible Research & Innovation (RRI) en Value Sensitive Design (VSD).

The aim of this article is to examine the differences in perception of ‘fairness’ between developing and developed countries, which influence developing countries’ willingness to embrace the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) proposals and to recommend as to how to overcome these differences. The article provides an introduction to the background of the OECD’s BEPS initiatives (Action Plan, Low Income Countries Report, Multilateral Framework, Inclusive Framework) and the concerns of developing countries about their ability to implement BEPS (Section 1); a non-exhaustive overview of the shortcomings of the BEPS Project and its Action Plan in respect of developing countries (Section 2); arguments on why developing countries might perceive fairness in relation to corporate income taxes differently from developed countries (Section 3); and recommendations for international organisations, governments and academic researchers on where fairness in respect of developing countries should be more properly addressed (Section 4).

The comparative discussions held during this seminar show that the different jurisdictions make use of – approximately – the same ingredients for their legislation on adult guardianship measures and continuing powers of attorney. Given the common international framework (for example the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities) and given the common societal context (cfr. the strong increase of the ageing population) this may not come as a surprise. Despite these common ingredients, the different jurisdictions have managed to arrive at different dishes spiced with specific local flavours. Given that each jurisdiction bears its own history and specific policy plans, this may not come as a surprise either. The adage ‘same same but different’ is in this respect a suitable bromide.
For my own research, the several invitations – that implicitly or explicitly arose from the different discussions – to rethink important concepts or assumptions were of most relevance and importance. A particular example that comes to mind is the suggestion to ‘reverse the jurisprudence’ and to take persons with disabilities instead of healthy adult persons as a point of reference. Also, the invitation to rethink the relationship between the limitation of capacity and the attribution of a guard comes to mind as the juxtaposition of the different jurisdictions showed that these two aspects don’t need to be automatically combined. Also the discussion on the interference between the continuing powers of attorney and the supervision by the court, provoked further reflection on hybrid forms of protection on my part. Finally, the ethical and medical-legal approaches may lead to a reconsideration of the traditional underlying concepts of autonomy and the assessment of capacity.

People with mental illness usually experience higher rates of disability and mortality. Often, health care systems do not adequately respond to the burden of mental disorders worldwide. The number of health care providers dealing with mental health care is insufficient in many countries. Equal access to necessary health services should be granted to mentally ill people without any discrimination. E-mental health is expected to enhance the quality of care as well as accessibility, availability and affordability of services. This paper examines under what conditions e-mental health can contribute to realising the right to health by using the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality (AAAQ) framework that is developed by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Research shows e-mental health facilitates dissemination of information, remote consultation and patient monitoring and might increase access to mental health care. Furthermore, patient participation might increase, and stigma and discrimination might be reduced by the use of e-mental health. However, e-mental health might not increase the access to health care for everyone, such as the digitally illiterate or those who do not have access to the Internet. The affordability of this service, when it is not covered by insurance, can be a barrier to access to this service. In addition, not all e-mental health services are acceptable and of good quality. Policy makers should adopt new legal policies to respond to the present and future developments of modern technologies in health, as well as e-Mental health. To analyse the impact of e-mental health on the right to health, additional research is necessary.

According to the precautionary principle lack of scientific evidence for the existence of a certain (environmental) risk should not be a reason not to take preventative policy measures. The precautionary principle had a stormy career in International environmental law and made its mark on many treaties, including the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). However it remains controversial. Proponents see it as the necessary legal curb to keep the dangerous tendencies of industrial production and technology in check. Opponents regard it with suspicion. They fear it will lead to a decrease in freedom and fear the powers to intervene that it grants the state. In this article the principle is reviewed from the perspectives of Ulrich Beck’s ‘reflexive modernisation’ and Michel Foucault’s notion of governmentality. It is argued that from Beck’s perspective the precautionary principle is the result of a learning process in which mankind gradually comes to adopt a reflexive attitude to the risks modernity has given rise to. It represents the wish to devise more inclusive and democratic policies on risks and environmental hazards. From the perspective of Michel Foucault however, the principle is part and parcel of neo-liberal tendencies of responsibilisation. Risk management and prudency are devolved to the public in an attempt to minimise risk taking, while at the same time optimising production. Moreover, it grants legitimacy to state intervention if the public does not live up to the responsibilities foisted on it. Both perspectives are at odds, but represent different sides of the same coin and might learn from each other concerns.