States apply different material conditions to attract or restrict residence of certain types of migrants. But states can also make use of time as an instrument to design more welcoming or more restrictive policies. States can apply faster application procedures for desired migrants. Furthermore, time can be used in a more favourable way to attract desired migrants in regard to duration of residence, access to a form of permanent residence and protection against loss of residence. This contribution makes an analysis of how time is used as an instrument in shaping migration policy by the European Union (EU) legislator in the context of making migration more or less attractive. This analysis shows that two groups are treated more favourably in regard to the use of time in several aspects: EU citizens and economic- and knowledge-related third-country nationals. However, when it comes to the acquisition of permanent residence after a certain period of time, the welcoming policy towards economic- and knowledge-related migrants is no longer obvious.

This article argues that it is legitimate for the state to practice soft paternalism towards changing hearts and minds in order to prevent behaviour that is discriminatory. Liberals accept that it is not legitimate for the state to intervene in order to change how people think because ideas and beliefs are wrong in themselves. It is legitimate for the state to intervene with the actions of a person only when there is a risk of harm to others and when there is a threat to social coexistence. Preventive action of the state is legitimate if we consider the immaterial and material harm that discrimination causes. It causes harm to the social standing of the person, psychological harm, economic and existential harm. All these harms threaten peaceful social coexistence. This article traces a theory of permissible government action. Research in the areas of behavioural psychology, neuroscience and social psychology indicates that it is possible to bring about a change in hearts and minds. Encouraging a person to adopt the perspective of the person who has experienced discrimination can lead to empathetic understanding. This, can lead a person to critically evaluate her prejudice. The paper argues that soft paternalism towards changing hearts and minds is legitimate in order to prevent harm to others. It attempts to legitimise state coercion in order to eliminate prejudice and broader social patterns of inequality and marginalisation. And it distinguishes between appropriate and non-appropriate avenues the state could pursue in order to eliminate prejudice. Policies towards eliminating prejudice should address the rational and the emotional faculties of a person. They should aim at using methods and techniques that focus on persuasion and reduce coercion. They should raise awareness of what prejudice is and how it works in order to facilitate well-informed voluntary decisions. The version of soft paternalism towards changing minds and attitudes defended in this article makes it consistent with liberalism.

In this article, we focus on how the education system can be used to promote equality in the context of changing people’s hearts and minds – values, morals and mindsets. The duties contained in the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (‘Equality Act’) bind private and public schools, educators, learners, governing bodies and the state. The Equality Act calls on the state and all persons to promote substantive equality, but the relevant sections in the Equality Act have not been given effect yet, and are therefore currently not enforceable. We set out how the duty to promote equality should be concretised in the Equality Act to inter alia use the education system to promote equality in schools; in other words, how should an enforceable duty to promote equality in schools be fashioned in terms of the Equality Act. Should the relevant sections relating to the promotion of equality come into effect in their current form, enforcement of the promotion of equality will take the form of obliging schools to draft action plans and submit these to the South African Human Rights Commission. We deem this approach inadequate and therefore propose certain amendments to the Equality Act to allow for a more sensible monitoring of schools’ duty to promote equality. We explain how the duty to promote equality should then play out practically in the classroom to facilitate a change in learners’ hearts and minds.

Tegenwoordig bestaat meer aandacht voor burgers die om uiteenlopende redenen niet goed in staat zijn om zich aan juridische normen te houden, in het bijzonder ook aan strafrechtelijke normen. Het gaat om mensen wier cognitieve vermogens tekortschieten en/of die een onderontwikkeld vermogen van zelfcontrole hebben. Deze ontwikkeling kan worden beschouwd als een zekere mate van erkenning dat de maatschappij – en de overheid in het bijzonder – medeverantwoordelijk is voor het scheppen van de bestaansvoorwaarden waaronder mensen zich kunnen ontplooien tot verantwoordelijke burgers. In dit artikel betoog ik dat deze gedeelde verantwoordelijkheid niet alleen geldt voor de ontwikkeling van de mentale capaciteiten die nodig zijn om de normen van het recht te kunnen volgen, maar ook voor het bieden van toegang aan burgers tot de materiële normen zelf.

In de Nederlandse rechtspraktijk kan de rechter een beroep op een strafuitsluitingsgrond verwerpen als blijkt dat de verdachte een zekere mate van eigen schuld heeft, ondanks dat de (overige) voorwaarden zijn vervuld. In de literatuur worden bezwaren aangevoerd tegen deze pragmatische benadering en zijn alternatieve aansprakelijkheidsmodellen tot stand gekomen: eigen schuld als zelfstandig strafbaar feit en de actio libera in causa. In deze bijdrage worden beide modellen beschreven en vergeleken met de Nederlandse benadering.

Few legal theorists today would argue that the domain of law exists in isolation from other normative spheres governing society, notably from the domain of ‘politics’. Nevertheless, the implicit norm that judges should not act ‘politically’ remains influential and widespread in the debates surrounding controversial court cases. This article aims to square these two observations. Taking the Miller v. Secretary of State and Urgenda cases as illustrative case studies, the article demonstrates that what it means for judges to adjudicate cases ‘apolitically’ is itself a matter of controversy. In reflecting on their own constitutional role, courts are forced to take a stance on substantive questions of political philosophy. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the ‘norm of judicial apoliticality’ should therefore be rejected. The norm’s coherence lies in its intersocial function: its role in declaring certain modes of judicial interpretation and intervention legitimate (‘legal’/‘judicial’) or illegitimate (‘political’).

This article examines the tension between the constitutional obligation of judges to uphold rules of positive law and possibly conflicting standards of conduct arising from professional-ethical values. The theoretical analysis will be illustrated by the case of Hungary, an EU member state experiencing rule of law challenges since 2010 and where the 2018-2019 criminalization of homelessness exemplifies the studied tension. Inspired by the theories of Philip Selznick and Martin Krygier, rule of law will be viewed as a value that requires progressive realization and context-specific implementation. By contextualizing the relevant Hungarian constitutional framework with the content of the judicial code of ethics and judicial practice, it will be shown how the legitimate space for Hungarian judges to distance themselves from legislation possibly in conflict with rule of law values is reduced. Theoretical suggestions for addressing such rule of law regressions will be made.

In each youth justice system, several age limits exist that indicate what type of reaction can and may be connected to the degree of responsibility that a person can already bear. Civil liability, criminal responsibility and criminal majority are examples of concepts on which age limits are based, but whose definition and impact is not always clear. Especially as far as the minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR) is concerned, confusion exists in legal doctrine. This is apparent from the fact that international comparison tables often show different MACRs for the same country. Moreover, the international literature often seems to define youth justice systems by means of a lower and upper limit, whereas such a dual distinction is too basic to comprehend the complex multilayer nature of the systems. This contribution therefore maps out and conceptually clarifies the different interpretations and consequences of the several age limits that exist within youth justice systems. To that extent, the age limits of six countries are analysed: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Northern Ireland. This legal comparison ultimately leads to a proposal to establish a coherent conceptual framework on age limits in youth justice.

Since 1 April 2014, young adults aged 18 up to and including 22 years can be sentenced with juvenile sanctions in the Netherlands. This legislation is referred to as ‘adolescent criminal law’ (ACL). An important reason for the special treatment of young adults is their over-representation in crime. The underlying idea of ACL is that some young adult offenders are less mature than others. These young adults may benefit more from pedagogically oriented juvenile sanctions than from the deterrent focus of adult sanctions. Little is known, however, about the characteristics of the young adults sentenced with juvenile sanctions since the implementation of ACL. The aim of this study is to gain insight into the demographic, criminogenic and criminal case characteristics of young adult offenders sentenced with juvenile sanctions in the first year after the implementation of ACL. A cross-sectional study was conducted using a juvenile sanction group and an adult sanction group. Data on 583 criminal cases of young adults, sanctioned from 1 April 2014 up to March 2015, were included. Data were obtained from the Public Prosecution Service, the Dutch Probation Service and Statistics Netherlands. The results showed that characteristics indicating problems across different domains were more prevalent among young adults sentenced with juvenile sanctions. Furthermore, these young adults committed a greater number of serious offences compared with young adults who were sentenced with adult sanctions. The findings of this study provide support for the special treatment of young adult offenders in criminal law as intended by ACL.

This article argues in favour of lowering the voting age to 16. First, it outlines a respect-based account of democracy where the right to vote is grounded in a respect for citizens’ autonomous capacities. It then outlines a normative account of autonomy, modelled on Rawls’s two moral powers, saying what criteria must be met for an individual to possess a (pro tanto) moral right to vote. Second, it engages with empirical psychology to show that by the age of 16 (if not earlier) individuals have developed all of the cognitive components of autonomy. Therefore, since 16- and 17-year-olds (and quite probably those a little younger) possess the natural features required for autonomy, then, to the extent that respect for autonomy requires granting political rights including the right to vote – and barring some special circumstances that apply only to them – 16- and 17-year-olds should be granted the right to vote.

The first part of this article presents three academic theories on radicalisation: Moghaddam’s staircase model of radicalisation, Galtung’s typology of violence (direct, structural and cultural violence), and Staub’s psycho-educative approach. The core of Staub’s approach is that in conflict periods, people can be psychologically manipulated through their own fears, insecurities and unresolved traumas. Therefore, psycho-education and the empowerment of people are highly necessary to stimulate citizens to function as active bystanders when they are confronted with wrongdoing. In the second part of this article some promising approaches are pres­en‍ted which might increase personal and social resilience. The role of narratives in understanding experiences and changing identities is discussed. Radio La Benevolencija in Rwanda uses the power of storytel­l‍ing to stimulate resilience among the population. In the concluding paragraph a two-pronged strategy on radicalization is presented. This positive criminological perspective aims to promote active bystandership, participation and resilience.

Klimaatverandering is niet meer weg te denken uit het publieke debat. In het afgelopen jaar stond het onderwerp vaak op de politieke agenda, werd Greta Thunberg uitgeroepen tot Time Person of the Year en was het Urgenda-arrest een van de meest besproken gerechtelijke uitspraken van het jaar. Binnen het strafrecht wordt nog weinig aandacht aan klimaatverandering besteed, maar dat zal op korte termijn veranderen. Dit artikel bevat een verkenning naar de strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid van partijen die bijdragen aan klimaatverandering en de strafrechtelijke handhaving van klimaatwetgeving.

Increasingly often, it is stated that the universal values underpinning Western liberal democracies are a product of a ‘Judeo-Christian’ tradition. This article explores the legitimacy of this claim from the perspective of liberal-democratic theory. It argues that state-endorsed claims about the historical roots of liberal-democratic values are problematic (1) if they are promoted as though they are above democratic scrutiny and (2) if they insinuate that citizens who belong to a particular (majority) culture remain the ‘cultural owners’ of the core values underpinning the state. More pragmatically, the paper suggests that the claim carries the risk of failing to facilitate all citizens becoming or remaining committed to nurturing fundamental rights and a shared society based on norms of democratic equality.

Socio-political concepts are not singularities. They are, instead, complex and evolving contextures. An awareness of the latter and of what we need to do when we handle concepts opens up space for the resolution of political disagreements and multiplies opportunities for constructive dialogue and understanding. In this article, I argue that the concepts-as-contextures perspective can unravel conceptual connectivity and interweaving, and I substantiate this by examining the ‘contexture’ of liberty. I show that the different, and seemingly contested, definitions of liberty are the product of mixed articulations and the development of associative discursive links within a contexture.

The Dutch Government intends to implement a Juvenile Justice Law for the Caribbean Netherlands. This article addresses this development and gives some important considerations from a children’s rights perspective; particularly, the rights of children while in the juvenile justice system and the Government’s obligation to prevent children from entering into the system. The discussion hinges on the findings of UNICEF The Netherlands’ recently published Situation Analysis on the Rights of Children and Adolescents in the Caribbean Netherlands, focusing on child vulnerabilities that may eventually lead to criminality and recommendations regarding necessary provisions, collaboration between ministries and public entities, and the availability of data to monitor the effectiveness of government policy.

In de onderhavige prejudiciële zaak is het Hof van Justitie voor het eerst verzocht om een uitspraak over de uitlegging van de bepalingen van Verordening (EU) nr. 1169/2011 over de vermelding van het ‘land van oorsprong’ en de ‘plaats van herkomst’ met betrekking tot levensmiddelen die uit de door Israël sinds 1967 bezette gebieden afkomstig zijn. In het op 12 november 2019 gewezen arrest in de de zaak Organisation juive européenne en Vignoble Psagot heeft het Hof van Justitie geoordeeld dat uit deze verordening volgt dat op levensmiddelen die afkomstig zijn uit een door Israël bezet gebied, niet alleen dit gebied maar tevens, wanneer die levensmiddelen afkomstig zijn uit een plaats die of een geheel van plaatsen dat een Israëlische nederzetting binnen dat gebied vormt, deze herkomst moet worden vermeld. In deze bijdrage worden de achtergronden en gevolgen van deze uitspraak nader toegelicht.
HvJ 12 november 2019, zaak C-363/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:954 (Organisation juive européenne en Vignoble Psagot)

Using frame analyses, the authors explore how people confirm, question or deny victimization, or refrain from interpretation. A frame consists of a problem definition (acts), the diagnosis of causes (identifying actors), and moral judgments. Results confirm that the interaction between factors defines the interpretation of victimization. Similar acts (for instance the consumption of alcohol) are ascribed different meanings depending on the type of frame. The positioning of actors in a frame determines who or what is perceived responsible for the (moral) judgment.

In this article, we discuss a particular form of interdisciplinary legal research. We focus on a discipline that may be fruitfully combined with doctrinal research, namely philosophy. The aim of this article is to give an account of the methods of philosophy that are most relevant and useful for doctrinal legal scholars. Our focus is therefore mostly on legal philosophy and the philosophical subdisciplines closely related to it, such as political philosophy and ethics. We characterize legal philosophy in three complementary ways: as an activity, as insights, and as theories. We then discuss three methods of legal philosophy: argumentation analysis and construction, author analysis and reflective equilibrium. In the practice of research these three methods are usually combined, as we will show with various examples.

Text and Data Mining (hereinafter, TDM) issue for the purpose of scientific research or for any other purpose which is included in the provisions of the new EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (hereinafter, DSM). TDM is a term that includes Web harvesting and Web Archiving activities. Web harvesting and archiving pertains to the processes of collecting from the web and archiving of works that reside on the Web. In the following analysis we will elaborate briefly upon provisions in EU Copyright law which were discussed during the proposal for a new Directive on Copyright in the DSM as well as provisions which are included in the text of art.3 and art.4 of the new Directive 2019/790/EU per TDM. In addition, the following analysis presents legislation in very few EU Member States which pertains to TDM and preceded the rulings of Directive 2019/790/EU. Digital legal deposit remarkable examples from EU Member States are also presented in this paper. The example of Australia is also presented below hereto because it is one of the oldest and most successful worldwide. The National Library of Australia’s digital legal deposit is state-of-the-art.