Deze text belicht achtergronden van het ethiekonderwijs aan juristen, zoals dat aan de Radboud Universiteit vorm krijgt. Centraal staat eerst de praktisch én theoretisch relevante spanning tussen ethiek en recht. Na een verkenning van deze spanning bespreekt Marcel Becker de status van ethische theorieën en de meerwaarde van sociaalwetenschappelijke kennis voor ethiekonderwijs.

Classic pragmatists like John Dewey entertained an encompassing notion of science. This pragmatic belief in the continuities between a scientific, ethical and cultural understanding of the world went into decline in the middle of the 20^th century. To many mid-century American and English philosophers it suggested a simplistic faith that philosophy and science could address substantive questions about values, ethics and aesthetics in a rigorous way. This critique of classic pragmatism has lost some of its force in the last few decades with the rise of neo-pragmatism, but it still has a hold over disciplines like economics and law. In this article I argue that this criticism of pragmatism is rooted in a narrow conception of what science entails and what philosophy should encompass. I primarily focus on one facet: John Dewey’s work on art and aesthetics. I explain why grappling with the world aesthetically, according to Dewey, is closely related to dealing with it scientifically, for instance, through the poetic and aesthetic development of metaphors and concepts to come to terms with reality. This makes his theory of art relevant, I argue, not only to studying and understanding law, but also to teaching law.

‘Illiberal’ is an adjective that is commonly used by scholars. For example, they might speak of ‘illiberal cultures’, ‘illiberal groups’, ‘illiberal states’, ‘illiberal democracies’, ‘illiberal beliefs’, and ‘illiberal practices’. Yet despite its widespread usage, no in-depth discussions exist of exactly what it means for someone or something to be illiberal, or might mean. This article fills this lacuna by providing a conceptual analysis of the term ‘illiberal practices’, which I argue is basic in that other bearers of the property of being illiberal can be understood by reference to it. Specifically, I identify five ways in which a practice can be illiberal based on the different ways in which this term is employed within both scholarly and political discourses. The main value of this disaggregation lies in the fact that it helps to prevent confusions that arise when people use the adjective ‘illiberal’ in different ways, as is not uncommon.

Terrorism can only be brought to an end if Islam and the Muslim community are enlisted as allies in combating it. Underlying militant jihadism is a violent interpretation of Islam which can best be challenged with the assistance of Islam and the Muslim community. Since the effects of the current state-led approach are questionable, while its criminal law component is close to exceeding the limits set by the rule of law and turns Muslims into a suspect community, it is important to test by way of a pilot whether an approach based on Islam can reap more promising results.

The Dobersberger decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union deals with the legal situation of posted workers on an international train. These workers, employed by a Hungarian company and based in Hungary, operate on a train connecting Budapest with Salzburg and Munich. The Court concludes against their inclusion under the Posting of Workers Directive, considering their connection to the Austrian territory as too limited. This decision is based on a selective representation of the facts and sits difficultly with the letter of the law and the intention of the legislator.

Since society was secularized, the values of democracy based on the rule of law seem to have the best (potential) binding force for social cohesion. These values are linked to Christianity however. The relation between both will be explained by a critical review of Larry Siedentops Inventing the individual and Olivier Roy’s l’Europe est-elle chrétienne?

Convict criminology draws from personal experience of imprisonment to offer critical criminological perspectives on punishment and prisons. In this article I discuss how some of these are aligned with questions of narrative and post-colonial perspectives in criminology. I use autoethnographic vignettes to communicate the experiences of imprisonment that inform the development of convict criminology, and I explore their relationship to narrative criminology’s interest in personal stories.

This article adopts German philosopher Hans Vaihinger’s Philosophy of “as if” as a vehicle to sketch the main features of the emerging research domain of narrative victimology, as well as address some of its limitations. Vaihinger emphasizes the importance of useful untruths, i.e. things we know to be untrue, but nevertheless behave as if they are not, if that strengthens their use as instruments for us to find our way more easily in the world. This applies to our daily lives, but also to our societal institutions and the models and metaphors that underlie our approaches to (social) science. The paper argues that the narrative metaphor of the historical event is often more apt to enhance our understanding of victimological phenomena than that of the mechanism, which is the default metaphor of (social) science. The paper subsequently describes four areas of inquiry of narrative victimology: victimisation’s impact on (life) stories; narratives in the aftermath of victimization; narratives of victim’s experiences with justice processes and the coincidence and juxtaposition of the victims’ narrative with narratives of other significant parties. For all its merits however, the narrative metaphor is also a “useful untruth”, equipped with its own limitations, for instance the difficulty of language in describing first hand experiences of victims and the possibility that narrative structures will be imposed upon victim experiences.

Narrative criminology focuses on stories. It initially contrasted itself with standard approaches to interviewing. The founders of narrative criminology proposed that we understand that what the persons we investigate are telling us, as acting discursively and not as factual descriptions of events or accurate representations of their perspective. This critique I compare to previous critique on interviewing to show their overlap. Next, I critique these critiques. Finally, I propose several ways through which narratives in interviews can be enriched.

In this review-essay, two books by criminologist Lois Presser are discussed: Why We Harm (2013) and Inside Story: How Narratives Drive Mass Harm (2018). In these books the author develops a general theory of harmful action, in particular collective and massive forms of harmful action that are often related to state institutions and large companies. Presser shows that all kinds of stories, scripts and ideologies may justify, support, cover up or deny harmful action. In her publications, cultural sociology, critical criminology and discourse analysis are intimately intertwined.

Critical narrative criminologists analyse dominant and institutionalised stories that can contribute to harm but they might also become more involved in interrogating and changing such narratives. The following question would be: in what ways can this be done? Based on experiences from a Participatory Action Research (PAR) project on stigma with people who use(d) illegal drugs, this paper reflects on the epistemological opportunities and challenges of fusing narrative criminology with PAR. Although such an integration raises potential tensions – especially with regard to the role of the researcher – PAR can amplify narrative criminology by offering a framework for practicing critical, ethical and socially engaged scholarship. Vice versa, narrative criminology can deepen PAR in its analysis of discursive power structures and the relation between narratives and action.

This article explores the intersection of two criminological perspectives—cultural criminology and narrative criminology. Taking inspiration from Mills and Fleetwood’s article, ‘Prepping and verstehen: A narrative criminological perspective’, where the authors contend that stories complement the pursuit of criminological verstehen, this article draws attention to other ways in which cultural criminology and narrative criminology are imbricated, taking notice of commonalities in cultural criminology’s analysis of media looping and narrative criminology’s identification of cycles of storytelling practice and lived experiences. A consideration of Donald Trump’s attempts to control narrative is used to develop an argument regarding cultural criminology’s and narrative criminology’s joint questioning of linear sequencing and mutual recognition of circulating fluidity

International human rights law (IHRL) was established in the aftermath of the Second World War to prevent a reoccurrence of the atrocities committed in the name of fascism. Central to this aim was the recognition that out-groups are particularly vulnerable to rights violations committed by the in-group. Yet, it is increasingly apparent that out-groups are still subject to a wide range of rights violations, including those associated with mass atrocities. These rights violations are facilitated by the dehumanisation of the out-group by the in-group. Consequently, this article argues that the creation of IHRL treaties and corresponding monitoring mechanisms should be viewed as the first step towards protecting out-groups from human rights violations. By adopting the lens of dehumanisation, this article demonstrates that if IHRL is to achieve its purpose, IHRL monitoring mechanisms must recognise the connection between dehumanisation and rights violations and develop a positive State obligation to counter dehumanisation. The four treaties explored in this article, the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, all establish positive State obligations to prevent hate speech and to foster tolerant societies. These obligations should, in theory, allow IHRL monitoring mechanisms to address dehumanisation. However, their interpretation of the positive State obligation to foster tolerant societies does not go far enough to counter unconscious dehumanisation and requires more detailed elaboration.

This article argues that it is legitimate for the state to practice soft paternalism towards changing hearts and minds in order to prevent behaviour that is discriminatory. Liberals accept that it is not legitimate for the state to intervene in order to change how people think because ideas and beliefs are wrong in themselves. It is legitimate for the state to intervene with the actions of a person only when there is a risk of harm to others and when there is a threat to social coexistence. Preventive action of the state is legitimate if we consider the immaterial and material harm that discrimination causes. It causes harm to the social standing of the person, psychological harm, economic and existential harm. All these harms threaten peaceful social coexistence. This article traces a theory of permissible government action. Research in the areas of behavioural psychology, neuroscience and social psychology indicates that it is possible to bring about a change in hearts and minds. Encouraging a person to adopt the perspective of the person who has experienced discrimination can lead to empathetic understanding. This, can lead a person to critically evaluate her prejudice. The paper argues that soft paternalism towards changing hearts and minds is legitimate in order to prevent harm to others. It attempts to legitimise state coercion in order to eliminate prejudice and broader social patterns of inequality and marginalisation. And it distinguishes between appropriate and non-appropriate avenues the state could pursue in order to eliminate prejudice. Policies towards eliminating prejudice should address the rational and the emotional faculties of a person. They should aim at using methods and techniques that focus on persuasion and reduce coercion. They should raise awareness of what prejudice is and how it works in order to facilitate well-informed voluntary decisions. The version of soft paternalism towards changing minds and attitudes defended in this article makes it consistent with liberalism.

Islamophobia, like xenophobia, points to deep-seated, ingrained discrimination against a particular group, whose effective enjoyment of fundamental rights is impaired. This in turn triggers the human rights obligations of liberal democratic states, more particularly states’ positive obligations (informed by reasonability considerations) to ensure that fundamental rights are effectively enjoyed, and thus also respected in interpersonal relationships. This article identifies and compares the fault lines in the practice of three international human rights supervisory mechanisms in relation to Islamophobia, namely the Human Rights Committee (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), the European Court of Human Rights (European Convention on Human Rights) and the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The supervisory practice is analysed in two steps: The analysis of each international supervisory mechanism’s jurisprudence, in itself, is followed by the comparison of the fault lines. The latter comparison is structured around the two main strands of strategies that states could adopt in order to counter intolerance: On the one hand, the active promotion of tolerance, inter alia through education, awareness-raising campaigns and the stimulation of intercultural dialogue; on the other, countering acts informed by intolerance, in terms of the prohibition of discrimination (and/or the effective enjoyment of substantive fundamental rights). Having regard to the respective strengths and weaknesses of the supervisory practice of these three international supervisory mechanisms, the article concludes with some overarching recommendations.

In this article, we focus on how the education system can be used to promote equality in the context of changing people’s hearts and minds – values, morals and mindsets. The duties contained in the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (‘Equality Act’) bind private and public schools, educators, learners, governing bodies and the state. The Equality Act calls on the state and all persons to promote substantive equality, but the relevant sections in the Equality Act have not been given effect yet, and are therefore currently not enforceable. We set out how the duty to promote equality should be concretised in the Equality Act to inter alia use the education system to promote equality in schools; in other words, how should an enforceable duty to promote equality in schools be fashioned in terms of the Equality Act. Should the relevant sections relating to the promotion of equality come into effect in their current form, enforcement of the promotion of equality will take the form of obliging schools to draft action plans and submit these to the South African Human Rights Commission. We deem this approach inadequate and therefore propose certain amendments to the Equality Act to allow for a more sensible monitoring of schools’ duty to promote equality. We explain how the duty to promote equality should then play out practically in the classroom to facilitate a change in learners’ hearts and minds.

Throughout the last decade several cyclists have published memoirs in which they account for their doping use. In previous literature such autobiographical accounts have been characterized as attempts of fallen sports stars to sanitize their spoiled public image. In contrast, the analysis in this article will show that the accounts are of relevance when it comes to understanding the problem of doping in professional cycling. Their accounts break the omertà regarding doping, providing insights about the motivation and opportunity structures behind doping and how such structures are endemic to the system of professional cycling.

De context van een zorgaanbieder speelt een rol bij de afweging of de IGJ vertrouwen heeft in een zorgaanbieder. Afhankelijk van het vertrouwen kiest de inspectie voor een meer op leren gerichte, dan wel een meer disciplinerende interventie. In de praktijk is de uitdaging voor inspecteurs te expliciteren wat die context is en hoe die te wegen in het bepalen van de interventie om daarmee toezicht op maat te kunnen leveren. Dit onderzoek beantwoordt de vraag: ‘Wat zijn de belangrijkste contextfactoren die de kwaliteit van de zorg van een zorgaanbieder kunnen beïnvloeden?’. Het onderzoek had een kwalitatieve opzet en was een combinatie van conceptanalyse, literatuuronderzoek, interviews met experts, focusgroepdiscussies en toetsing van contextfactoren door inspecteurs en onderzoek van inspectierapporten. Het resultaat hiervan is het kader ‘Context van een zorgaanbieder’ met vier categorieën: Toezichtgeschiedenis, Organisatorische context, Bestuurlijke context en Maatschappelijke context.
Het kader ‘Context van een zorgaanbieder’ is geïntegreerd in het Afwegingskader Vertrouwen van de IGJ. Dit geeft de inspecteur handvatten om af te wegen of en hoe de context invloed heeft op het vertrouwen in de zorgaanbieder en een toezichtinterventie in te zetten die het beste bijdraagt aan het doel, namelijk het verbeteren van de kwaliteit van zorg.

The contribution of sport to reintegrating offenders receives limited attention, both in science and in the practice of probation and the prison system. From the perspective of desistance, this literature study concluded that sport can contribute to the development of individual capital, social capital and an alternative identity. However, the effect of sport is not necessarily positive. There are risks of negative influence or the reinforcement of problem behaviour. In counselling offenders, sport should be combined with other interventions to reduce recidivism. A personalized approach is required, based on the risk-need-responsivity model.