In the United States, the term disproportionate minority contact (DMC) is used to refer to the disproportionate number of minority youth who come into contact with the juvenile justice system. Statistics on DMC in the United States put the issue on the political agenda and measures have been taken to reduce the inequality. In the Netherlands, there are some studies on the representation of ethnic minority groups in suspect statistics, but data regarding all ethnic groups at various stages of the juvenile justice chain are lacking. Due to this lack of information, DMC is not mentioned in Dutch research literature and is not a political issue. Therefore, the purpose of this article was to explore whether DMC existed in the Netherlands and whether elements of the US policy could be applied to the Dutch situation. To investigate this, the likelihood (odds ratio (OR)) was calculated for young people with a migration background to be registered and held as a suspect, to participate in an alternative punishment program (Halt) and their likelihood of incarceration. It turned out that the OR for young people with a non-Western migration background to be registered as a suspect was more than three times as high, with an OR of 5 or higher for some ethnic groups. The chances of a Halt-settlement were much lower for young people with a non-Western background. The odds of ending up in a youth prison was over six times higher for youngsters with a non-Western background compared to their Dutch native peers. For young people of Caribbean and Moroccan origin the likelihood was more than ten times higher. These results showed that DMC is present at all examined stages in the Dutch juvenile justice chain. The large overrepresentation of young people with a migration background (especially of Moroccan and Caribbean origin) shows that further research is needed in order to develop programs to reduce DMC. To establish this, it is important to register the ethnic origin of the individuals at all stages of the juvenile justice chain.

Quantitative empirical research into legal decisions must be conducted using statistical tools that are appropriate for the data involved. Court decisions are one example of a domain where the data is intrinsically hierarchical (i.e., multilevel), since decisions are made on individual cases by decision-makers in courts located across geographical (or jurisdictional) areas. Past research into court decisions has often either neglected higher level variables or incorrectly used single-level statistical models to analyze multilevel data. The lack of a clear understanding about when and why multilevel statistical models are required may have contributed to this situation. In this paper, we identify the problems of estimating single-level models on hierarchically structured data, and consider the advantages of conducting multilevel analyses under these circumstances. We use the example of criminal sentencing research to illustrate the arguments for the use of multilevel models and against a single-level approach. We also highlight some issues to be addressed in future sentencing studies.

I argue that a compelling way to articulate what is wrong with racial profiling in policing is to view racial profiling as a violation of the presumption of innocence. I discuss the communicative nature of the presumption of innocence as an expression of social trust and a protection against the social condemnation of being undeservingly investigated, prosecuted, and convicted for committing a crime. I argue that, given its communicative dimension, failures to extend the presumption of innocence are an expression of disrespect. I take the New York Police Department’s stop-and-frisk policy as an example of racial profiling and argue that its use of race-based forms of suspicion as reasons for making stops is a violation of the presumption of innocence. I maintain that this systemic failure to extend the presumption of innocence to profiled groups reveals the essentially disrespectful nature of the NYPD policy.

Both in punishment theory and sentencing practices, the subjective sentence severity is an important yet neglected area of research. This paper aims to explain differences between inmates in their subjective severity of imprisonment and to contemplate these against the background of important sentencing goals and sentencing principles. Two models commonly used to explain adjustment to prison life were applied: the import and deprivation model. Data from the Prison Project, collected among Dutch inmates staying in pretrial detention, reveal that both import and deprivation characteristics are related to the subjective severity of imprisonment. No support is found for a moderation effect of personality.

Antony Duff proposes a comprehensive concept of the presumption of innocence, covering the period before, during and after a criminal process, both in an official (state vs. individual) and a non-official, civic sense. By that broad usage, the concept of presumption of innocence is getting blurred and risks losing its contours. I therefore suggest to keep separate matters separate. The presumption of innocence in the narrow sense that I suggest applies only where there exists a suspicion that an individual has committed a criminal offence. The important function of the presumption of innocence in that situation is to prevent an over-extension of state power against the individual under suspicion before that suspicion has been confirmed to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. A general presumption that all people abide by the law at all times is neither warranted nor necessary. It is not warranted because experience tells us that many people break some laws sometimes. And it is not necessary because a system of civil liberties is sufficient to protect us against official or social overreach based on a suspicion that we may commit crimes.

The primary objective of the ISD Order is to reduce public nuisance caused by extremely persistent offenders. Another objective is to reduce recidivism. Recidivism can be prevented by influencing behaviour, with due regard to any personal issues involved. In this article the author looks at the arguments the judiciary uses to impose or end an ISD Order. The author notices that the judiciary views ISD Orders as a last resort: an order is given only in the absence of alternatives, and with the requirement attached that ISD subjects are to be put on a programme. The judiciary considers rehabilitation within an ISD framework to be extremely important. The orders are almost invariably imposed for two years, with no deduction of the pretrial detention period. There is reason to terminate the order if the recidivism risk has receded, but there may be other termination grounds, outside the control of the ISD subject, such as negligence on the part of a government agency.