In this article a critical reflection upon age limits applied in the law is provided, in light of the tension that exists in international children’s rights law between the protection of children and the recognition of their evolving autonomy. The main research question that will be addressed is to what extent the use of (certain) age limits is justified under international children’s rights law. The complexity of applying open norms and theoretically underdeveloped concepts as laid down in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, related to the development and evolving capacities of children as rights holders, will be demonstrated. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child struggles to provide comprehensive guidance to states regarding the manner in which the dynamic legal position of children should be applied in practice. The inconsistent application of age limits that govern the involvement of children in judicial procedures provides states leeway in granting children autonomy, potentially leading to the establishment of age limits based on inappropriate – practically, politically or ideologically motivated – grounds.

The promises of Big Data, predictive policing and artificial intelligence hold a key position in the public debate for quite some time now. Optimists tell that it is possible to predict where criminal events will occur before they take place. This would implicate a major shift towards a crime and insecurity preventive society, feeding on our cultural longing for a secure future. Therefore we give algorithms and deep learning access to more and more aspects of our lives. But how realistic and desirable is the application of Big Data techniques in the area of security?
In this article we put focus on the research question ‘In which way can Big Data and predictive policing support good governance of security?’, that has led our study. By exploring the central concepts, the processes behind them and their results in the domain of public security, we conclude that there are only rather disappointing results from the application of these techniques: crime and insecurity have not dropped when the police and other organizations turned to Big Data techniques. Instead, many negative side effects occurred. We search for explanations in six central academic critiques on the application of these techniques in the area of security.
We have found several ways to guaranty principles of good governance in the application of Big Data techniques, but these require a firm paradigm shift on Big Data in general. The heuristics of security professionals should not be overshadowed by technological promises: the professional should always be in the loop, must understand the way predictions come into existence and must be able to correct flaws and bugs of (semi-)automated decisions. We conclude that safeguarding public security must remain human work in which Big Data techniques can assist.

The past few decades have seen an increasing scrutiny of the impacts – both positive and negative – that companies have on the societies in which they operate. The search for adequate responses to such scrutiny is reflected in developments in the societal, political and academic debate on three separate but interrelated concepts: corporate social responsibility, business and human rights and responsible business conduct. The focus in this Special Issue will be on law and policy relating to responsible business conduct in global value chains. The contributions in this Special Issue identify relevant developments and institutions in the Netherlands, including rules and regulations related to trade, investment and corporate governance as well as cases related to corporate and consumer responsibilities, and assess their role in relation to the potential to provide a positive response to the concern about the human and environmental impacts of business activities. Together, they provide a multi-perspective view of relevant gaps and/or best practices with regard to regulatory governance in the Netherlands while at the same time enabling a comparative debate on the extent to which these diverse developments and institutions are in line with stated policy goals in this context both at national and EU levels. In doing so, this Special Issue aims to contribute to further coherence between national and EU policies with regard to RBC in global value chains and sustainable development.

Until recently, Dutch merchant ships could not rely on privately contracted maritime security staff to protect themselves against pirates. On the one hand, the argument prevailed that the State had to retain the monopoly on the use of force and, on the other hand, one also feared for the escalation of violence or international incidents. Nowadays, however, more and more European countries allow for the use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board merchant ships. As a result, the Dutch Parliament has adopted a bill containing rules for the use of armed private security guards on board Dutch maritime merchant ships (Law to Protect Merchant Shipping 2019 (published in the Dutch official Gazette on June 7th, 2019)).
The author addresses the question whether because of the new law a level playing field will emerge with the Merchant Navies from the neighboring Flag States of Belgium, the United Kingdom, Spain and Denmark, presenting a comparative analysis of their domestic legislation.
The Dutch law clearly regulates the use of force and the master has the final responsibility for everything that happens under his authority. In principle, the security guards may only apply violence as the master has determined that it is necessary. Innovative is that there is a reporting obligation whereby every incident should be reported with images and sound recordings. It seems, however, that the law is especially made to protect and secure and not necessarily to provide a solution for situations in which pirates come on board.
It is clear that the intention of the legislator is to leave the monopoly on the use of force in the hands of the State. However, the adoption of this law to protect merchant shipping could constitute a first step in enabling the use of force by other actors than the State, which in itself is groundbreaking. Before being able to go on this road, there are still countless political (mainly related to the sovereignty of a State) and legal challenges (mainly concerning the use of force and respect for human rights) to be addressed.

For the second time, various of our academic board analysed employment law cases from last year. However, first, we start with some general remarks.

Piracy holds a special place within the field of international law because of the universal jurisdiction that applies. This article reconsiders the role of piracy in the development of universal jurisdiction. While usually a connection is established between Cicero’s ‘enemy of all’ and modern conceptions of pirates, it is argued that ‘enemy of the human species’ or ‘enemy of humanity’ is a medieval creation, used by Bartolus, which must be understood in the wake of the Renaissance of the twelfth century and the increased interest for the study of Roman Law. The criminalization of the pirate in the late Middle Ages must be understood not only as a consequence of royal power claiming a monopoly of violence at sea. Both the Italian city-states and the Hanse may have preceded royal power in criminalizing pirates. All the while, political motives in doing so were never absent.

This article provides an overview of the developments about the armed on-board protection of Dutch vessels under Dutch law. The Dutch position has changed over the years. In 2011, the starting point was that private security companies (PSCs) are not to be allowed. It was expected that adequate protection of Dutch vessels could be provided by vessel protection detachments (VPDs). Although not considered as an absolute statutory bar, the state monopoly on force was considered the main argument against PSCs. After optimising the use of VPDs and given the development in other countries, the approach changed into a ‘VPS, unless …’-approach. Under the new Protection of Merchant Shipping Act that is expected to come into force in the second half of 2019, PSCs can be employed only if no VPS is available. This article gives an overview of the argumentation in this change of view over the years. It also explores the headlines, criteria and procedures of the new law and some other topics, including the position of the master under the upcoming law. In line with the other country reports, it enables the comparative study in the last article of this special issue.

Germany reacted to the rise of piracy around the Horn of Africa not only by deploying its armed forces to the region, but also by overhauling the legal regime concerning private security providers. It introduced a dedicated licensing scheme mandatory for German maritime security providers and maritime security providers wishing to offer their services on German-flagged vessels. This legal reform resulted in a licensing system with detailed standards for the internal organisation of a security company and the execution of maritime security services. Content wise, the German law borrows broadly from internationally accepted standards. Despite deficits in state oversight and compliance control, the licensing scheme sets a high standard e.g. by mandating that a security team must consist of a minimum of four security guards. The lacking success of the scheme suggested by the low number of companies still holding a license may be due to the fact that ship-owners have traditionally been reluctant to travel high-risk areas under the German flag. Nevertheless, the German law is an example of a national regulation that has had some impact on the industry at large.

The power to regulate on-board protection of merchant vessels lies with the flag state. However, the national models of regulation are not developed in a unilateral vacuum. In fact, the whole concept of flag state jurisdiction and legislative power has to be understood and exercised on the national level in close relation with the general regime of the international law of the sea. The aim of the article is therefore two-fold: first, it aims to provide a background for the country reports in this special issue by giving a brief insight into the problem of piracy in the twenty-first century and the international approaches towards this problem. Here the article also provides an insight into the legal background by presenting the concept of piracy in the law of the sea and connected law enforcement powers. Thus, this part of the article provides the overall context in which the discussions concerning on-board protection and the development of national regulations have occurred. Second, the article analyses the issue of on-board protection from the perspective of the legal framework in international law, as well as relevant international soft-law instruments, influencing the development on the national level. On-board protection of vessels as such is not regulated in the international law; however, international law provides a form of general legal setting, in which flags states navigate. Thus, this article aims to draw a picture of the international context in which flags states develop their specific legal approach.

The sharp increase of piracy attacks in the last two decades was followed by a parallel increase of demand in the maritime security sector. A plenty of flag States around the world have started to authorize the deployment of armed security guards, either military or private, aboard commercial ships. In 2011, Italy also introduced the possibility of embarking armed security services to protect Italian flagged ships sailing in dangerous international waters. Like the other flag States’ legal systems, the newly adopted Italian legislation aims to preserve the domestic shipping industry which was particularly disrupted by modern-day pirates. On the other hand, the doubling of approaches of the Italian legal and regulatory framework, initially privileging military personnel and then opting for the private solution, took the author to investigate the main relevant features of the Italian model of regulation and to analyze the recent developments of the domestic legal practice on counterpiracy armed security services, focusing on the role that customary and treaty obligations of international law played for the realization at national level of on-board armed protection of Italian ships. The use of lethal force at sea and the relationship between the shipmaster and the security guards will receive specific attention in this article.

This article examines the legal issues pertaining to the use of civilian armed guards on board Danish-flagged ships for protection against piracy. The Danish model of regulation is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, the Danish Government was among the first European flag States to allow and formalise their use in a commercial setting. Secondly, the distribution of assignments between public authorities and private actors stands out as very pragmatic, as ship owners and contracting private security companies are empowered with competences which are traditionally considered as public administrative powers. Thirdly, the lex specialis framework governing the authorisation and use of force in self-defence is non-exhaustive, thus referring to lex generalis regulation, which does not take the special circumstances surrounding the use of armed guards into consideration. As a derived effect the private actors involved rely heavily on soft law and industry self-regulation instrument to complement the international and national legal framework.

Bridging assistance paid to a worker who loses his or her job by reason of redundancy, but ceasing once the worker becomes eligible to receive retirement benefits, is discriminatory under Directive 2000/78 if this moment comes earlier for disabled than non-disabled workers.

In deze bijdrage wordt onderzocht in hoeverre het Nederlandse aansprakelijkheidsrecht is toegerust op toenemende autonomie van drones en verdergaande miniaturisering in dronetechnologie. Na korte uitleg van relevante luchtvaartwetgeving voor dronegebruik wordt ingegaan op de onrechtmatige daad en productaansprakelijkheid. Daarna wordt besproken in hoeverre het huidige stelsel van aansprakelijkheid aanpassing behoeft.

This contribution focuses on military assistance of the Dutch police with forensic expertise by the army (not being the Dutch gendarmerie, the Koninklijke Marechaussee). The assistance basically consists of helping with search activities, with analysis and observations, all key functions within policing. The central question is: to what extent is this specific military assistance an example of plural policing? Today the armed forces are an essential part of a wider security policy, because the various types of national and international security are increasingly interconnected. This stresses the importance to involve the army in social (national) security. The forensic military assistance the authors studied does, however, not comprise law enforcement or patrolling in public spaces. With that in mind, this kind of assistance cannot automatically be labelled as plural policing. On the other hand, the military assistance contributes to a safe society and from that point of view it is an example of plural policing.

The Netherlands armed forces are increasingly involved in activities within the Netherlands as well as abroad, that can be characterized as law enforcement. Military personnel, however, are not trained as law enforcement officials and perform these non-military tasks based on their military skills and drills. Nevertheless, their efforts eventually must lead to a criminal persecution of a suspect. Therefore, it is important that military personnel are well aware of the particular requirements set out by criminal procedures while planning and executing a military action and, whenever possible, operate in close collaboration with authorized law enforcement officials.

Drones en drone-gerelateerde cybertechnologieën nemen een vlucht in het veiligheidsdomein in de vorm van toepassingen door het leger, de politie, brandweer, private beveiligingsbedrijven, en ook deurwaarders, agrariërs en burgerinitiatieven. Drones werden in eerste instantie ontwikkeld voor militaire doeleinden. Hun aanpassingsvermogen als universele platforms voor beeldregistratie en goederenvervoer leidt tot hoge verwachtingen rond toepassing in het civiele domein. Dit artikel onderzoekt de ethische aspecten van “dual use” van drones en gerelateerde technologieën. Verschillende dimensies van dual use worden verkend: de technologisch ontwikkeling, maar ook de ontwikkeling van wet- en regelgeving in Amerika en Europa. Voor het Nederlandse veiligheidsdomein is relevant dat dit artikel bijdraagt aan het signaleren van de noodzaak om de ontwikkeling en toepassing van drones in breder perspectief te bezien. Drones en hun toepassingen maken deel uit van de internationale markt van militaire organisaties en van veiligheidsorganisaties in het publieke en private domein. Bovendien maken ze veelal deel uit van geïntegreerde systemen en van wereldwijde platforms voor consumentenelektronica. Dit artikel is een van de resultaten uit het door NWO gefinancierde project 'Responsible Design of Drones and Drone Services: Towards an Ethical and Juridical Tool For Drone Design and Risk Assessment' (Project no. 313-99-318). Het project was gericht op het ontwikkelen van een instrument voor ontwikkeling en gebruik van dronetoepassingen uitgaande van methoden als Responsible Research & Innovation (RRI) en Value Sensitive Design (VSD).

Most state-corporate crime research is focused on crime or harmful outcomes in or by democratic states. The goal of this article is to investigate the applicability of this concept to relations between economic actors and non-democratic state actors. The concept of state-corporate crime is applied to three contexts in which corporations have become involved in international crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Each representing a turning point in the academic and public perception of ‘business and human rights’, the contexts that are analysed are Nazi Germany (1993-1945), Apartheid South Africa (1948-1994) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC; 1996-now). It is concluded that in non-democratic states with totalitarian of authoritarian regimes (such as Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa), the concept of state-corporate crime is applicable and explanatory. In such strong states, economic and state actors make use of mutual benefits while, on the whole, state-interests prevail. As a result, the harmful outcome of the dynamics between corporations and states can best be described as corporate facilitated state crime. In weak states (such as the DRC) economic actors are generally more powerful while their involvement in international crimes also runs via non-state actors. The blurred lines between economic actors and state actors (and their interests) makes it difficult to apply the concept, in its different forms, to state-corporate cooperation in weak states and ‘new’ wars.

In 2015, South-Korea and Japan came to a ‘final’ agreement concerning the ‘comfort women’ issue. This contribution reveals that this deal signals the next stage in a process of denial through which Japanese authorities have structurally denied the women’s’ victimhood. Taking a discourse analytical approach, the contribution investigates this historical process of denial and its implications. The analysis shows that denial takes several forms and performs different functions throughout the process. It demonstrates that denial is an interactional phenomenon, has different psychologies underlying it, and that it operates on different levels. Denial ultimately contributes to a state of continued victimization.