Comparing the developments in the Netherlands with those in Belgium the authors find important differences relating to the questions pertinent to implementation. Experiments have also been done in the Netherlands and their evaluations showed positive results, but there were different models which were not clearly – or not at all – related to the traditional criminal justice process. They all were lacking the formal collaboration with the courts, that was seen in Belgium. There has been no form of central direction and no important influence from the academic world and the various projects have officially been replaced in 2006 by a national policy of implementing ‘victim-offendertalks’. These talks have their merits and are appreciated by victims and offenders, but they do not amount to mediation in a restorative style, since restorative agreements are not allowed to result. Nevertheless, there are a number of indications that restorative justice practices could still become recognized and accepted. Staff of the police, the public prosecutors office and judges are interested and new experiments are beginning. The new development of local ‘veiligheidshuizen’ (‘front offices for safety’) offers a promising setting for interagency co-operation and conferencing with citizens in trouble and conflict. The conferencing-model has gained broad acceptance in the context of juvenile care and may continue to inspire justice personnel. In process now is the foundation of a new restorative justice network, called ‘Restorative Justice Netherlands’.

Responding to Bouverne-De Bie and Roose Walgrave stresses the importance of using a narrow definition of restorative justice as a way of doing justice by repairing the harm caused by crime. This narrow definition alone allows for the development of a consistent praxis and theory of restorative justice and for adequate research of its effects. Restorative Justice cannot offer the ´politically critical´ social praxis on the interface between the public and the private world that Bouverne-De Bie and Roose would like to see. But the apparent influence that basic concepts and ideas of restorative justice have on social practices outside the sphere of criminal justice imply that such social practices and restorative justice praxis can work in the same direction by avoiding stigmatization and exclusion and promoting redress and inclusion.

Conceptions of what ethics are about inform the expectations one has when consulting ethicians. To illustrate this Pattyn shows how two different conceptions of ethics generate two opposite expectations. One could either consider ethics as a specific disciplinary domain that can evaluate and judge decisively about a certain phenomenon on the basis of fundamental criteria, or see ethics as the study of the ways in which a phenomenon – such as restorative justice – can appear as a morally accountable praxis in a specific cultural setting or ‘situated understanding’. Pattyn argues that only the second view makes sense and discusses several types of settings and understandings in relation to various types of judicial settlement. The conclusion following from the analysis is that the ambitions of restorative justice amount to an everyday moral strategy to heal the damaged cohesion of social groups after a transgression and to offer offender and victim alike the opportunity to rehabilitate.

The authors discuss the space that can be found for restorative justice in decisions on human rights issues in the criminal procedure by the European Court of Human Rights, based on par. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. There is room for restorative justice because the court accepts the waiver of the procedural rights and safeguards by the defendant, provided that he does so completely voluntarily, after being fully informed, and provided that there is no important public interest that stands in the way of out-of-court settlements. The alternative procedure to a full dressed criminal trial should, in addition, live up to such standards that the procedure can be judged fair. Pressures on avoiding unreasonable delay and legal counseling necessary to fully inform the defendant about his options can lead to a formalization of restorative procedures which can be a threat to the merits of restorative justice.

The author, reflecting upon both Bouverne-De Bie & Roose and Walgrave, deplores to some degree the fact that the Journal for Restorative Justice, from its foundation, has narrowed its focus and scope by making it a priority to attempt to influence the criminal justice system. Most of the conflicts and troubles between citizens never reach the criminal agencies and are dealt with by other methods, such as methods of social work, without approaching the police. The potential scope for influencing conflict-behavior is therefore immensely greater outside the sphere of the criminal law.

Social (re-)integration is such a complex phenomenon that it is not possible to make a direct link between restorative justice and social reintegration of offenders. If one considers restorative justice, not in its utility for maintaining the law but as a praxis of social work, one could get the impression that restorative justice runs the risk of individualizing the social problem of crime by making offenders responsible and of losing sight of the structural dimensions causing or contributing to criminality. The same structural dimensions may appear to be a blockade for effective emancipation of offenders from their often marginal and powerless positions. Considered as a praxis of social work, restorative justice should be able to promote (the awareness of) accountability and the mutual exploration of the many roads that can lead to effective emancipation and reintegration.

Van Stokkom endorses Pattyn’s criticism of principled ethics. It is more convincing to view ethics as a way to understand moral practices and moral experiences. For example, the ethical value of restorative justice practices resides in moral communication in which the participants strive for recognition. Nevertheless, Pattyn does not notice that moral justifications often rely on ethical principles. When we must make choices or introduce new policies, we often cannot escape justifications that fit in with ethical principles. Nevertheless, these principles may also paralyze or polarize discussions. In populist times – with its punitive rhetoric – it seems wise to keep public discussion at bay from ‘high restorative principles’ such as the ‘superfluity of punishment’ and concentrate on the narrative power of restorative justice practices.

Blad responds to Groenhuijsen by showing how political decisions in the Netherlands, after successful experiments with restorative justice for juveniles and adults, were based on the belief that criminal justice would lose its punitive foundation and tenor when restorative justice practices would become integrated in the justice system. Criminal justice should not be about resolving conflicts between victims and offenders and the type of mediation, that could lead to an agreement as an important element to be considered in sentencing, was therefore rejected. In so far as restorative justice ideology took influence, it seems to have been a misconception of restorative justice as merely a new form of penal abolitionism. The fact that restorative justice does not deny the legitimacy of the provisions in the substantive criminal law and that all important restorative projects co-operate with criminal justice agencies was apparently ignored. Against the background of the dominant political culture of ‘punitive populism’ and intensified use of severe punishments it seems highly unlikely that abandoning the ambition to develop a restorative justice paradigm would further the implementation of restorative justice.

Evaluative studies show that victims are generally satisfied with their participation in a restorative intervention, even when concerning violent crime. Therefore, we don’t have to ask whether restorative justice should be offered to victims of crime, but how it should be offered. Using the victimological literature, we explore the appropriateness of two opposing models with regard to the offer in violent crime cases. The protective model, as for instance endorsed by victim support services in Québec, is based on the concern for the protection of vulnerable victims. The proactive model, as inscribed in the 2005 law on the general offer of mediation in Belgium, is based on the informed consent principle. Both models respect the needs of victims, while ranking these needs differently. The available empirical and theoretical observations on the subject do not unilaterally support or reject either model. We, therefore, present a complementary, albeit theoretical model, i.e. the integration of the invitation to a restorative intervention within victim support services.

Discussions in the movement of restorative justice about the fundamental question, whether its interventions are alternatives to punishment or alternative punishments, have become repetitive and seem to be in a dead end. The author reviews the arguments against the background of the ‘last resort’ principle in Husak’s work. Husak distinguishes between last resort in terms of sentencing and last resort in terms of criminalization. Since the restorative justice movement does not fundamentally reject the primary criminalisations, but accepts the definitions of certain forms of conduct as crime, it merely strives to offer alternatives to punishments that would otherwise be imposed. If protagonists of restorative justice want to avoid this, they should consider an abolitionist option to strive for decriminalization.

Legislation affects restorative justice in four ways: existing legislation may allow it, new laws may enable it, laws may limit it, or restorative justice may be the norm. Examples from different countries are given and specific questions about the relationship of restorative justice to the criminal justice system discussed. It is suggested that, broadly speaking, safeguards should be legislated and practice regulated by an independent body. It is concluded that restorative practices, have the potential to transform society’s response to harmful behaviour.

Due to immigration the Dutch have made a significant contribution to the development of New Zealand, especially in the field of juvenile justice and adoption. As for New Zealand’s Youth Justice Service, the introduction of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act in 1989 has been a landmark in New Zealand’s history of dealing with juvenile delinquency. While it was not designed as a restorative justice system, the current system is tuned towards restorative justice. Until then, New Zealand had a shameful history as far as the handling of juvenile delinquency is concerned. The Maori, whose youngsters were – and still are – overrepresented in juvenile statistics, heavily criticized this model, emphasizing the need to strengthen the bond between the (extended) family and the juvenile offender, as well as the need to provide for redress. In the same period, the United Nations Convention on Children’s Rights (UNCROC) was introduced (1989), the Act of 1989 paying tribute to the UNCROC. As the national juvenile justice system to some extent does not live up to the standards of the UNCROC, there remains room for improvement. However, black clouds gather over New Zealand’s juvenile justice system, for the present government has announced to be in favor of a punitive oriented policy; there is a call to get ‘tough on juvenile crime’. This policy, however, implies setting back the clock and endangers the current orientation on restorative justice, as well as the legal values set out by the UNCROC.

This article provides a perspective on the development of restorative justice practice in Northern Ireland. The island of Ireland has a standing history as to the use of restorative justice. In fact, the earliest restorative form of law dates from 2000 BCE, the so-called Brehon Laws. To date, Northern Ireland features as a divided society; over the past 35 years intercommunity conflict brought devastation and heartbreak to the health of the community. Nevertheless, initial soundings were heard as to how the practice of restorative justice might be re-introduced to Northern Ireland. Already in 1989, the Probation Board indicated its intention of piloting a Victim Offender Mediation Programme. From that time, serious attempts were undertaken to implement restorative justice within the North-Irish society. Initiatives were undertaken by Republican as well as Loyalist communities, both being eager to move away from violent community based justice. Special attention was given towards juvenile crime. In 2000 this interest in restorative justice led to a commitment from the North-Irish authorities to put restorative justice matters at the heart of the criminal justice system for young offenders. As a result, in the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 the Youth Conference Service was initiated. Between 2003 and the present, Youth Conference Orders or Plans have been the most common disposals for adjudicated offenders up to eighteen years of age. The focus is on the parties resolving how the young person can make amends to the victim and what can be done to prevent further offending. All Agencies linked into the Youth Justice system recognize the special needs of young people. Recent figures show the numbers of young people going into youth custody in Northern Ireland have decreased due to the use of restorative justice models.