While the legal path to ending marital captivity has been cleared, socio-cultural obstacles continue to prevent victims from going to court. This article focuses on the religious and socio-cultural elements within the Dutch-Pakistani community that promote the continued existence of marital captivity, thereby zooming in on the importance of the nikah, the prevalence of (transnational) arranged marriages, and the concept of family honor.

This article delineates the problem of judicial subjectivity in so-called ‘hard cases’. Decisions in such cases are essentially decisions of conscience, which in principle can escape the control mechanisms of objectivation and justification. This leads to the question as to the attributes of a good judge.

Do religious motives result in greater freedom of action? This question cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. First of all, a distinction must be made between conduct that falls within the scope of the right to freedom of religion as opposed to other conduct. This distinction in turn needs some qualification. The aforementioned right can, after all, be restricted. The conduct in question could moreover fall within the purview of another fundamental right, as a result of which persons without religious motives are entitled to invoke another fundamental right. All these distinctions will be reviewed in this article. Special attention will be given to religiously motivated statements condemning homosexuality and the religiously motivated refusal to have children vaccinated.

In the ruling on Lachiri/Belgium, commentators discern a new development in the ECHR’s jurisprudence on the relationship between the headscarf and freedom of religion. According to the author, that is not the case: in fact, he observes a continued bias of the Court towards the headscarf.

As a special employer, the church has an interest in shaping its own personnel policy in order to achieve the mission and objective. In part, the legislator has met this need. After all, various laws in the field of appointment, terms of employment and dismissal take account of the specific interests of the church as described before. The external border consists of fundamental human rights that are included in the ECHR and the European Directive on equal treatment. It is not always clear where the external border is exactly. The Dutch legislation regarding the battle of ‘church law’ and fundamental rights is not consistent. Moreover, there we notice a tension between national law and the European directive.

For liberals religion is a private matter. This does not mean that a citizen should leave his or her religion at home. It does mean that laws and public services should not be determined by religious beliefs. The article describes how liberals have looked upon religion in their programs of principles since mid 19th century. The educational arrangement in the Netherlands of 1917, favouring religious schools, did not satisfy them. What were the liberal proposals in order to safeguard the religiously neutral, publicly-maintained schools?

Some religious persons refuse to undergo certain medical treatments such as vaccinations or blood transfusions. They refuse treatment not only for themselves but for their children as well. Many fundamental rights may be at stake here: freedom of religion, the right to physical integrity and respect for family life on the one hand, and the duty of public authorities to provide for health care and defend children’s rights on the other. The main topic of this contribution is the extent to which the government is allowed to make certain treatments compulsory.

Two new rulings by the European Court of Human Rights confirm earlier jurisprudence regarding the ‘burqa ban’, as such ban is justified on the basis of the principle of ‘living together’. Still, two points stand out in these rulings that need discussion. The first is that this is an example of how the Court applies its new ‘qualitative, democracy-enhancing approach’ that pays more consideration to domestic decision-making in the field of human rights. These rulings show the flipside of this laudable endeavour, however, as the Court sees no reason to evaluate, let alone critically assess, the outcome of these domestic decision-making processes. Second, the remarkable ‘concurring opinion’ by the president of the ruling judges, in which he states in very stern wordings that the ruling should not be considered a cart blanche for burqa bans elsewhere. Given the elaborate considerations why such ban would not be admissible, it is surprising that the Court has failed to elaborate why the burqa bans in France and Belgium are admissible.

The term ‘Judeo Christian civilization’ dates from the second half of the twentieth century, but has of recent gained in popularity with politicians and policy makers. It seems to be no coincidence that this has a direct correlation with the debates on the position of Islam in Europe. This article is a critical assessment of the meanings of the various elements of this term: what is so Christian about European civilization, what is Judaism’s part therein, and what role does the Islam play? It is notable that one often considers this Judeo Christian ‘culture’ or ‘civilization’ as an uninterupted historical proces, while the second half of the twentieth century shows a clear rupture when it concerns values or the experience of religion. Also remarkable is that one often fails to make the differentiation between religion as a theological cult and as a culture carrier, or between the principles and the practice of a religion. As a consequence, the term ‘Judeo Christian civilization’ or ‘culture’ is being used in a very sloppy or selective manner, often with the purpose to exclude Islam.

A foreign national can be granted asylum if he has made it plausible that he is persecuted in his country for reasons related to religion. In order to make his asylum motives plausible, an applicant must declare consistently and coherently. There cannot be any doubt as to his identity or his asylum motives. A claimed convert has to declare convincingly about his conversion and has to demonstrate a broad knowledge of his Faith. Often, pastors and churches write testimonies stating the conversion is genuine. These letters are important, but never a decisive factor.

Certain radical public acts of expression, those which for instance incite hatred or recruit participants for armed conflict, are punishable under criminal law, even when these pronouncements are religiously motivated. This study examines which statements incur punishment, and the role freedom of religion and freedom of expression play when making this assessment.

Some months after the German occupation of the Netherlands, the Reichskommissar inroduced a Germanlike system of collecting finances for the poor people, soon followd by an equal system of social work. These initiatives at the same time aimed at urge the national-socialistic ideology, as such dismissed by the society and the churches. The occupying authorities avoided a clash with the churches.

What freedom of speech do religious leaders have when their religious speech discriminates others? Freedom of religion and freedom of expression may collide with the right to equality (including the principle of non-discrimination). Religious plurality and social polarization in Dutch society induce conflict between these fundamental rights.
This article reviews two legal cases where an imam and a minister were accused of discrimination of homosexuals. From this jurisprudence the authors deduce three principles in judicial decisions weighing freedom of religion and freedom of speech against equality rights: interpretative reluctance, cautiousness and the position of the religious leader.

In 2011 the Dutch Parliamentarian Geert Wilders was acquitted of group defamation pursuant to article 137c of the Penal Code. The court ruled that the qualification ‘concerning a group of people because of their religion’ had not been fulfilled because Wilders had spoken about the religion of Islam but not about people. This recent juridical shortcut has various foundational problems in semantics and jurisprudence. In view of the impact that defamation of religion can have via the modern media, violent disturbance of public order should be reintroduced as a ground of liability.

If one listens to what the authorities say about matters such as female circumcision and terrorism, Islam has nothing to do with it. These authorities are supported in this opinion by the work of many scientists. A cross section of the Dutch scientific literature on female circumcision and terrorism is discussed here. The upshot is that, regarding female circumcision, the literature is plagued with factual inaccuracies while the question of Islamic terrorism is dealt with in a one-sided and over-simplified way. The article concludes with an alternative research agenda that would help fill the gaps in our knowledge about the role of Islam in the behaviour of Islamic terrorists.

In this article I propose an alternative framework for analyzing the Salafi movement by focusing on the practices of meaning-making by and within different networks of the movement. I will show that many practices of the Salafi movement are not problematic for integration per se, but that they produce an alternative vision of the world and re-arrange the daily lives of its participants in such a way that it competes with the state’s vision of good citizenship with its (since 9/11) increasing emphasis on secular and sexual liberties.