This article seeks to provide an introduction to art theft today. It is divided into sections that look at the context in which art is stolen, definitions of key terms, an explanation as to why the field is understudied and under-reported, and a brief history of the phenomenon. It also contains sidelines on actual developments like the theft of a Van Gogh painting from the Singer Laren Museum in the Netherlands as well as on the drop of art theft since the start of the Corona pandemic.

This article provides a short overview of art crime policing and gives some insights as to why art crime policing is an especially arduous task while specifically providing examples from the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK). The article focuses first on the detection of art crime, exploring why many crimes do not enter the criminal justice system. Here, the fact that art crimes are often not detected at all or, if they are, not reported to the police is discussed in some depth in particular with a view to art theft and forgeries. The article then addresses the investigation and prosecution of art crime cases in the EU and how they are facilitated and inhibited in various member states. Finally, the challenges and possible improvements at the European level are discussed and future directions of the fight against art crime are debated.

How can technological tools contribute to supervising and reintegrating offenders in society? Globally, technological tools for supervision are broken down into so-called first generation (GPS tracking) and second generation (smartphone and sensor technology). An overview is given of what is globally known about the effectiveness and assumed mechanisms of action of first-generation technical tools. Then it is explored what added value second-generation technical aids can have and to which working mechanisms they could connect. Smartphone and sensor technology have the potential to contribute to the rehabilitation functions of the supervision, inter alia because they offer possibilities for more personalized supervision and for the combination of supervision and treatment. Although initiatives have been started in this regard and research is ongoing, hardly anything is known yet about the effectiveness of these new technological applications. The reliability and safety of IT, as well as ethical and legal aspects also require attention.

The decision to revoke or recall a conditional sanction is barely researched in criminal justice research, despite the interests involved for the offender as well as society. This article reflects on some results from a comparative research project on breach decision-making (COST Action on Offender Supervision in Europe). Using Hawkins’ concept of serial decision-making, the interdependence of early stage and final stage decision makers is highlighted. The significant power exercised by early stage actors raises the issue of the need to ensure credibility of community sanctions and appropriate due process protections, without reducing their discretion so much that they cannot perform their role of supporting the offender to complete the supervisory order successfully.

This article investigates which online undercover investigative methods are applied in practice and how they fit in the Dutch legal framework. In particular, the three special investigative powers of a pseudo purchase, systematic information gathering and infiltration are examined. Investigative powers cannot be applied unilaterally (across state borders). When law enforcement officials cannot reasonably determine the location of the suspect, the online unilateral application of undercover investigative powers is allowed. However, there is still a risk that diplomatic tensions arise with the involved state. States should agree in treaties under which circumstances cross-border online undercover operations are allowed.

In 2018 the Dutch parliament accepted new cybercrime legislation (the Cybercrime III Act) that creates several new online criminal offences and gives law enforcement agencies new investigative powers on the Internet. This article describes the background of Dutch cybercrime legislation and the contents of the Cybercrime III Act. The newly introduced cybercrimes are discussed as well as the new investigative competences. Particularly the legitimacy and the necessity of the investigative power of the police to hack computer systems of suspects may significantly interfere with the right to privacy.

Recently the Dutch Government has responded to an advise from the advisory body Raad van State concerning the relationship between the administrative and the penal system of sanctions.
Nowadays administrative sanctions are imposed in the Netherlands for serious offenses, whereas the original intention was to only use these procedures for minor felonies. It is unclear why some offenses are subject to a judicial judgment, while others are dealt with in administrative proceedings. Moreover, it appears that the administrative fines are often significantly higher than fines imposed by a judge. The government feels that harmonisation between the maximum of the administrative and penal fine should be realized. With regard to the choice between administrative and penal law, the government hasn’t found a criterion for deciding which offenses should be subject to a judicial judgment and which can be dealt with in administrative proceedings. The authors argue that the government could have offered more clarity by using the criterion of ‘serious criminal conduct’ as defined in criminal law. Criminal law has to be chosen when there is serious criminal conduct. In other cases it is possible to choose the administrative procedure.

The Dutch Judiciary has only a very limited role in the imposition of sanctions with traffic offenses. With other minor offenses its role is rather limited and has decreased. There has been a striking shift from the imposition of penal sanctions to sanctions based on administrative law in this area. With major offenses (crimes) the role of the judiciary is still significant and has not diminished over the last 20 years. This despite policy efforts to boost out of court sanctioning.
The Judiciary is a fundamental pillar of the rule of law. It offers legal protection, by judging and, if necessary, penalizing violations of norms in a fair trial. In this way not only justice is done with individual cases. Case law has wider implications: confirmation and development of norms and thus general prevention. To fulfil this aim a certain volume of cases and openness of the judgment process is necessary.

In this article the author reports on an ethnographic research conducted on the Collective Shopping Ban, a measure taken in the Netherlands in an effort to make shopkeepers co-responsible for maintaining safety and security. By describing the practice of the Collective Shopping Ban in The Hague, he investigates how the involved shopkeepers are dealing with offenses like theft, nuisance, intimidation, and vandalism. The author describes the sociological background of banning orders and what the banning of people means in terms of purification of public space.

This article analyses to what extent current responses to crime committed by immigrants can be seen as a modern version of the classical practice of banishment. To that end it analyses three recent policy developments directed at criminally convicted immigration. The analysis shows that during the last ten years there has been a sharp increase in the number of immigrants losing their residence permit following a criminal conviction. Moreover, punishment aimed at criminally convicted immigrants without a legal right to stay is increasingly aimed at permanent exclusion through the practice of deportation. Drawing on the theoretical notions of crimmigration and bordered penality, it is therefore argued that criminally convicted immigrants increasingly see themselves confronted with punishment practices that are the modern equivalent of the classical practice of banishment. This raises important questions about where we should draw the line between insiders and outsiders.

There are different types of banning orders (criminal, administrative and private banning orders) and also various procedures for imposing these orders. According to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR) it is unlikely that the private banning orders can be labelled as a criminal charge. The nature of the private banning orders is not punitive. These orders are to be regarded as recovery sanctions. However, applying the ‘Engel criteria’ will lead to the conclusion that some criminal banning orders are to be considered as a criminal charge. Accumulation between criminal and private law banning orders might be troublesome, but it is possible. It is recommended that the Public Prosecution Service is cautious when it comes to demanding a criminal banning order, when a private banning order has already been imposed.

In the Netherlands, the number of criminal record screenings performed each year skyrocketed to more than one million. Yet, empirical evidence on its effects has been largely absent. In this article the author addresses parts of the findings of her PhD research, which aimed to fill this gap, by providing a subjective perspective of how having a criminal record impacts the process of re-entry into society, particularly into the labor market, for young adults. It is based on the lived experiences of 31 young adults having a criminal record who were followed during their process of reintegration into the labor market. The vivid, real-life stories of young adults’ strategies of dealing with the stigma of a criminal record, and how this subsequently influences their position in the labor market, highlight the counterproductive effects of increasingly widespread criminal record screening. They provide evidence that many young adults adopt self-exclusion as a strategy for avoiding rejection and exclusion.

Criminologists generally regard below-average intelligence as a robust correlate of delinquency and crime. In this article the author argues that the negative association between IQ and crime could be explained at least in part by a lack of research access to gifted adults who possess wealth, power and privileges. Asking these adults about other types of offending (e.g. white-collar crimes) than usual in self-report studies might uncover a positive relationship between IQ and prevalence rates, in accordance with the results of the exploratory study underlying this article. As a consequence different conclusions about the linkages between intelligence and crime might have to be drawn.

Drawing on material from her extensive study of Russian organized crime, the author sketches a portrait of Semjon Mogilevitsj. This Russian ‘godfather’ enjoys the reputation of being the smartest and highest educated mafia boss worldwide. Indeed Mogilevitsj obtained a master’s degree in Economics with good results, but this alone doesn’t explain his phenomenal successes in criminal as well as in legal business. Describing the steady expansion of his criminal activities from Russia into Israel, the United States, Eastern Europa, Italy and Canada, the author suggests that the social and economic circumstances in Russia just before and during the collapse of the Soviet Union might have served as an ideal playing ground for Mogilevitsj to develop the specific social intelligence and skills needed to successfully run a criminal organization.

In recent years, there are signs that young people with a (mild) intellectual disability are overrepresented in the criminal justice system. It turns out that especially a large majority of the repeated offenders have an intellectual disability. Therefore it would be relevant to know whether and when an intellectual disability is recognized by professionals in the criminal procedure. What is the impact of not recognizing the specific disability on the offender in the criminal justice procedure and on recidivism? The author focuses on a rather new accelerated out-of-court settlement of criminal cases, the so-called ZSM method. She concludes that the high speed of this procedure increases the vulnerability of suspects with a (mild) intellectual disability, especially because the various professionals involved in this procedure seem to lack substantial awareness of the problem. This situation increases the risk of false confessions and witnessing and might also contribute to recidivism.

This article describes the subsequent waves of contract killings in the Netherlands since the twentieth century. Contract killings appear to happen especially within ethnic groups which are newcomers to Dutch society. The Chinese community in Amsterdam fought two internal ‘wars’. The first one was from 1918 till 1935 and circled around the trade in opium and arms. The second one took place between 1969 and the mid-seventies and was fueled by conflicts about the heroin trade. Then Turkish criminals took over the heroin trade, which resulted in a wave of Turkish victims of contract killings throughout the second half of the seventies and into the eighties. The cocaine trade came up in the eighties and was run first by Chileans and later by Colombians, which resulted in several murders within the criminal circles of these communities. While contract killings of (by birth) Dutch criminals had always been very rare, this changed from the mid-eighties. These killings not only took place in Amsterdam, but also in the southern provinces of Limburg and Brabant, as well as in Rotterdam. Most Dutch criminals specialized in cannabis growing and trading. In the nineties the number of contract killings reached a peak. By then Yugoslavs had entered the criminal scene in the Netherlands. They cooperated with Dutch criminals and offered their services as hitmen. From 2000 onwards the number of contract killings has been dropping constantly and has now reached a more or less constant level of around twenty yearly. In the last couple of years many young Moroccan Dutch criminals have been killing and killed in conflicts on drugs trade. The author signalizes a lack of ‘professionalism’ in contract killers today and draws a parallel with the period when Chinese criminals were fighting their wars in Amsterdam. The hitmen are young, have little experience, are not intelligent and use far too many bullets to do the job.

In this interview the Dutch prosecutor Koos Plooij discusses with criminal lawyer Christian Flokstra on the intention of the Public Prosecution Office to adapt article 46 of the Dutch Penal Law (Sr) in such a way that the burden of proof necessary for a sentence on contract killing is lowered. Plooij argues that many suspects who were clearly up to a very serious deed, have received a relatively low punishment because it was too difficult to prove that they were preparing a contract killing – and were not simply trying to intimidate their target or for instance take this person as a hostage. For the judge it is essential to establish which crime was being prepared, since the latter are completely different crimes and the punishment is much lower compared to the punishment for murder. Flokstra replies by stressing that the limitations of the current article 46 Sr exist to assure that people are not punished for things they didn’t do or were not planning to do. He argues that the prosecution should accept that sometimes there’s just not enough proof to convince the judge that the suspect was preparing a contract killing. A sentence for arms possession or participation in a criminal organization could be an alternative in such cases. Both men agree that the current maximum punishments for these crimes are too low.

This article focuses on witness protection programs for (former) criminals who witness against suspects in criminal procedures. It goes without saying that these witnesses run the risk of becoming the target of a contract killing. The author describes the conditions of admission to a witness protection program, as well as the various existing types of protection. Witnesses themselves are often not very enthusiastic about the program. Since they themselves have a criminal past, they look at the police as their enemy and often prefer to receive a lump sum and arrange their safety themselves, as becomes clear from several examples provided by the author.

In the past few years, about three hundred Dutch Muslims travelled to Syria and Iraq to join the violent jihad. This article explores the phenomenon by looking into the individual characteristics and processes of these Dutch jihadis. It presents the findings of a study of the life stories of twelve of them, showing the diversity of the group. It also looks into types of jihadists and their roles in the jihadist scene using categories provided by Maher and Bjørgo. The article arrives at the somewhat unsatisfactory conclusion that there is no standard Dutch jihadist and that we need to study more individual cases and better understand what is going on within the jihadist scene in order to be able to stop people from following the path towards the violent jihad.

This article draws on three years of ethnographic research into the embeddedness of crime and identity of the Rollin 200 Crips, a Dutch ‘gang’ from the city of The Hague. During the course of this fieldwork the possibilities of social media were explored. Posts and pictures on social media can be used by criminologists as a relative easy way to collect data, but social media can also be used as a platform to communicate and contact informants. The central argument in this article is that ethnographers should somehow try to incorporate these offline practices in their fieldwork to better deal with the fact that boundaries between being online and offline are becoming increasingly interwoven and blurred. But like forms of offline ethnography, there is also a need to reflect on the usage of this data, particularly in terms of selectivity and ethics.