In the Netherlands, over the past 25 years mayors have had an increasing number of formal powers, based on administrative law, to fight against crime and disorder. Now, the Dutch mayors have the power to impose a restraining order, to close houses in case of drugs and/or drugs trade, or to decline a request for a permit when it might be used for illegal activities.
To implement these measures, the local government is highly dependent on (information provided by) the police. At this moment we do not have much information about this cooperation between local government and the police in the management of crime and disorder. This paper is based on an empirical study concerning this issue. It shows that the inter-organizational cooperation between local government and the police may differ strongly, however this cooperation still often depends on central factors and circumstances. An important factor is the (growing) distance between the police and local government in regard to the local approach of problems of crime and disorder. A significant number of local police officers concentrates mainly on the maintenance of law and order by criminal law enforcement instead of the implementation of administrative measures. As a result, local government is often unsatisfied about the contribution of the police. For example, the quality of the information provided by the police is often perceived as insufficient. In some cases local governments try to diminish the degree of interdependency with the police and to strengthen their own position in the local safety domain.

The operational leader, the ‘gold commander’, fulfils a crucial function in crisis- and disaster management in the Netherlands. He is held responsible for the total coordination of all collaborating emergency services and supports/advises the Mayor, the Commander in Chief. Unfortunately, this function has never been very effective in practise, as shown by many evaluations. From a scientific point of view, it is easy to understand why the operational leader cannot be effective in the Dutch crisis management organisation. The operational leader has no authorities and has been seated in an emergency operation centre far from the Mayor. This article examines why this issue has not been solved, despite 30 years of studying and adjusting the Dutch crisis management organisation.

This contribution reports on a delimited part of a larger, exploratory study, the main question of which was: How do aldermen perceive threats, what are their behavioral intentions and what is the influence of threats on the process and the outcome of decision-making? This question was answered with the help of Q-methodology, semi-structured interviews and case studies. This article discusses the results of the Q-methodology and the semi-structured interviews. The case studies will be reported separately later on. Through the Q-methodology three patterns in perception were found in dealing with threats: ‘combative and decisive’, ‘vulnerable and thoughtful’ and ‘down-to-earth and accepting’. The interviews show that it usually concerns instrumental threats that are deliberately used to influence decision making, which usually take place in the private sphere and vary from verbal aggression to physical violence. Most threats come from individuals, but some come from groups, in some cases there is a relationship with criminals. In the cases reviewed, the consequences in the private sphere are far-reaching, there are indications for the influence on public functioning (from hardening to great caution). There is almost always a report, a fuss in the media can affect the authority of the official.

In today’s society, full use is made of online banking. This makes safety and security of online banking an important issue. Two significant threats to users of online banking in The Netherlands are phishing and malware attacks. In this study, an end-user perspective is adopted to study customers’ perceptions regarding safety and security of online banking. A unique feature to this study is that we explore – besides other predictor variables – the relationship between online banking fraud victimization and risk perception. We have made a distinction between three types of victimization: 1) self-experienced victimization, 2) victimization of acquaintances, such as family and friends, and 3) having heard of stories in the media about online banking fraud victimization. Based on a secondary analysis of data from 1200 Dutch users of online banking, collected through an online survey, we conclude that participants perceive their risk of online banking fraud to be small. In general, participants have little experience with victimization, both themselves (2.3%) and in social settings (29.6%). Three quarters of the respondents (75.6%) are aware of victimization of online banking fraud by means of media coverage. Direct and indirect victimization, however, have almost no influence on risk perception regarding online banking fraud. Risk perception is mainly determined by perceived vulnerability, that is, the estimated probability of becoming a victim of online banking fraud. Furthermore, perceived severity or impact of online banking fraud and the degree of trust in online banking contribute to some extent to risk perception. In total, 64.0% of variance in risk perception was explained by the predictors perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, locus of control, trust in online banking, (in)direct experiences with victimization (self, acquaintances and media) and demographic variables (gender, age, educational level and work status). The results of this study may help to improve communication about risks regarding online banking.