Zoekresultaat: 7 artikelen

x
De zoekresultaten worden gefilterd op:
Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy x Jaar 2010 x Rubriek Artikel x
Artikel

Access_open Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: An Iterative Relationship

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2010
Trefwoorden constitutionalism, globalization, democracy, modernity, postnational
Auteurs Neil Walker
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    The complexity of the relationship between democracy and modern constitutionalism is revealed by treating democracy as an incomplete ideal. This refers both to the empirical incompleteness of democracy as unable to supply its own terms of application – the internal dimension – and to the normative incompleteness of democracy as guide to good government – the external dimension. Constitutionalism is a necessary response to democratic incompleteness – seeking to realize (the internal dimension) and to supplement and qualify democracy (the external dimension). How democratic incompleteness manifests itself, and how constitutionalism responds to incompleteness evolves and alters, revealing the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy as iterative. The paper concentrates on the iteration emerging from the current globalizing wave. The fact that states are no longer the exclusive sites of democratic authority compounds democratic incompleteness and complicates how constitutionalism responds. Nevertheless, the key role of constitutionalism in addressing the double incompleteness of democracy persists under globalization. This continuity reflects how the deep moral order of political modernity, in particular the emphasis on individualism, equality, collective agency and progress, remains constant while its institutional architecture, including the forms of its commitment to democracy, evolves. Constitutionalism, itself both a basic orientation and a set of design principles for that architecture, remains a necessary support for and supplement to democracy. Yet post-national constitutionalism, even more than its state-centred predecessor, remains contingent upon non-democratic considerations, so reinforcing constitutionalism’s normative and sociological vulnerability. This conclusion challenges two opposing understandings of the constitutionalism of the global age – that which indicts global constitutionalism because of its weakened democratic credentials and that which assumes that these weakened democratic credentials pose no problem for post-national constitutionalism, which may instead thrive through a heightened emphasis on non-democratic values.


Neil Walker
Neil Walker is Regius Professor of Public Law and the Law of Nature and Nations at the University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom.
Artikel

Access_open Is de vrijheid van godsdienst in de moderne multiculturele samenleving nog een hanteerbaar recht?

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2010
Trefwoorden freedom of religion, human rights, human dignity, traditional religion, unequal treatment
Auteurs Koo van der Wal
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    There are two fundamental problems with regard to the freedom of religion. The first concerns the content and scope of the right; the second, a possible unequal treatment between population groups. The first problem can only be dealt with by a preliminary analysis of the religious phenomenon, which precedes a legal definition. It turns out that there is a range of different types of religion, with on the one hand traditional forms of religion which are narrowly interwoven with the culture in question (all kinds of ‘cultural’ practices possessing a religious dimension), and on the other forms of religion which loosen to a considerable extent the ties between culture and religion. Evidently, the former types of religion cause problems in modern society. An additional problem is that freedom of religion as a modern basic right rests on a view of human being – including the idea of the inherent dignity and autonomy of the human person – which is at odds with the symbolic universe of traditional religion. The conclusion of the article is that in the modern pluralist society freedom of religion is on its way to becoming, or already has become, an unmanageable right. So the problems arising around this right (including that of unequal treatment) can only be solved in a pragmatic, not really satisfactory way. In that context, modern humanitarian standards should be observed in the implementation of the right of freedom of religion because fundamental human rights are connected with a specific concept of humanity.


Koo van der Wal
Koo van der Wal is emeritus professor of Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam and the Erasmus University Rotterdam.
Artikel

Access_open Constitutionele toetsing in een democratie zonder volk

Een kelseniaanse rechtvaardiging voor het Europees Hof van Justitie

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2010
Trefwoorden Kelsen, Democracy, Legitimacy, European Union, European Court of Justice
Auteurs Quoc Loc Hong
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    This article draws on Hans Kelsen’s theory of democracy to argue that, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the democratic legitimacy of either the European Union (EU) or the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The legitimacy problems from which the EU in general and the ECJ in particular are alleged to suffer seem to result mainly from our rigid adherence to the outdated conception of democracy as popular self-legislation. Because we tend to approach the Union’s political and judicial practice from the perspective of this democracy conception, we are not able to observe what is blindingly obvious, that is, the viability and persistence of both this mega-leviathan and the highest court thereof. It is, therefore, imperative that we modernize and adjust our conception of democracy in order to comprehend the new reality to which these bodies have given rise, rather than to call for ‘reforms’ in a futile attempt to bring this reality into accordance with our ancient preconceptions about what democratic governance ought to be. Kelsen is the democratic theorist whose work has enabled us to venture into that direction.


Quoc Loc Hong
Quoc Loc Hong was a FWO Postdoctoral Fellow from 2007 to 2009 at the University of Antwerp. He is currently an independent researcher.
Artikel

Access_open De droom van Beccaria

Over het strafrecht en de nodale veiligheidszorg

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2010
Trefwoorden Beccaria, criminal law, nodal governance, social contract
Auteurs Klaas Rozemond
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing argue in their book, Governing Security, that the state has lost its monopoly on the governance of security. Private security arrangements have formed a networked governance of security in which the criminal law of the state is just one of the many knots or ‘nodes’ of the security network. Johnston and Shearing consider On Crimes and Punishment, written by Cesare Beccaria in the 18th century, as the most important statement of the classical security program which has withered away in the networked governance of the risk society. This article critizes the way Johnston and Shearing analyze Beccaria’s social contract theory and it formulates a Beccarian theory of the criminal law and nodal governance which explains the causes of crime and the rise of nodal governance and defends the central role of the state in anchoring security arrangements based on private contracts and property rights.


Klaas Rozemond
Klaas Rozemond is associate professor at the Department of Criminal Law, Faculty of Law, VU University Amsterdam.
Artikel

Access_open Paul Scholten en Herman Dooyeweerd: het gesprek dat nooit plaatsvond

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2010
Trefwoorden Scholten, Dooyeweerd, legal principles, legal reasoning, religion
Auteurs Bas Hengstmengel
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    The legal scholars Paul Scholten (1875-1946) and Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) had much in common. The most significant agreement is their emphasis on the influence of a (religious) worldview on legal scholarship and practice. Unfortunately, they never met to discuss the similarities and differences of their jurisprudential ideas. In this article I try to reconstruct this conversation which never took place. Scholten’s legal thought is specifically oriented to the practice and difficulties of judging. Dooyeweerd above all was a philosopher whose specific philosophy of the modal aspects of reality is the basis for his thinking about the law. Both scholars emphasized the importance of legal principles. They also identified several fundamental legal categories and concepts. However, their methodology is different. The way religion and morality influence their legal thought is also different. A discussion of the contemporary relevance of their work completes the paper.


Bas Hengstmengel
Bas Hengstmengel is a PhD-candidate at Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam. He writes a dissertation on procedural justice.
Artikel

Access_open ‘Wat is waarheid?’ De rol van deskundigen bij waarheidsvinding in de strafrechtspraak

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2010
Trefwoorden Legitimation durch Verfahren, criminal law, expert-witnesses, truth, reliability of evidence
Auteurs Anne Ruth Mackor
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Huls has argued that the idea that judges are truth-finders is misleading. In the first part of the paper I put his claim to the test. Against Huls I argue that the aim of procedures in criminal lawsuits is not only to guarantee binding decisions but also to help to find the truth. In the second part of the paper I investigate the role expert-witnesses play in truth-finding. Cleiren and Loth have argued that experts fail to understand the differences between legal and scientific ways of truth-finding. It turns out that Cleiren does not offer an argument for her claim and that Loth’s claim fails too, since it confuses coherence as truth and coherence as epistemic justification. I conclude that legal scholars, rather than experts, fail to understand the nature of legal and scientific truth-finding.


Anne Ruth Mackor
Anne Ruth Mackor is professor of professional ethics, in particular of the legal professions, at the Faculty of Law of Groningen, and Socrates professor of professional ethics at the Faculties of Philosophy and Theology of Groningen.
Artikel

Access_open Slapende rechters, dwalende rechtspsychologen en het hypothetische karakter van feitelijke oordelen

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2010
Trefwoorden psychology of law, criminal law, miscarriages of justice, hypothetical reasoning
Auteurs Klaas Rozemond
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    In their book De slapende rechter (The sleeping judge) Dutch legal psychologists W.A. Wagenaar, H. Israëls and P.J. van Koppen claim that Dutch judges wrongfully convict suspects in certain cases because these judges generally fail to understand the way hypothetical reasoning works in relation to empirical evidence. This article argues that Wagenaar, Israëls and Van Koppen are basically right in their claim that reasoning on evidence in criminal cases should have the form of hypothetical reasoning. However, they fail to apply this form of reasoning to their own analysis of Dutch criminal cases and the causes of wrongful convictions. Therefore, their conclusion that a form of revision of convictions outside of the criminal law system should be introduced does not meet their own methodological standards.


Klaas Rozemond
Klaas Rozemond is associate professor at the Department of Criminal Law, Faculty of Law, VU University Amsterdam.
Interface Showing Amount
U kunt door de volledige tekst zoeken naar alle artikelen door uw zoekterm in het zoekveld in te vullen. Als u op de knop 'Zoek' heeft geklikt komt u op de zoekresultatenpagina met filters, die u helpen om snel bij het door u gezochte artikel te komen. Er zijn op dit moment twee filters: rubriek en jaar.