Blad responds to Groenhuijsen by showing how political decisions in the Netherlands, after successful experiments with restorative justice for juveniles and adults, were based on the belief that criminal justice would lose its punitive foundation and tenor when restorative justice practices would become integrated in the justice system. Criminal justice should not be about resolving conflicts between victims and offenders and the type of mediation, that could lead to an agreement as an important element to be considered in sentencing, was therefore rejected. In so far as restorative justice ideology took influence, it seems to have been a misconception of restorative justice as merely a new form of penal abolitionism. The fact that restorative justice does not deny the legitimacy of the provisions in the substantive criminal law and that all important restorative projects co-operate with criminal justice agencies was apparently ignored. Against the background of the dominant political culture of ‘punitive populism’ and intensified use of severe punishments it seems highly unlikely that abandoning the ambition to develop a restorative justice paradigm would further the implementation of restorative justice.

Discussions in the movement of restorative justice about the fundamental question, whether its interventions are alternatives to punishment or alternative punishments, have become repetitive and seem to be in a dead end. The author reviews the arguments against the background of the ‘last resort’ principle in Husak’s work. Husak distinguishes between last resort in terms of sentencing and last resort in terms of criminalization. Since the restorative justice movement does not fundamentally reject the primary criminalisations, but accepts the definitions of certain forms of conduct as crime, it merely strives to offer alternatives to punishments that would otherwise be imposed. If protagonists of restorative justice want to avoid this, they should consider an abolitionist option to strive for decriminalization.

Legislation affects restorative justice in four ways: existing legislation may allow it, new laws may enable it, laws may limit it, or restorative justice may be the norm. Examples from different countries are given and specific questions about the relationship of restorative justice to the criminal justice system discussed. It is suggested that, broadly speaking, safeguards should be legislated and practice regulated by an independent body. It is concluded that restorative practices, have the potential to transform society’s response to harmful behaviour.

Due to immigration the Dutch have made a significant contribution to the development of New Zealand, especially in the field of juvenile justice and adoption. As for New Zealand’s Youth Justice Service, the introduction of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act in 1989 has been a landmark in New Zealand’s history of dealing with juvenile delinquency. While it was not designed as a restorative justice system, the current system is tuned towards restorative justice. Until then, New Zealand had a shameful history as far as the handling of juvenile delinquency is concerned. The Maori, whose youngsters were – and still are – overrepresented in juvenile statistics, heavily criticized this model, emphasizing the need to strengthen the bond between the (extended) family and the juvenile offender, as well as the need to provide for redress. In the same period, the United Nations Convention on Children’s Rights (UNCROC) was introduced (1989), the Act of 1989 paying tribute to the UNCROC. As the national juvenile justice system to some extent does not live up to the standards of the UNCROC, there remains room for improvement. However, black clouds gather over New Zealand’s juvenile justice system, for the present government has announced to be in favor of a punitive oriented policy; there is a call to get ‘tough on juvenile crime’. This policy, however, implies setting back the clock and endangers the current orientation on restorative justice, as well as the legal values set out by the UNCROC.

The author reports on the doctorate research that she presented in 2009. Restorative practices have not often been researched as a praxis of social work, on the interface between giving help and administering justice. The author situates restorative mediation as a form of social work on the threshold between the private and the public, a threshold that she considers to be of a social nature.Restorative mediation as social work should contribute to values such as human dignity and social justice. The author observed and studied restorative mediation in adult on the one hand and juvenile criminal cases on the other (in Flanders, Belgium) and found that these practices differ widely.Although in both kind of practices responsibility and restoration are central concepts, their meanings differ fundamentally: in youth cases the offer of restorative mediation departs from a critical pedagogy oriented at emancipation, holding on to protective arrangements at the same time. Societal developments changed the image of youngsters from victims of society into risks for society and this may have implied that social problems around criminality are now also by mediation transformed into individual problems for which juveniles should be held accountable.In adult criminal cases the approach was initially much more on civic responsibility for the harm done to victims and since mediation was only offered in serious cases the courts always had their say too.Reflecting upon her research the author questions whether dominant social norms can be and still are challenged in the praxis of mediation. Restorative mediation has become incorporated into the existing institutional arrangements relevant to juveniles and adults: with juvenile cases the logic of prevention seems to become dominant. The practices seem to become exercises in taking responsibility within the traditional normative framework. On the threshold between the private and the public restorative practices, with their self-image of being a more humane form of law enforcement, run the risk of becoming blind for the potential effect of criminalization of their clients.