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Artikel

Access_open The Right to Have Rights as the Right to Asylum

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2014
Trefwoorden Arendt, asylum, refugeeship, right to have rights, statelessness de facto and de jure
Auteurs Nanda Oudejans
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    This article argues that the right to have rights, as launched by Hannah Arendt, is relative to refugee displacement and hence translates as a right to asylum. It takes issue with the dominant view that the public/private divide is the locus classicus of the meaning of this primordial right. A different direction of thought is proposed, proceeding from Arendt’s recovery of the spatiality of law. The unencompassibility of place in matters of rights, freedom and equality brings this right into view as a claim at the behest of those who have lost a legal place of their own. This also helps us to gain better understanding of Arendt’s rebuttal of the sharp-edged distinction between refugees and stateless persons and to discover the defiant potential of the right to have rights to illuminate the refugee’s claim to asylum as a claim to an own place where protection can be enjoyed again.


Nanda Oudejans
Nanda Oudejans is an independent researcher in philosophy of law and political philosophy.
Artikel

Access_open The Meaning of the Presumption of Innocence for Pre-trial Detention

An Empirical Approach

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2013
Trefwoorden pre-trial detention practice, presumption of guilt, incapacitation, presumption of innocence
Auteurs Lonneke Stevens
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    The presumption of innocence (PoI) is considered to be an important principle for regulating pre-trial detention. The idea is that pre-trial detention should be a last resort. However, pre-trial detention practice demonstrates that pre-trial detention does not function on the basis of a presumption of innocence but rather from a presumption of guilt and dangerousness. It must be concluded that, with regard to pre-trial detention, the PoI has a rather limited normative effect.


Lonneke Stevens
Lonneke Stevens is Associate Professor of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure at VU University Amsterdam.
Artikel

Access_open Retributivist Arguments against Presuming Innocence

Answering to Duff

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2013
Trefwoorden broad presumption of innocence, retributivism, punishment of innocents, vicarious liability of car owners, drink-driving tests of non-suspects
Auteurs Alwin A. van Dijk
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    Factors justifying not presuming innocence are generally incorporated into the Presumption of Innocence (PoI). A confusing discourse has resulted: numerous guilt-presuming acts are deemed consistent with the PoI. I argue for an unusually broad PoI: any act that might convey to a reasonable actor that he is not presumed innocent of a punishable offence constitutes a PoI interference. Thus, academic debate need only be about the question what PoI interferences are justifiable or unjustifiable. This question must be answered using pro- and anti-PoI values. I analyse three PoI interferences in relation to Duff’s retributivist punishment theory: presumptions of guilt, vicarious liability of car owners and coercing non-suspects into proving their sobriety. Retributivists tend to castigate such procedures based on their (supposed) consequentialist rationale. I argue, however, that they might also be justified on retributivist grounds. The retributivist anti-PoI duty to punish the guilty may be the worst enemy of innocents.


Alwin A. van Dijk
Alwin A. van Dijk is Assistant Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Groningen.
Artikel

Access_open Presumption of Innocence Versus a Principle of Fairness

A Response to Duff

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2013
Trefwoorden rules, principles, fairness, PoI
Auteurs Magnus Ulväng
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    In my response to Duff I focus mainly on the following two issues. Firstly, I examine what kind of a norm the presumption of innocence (PoI) really is and how it ontologically differs from other types of rules, principles, rationales, etc. My tentative conclusion is that a PoI does not suffice the requirement of being a dogmatic rule and, thus, has less weight than what Duff perhaps assumes.
    Secondly, I examine what role the concept of innocence plays in the debate on fundamental (moral and legal) principles and the underlying rationales of a criminal law system. Although I am sympathetic to much of what Duff purports in his plea for civic trust and a parsimonious use of criminal law, I am reluctant to believe that it is really a broader version of a PoI that warrants the kind of morally decent criminal law system that he suggests normatively ought to be. In my view, most of what Duff wants to ascribe to the PoI can be derived from a principle of fairness which, in my view, is already embedded in the fundamentals of criminal law doctrine.


Magnus Ulväng
Magnus Ulväng is Professor of Criminal Law at Uppsala University.
Artikel

Access_open Absolute Positivism

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2013
Trefwoorden jurisprudence, legal positivism, Hans Kelsen, pure theory of law
Auteurs Christoph Kletzer
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    The paper argues that we miss the point and strength of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law if we take it to drive a middle way between reductionism and moralism. Rather conversely, the Pure Theory is a radical theory. It tries to overcome the opposition between reductionism and moralism by making clear that both opponents rest on the same ill-conceived convictions about legal validity. Both take it that the law cannot be normative by itself. In contrast, the Pure Theory tries to find a new approach to the understanding of law that takes seriously the constitutive functions of law. It tries to understand the validity of law as resting in law itself. As such it is an attempt to find a philosophically satisfactory formulation of what can be called absolute positivism.


Christoph Kletzer
Christoph Kletzer is a Senior Lecturer at the Dickson Poon School of Law at King’s College in London.
Artikel

Access_open Juridical Acts and the Gap between Is and Ought

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2013
Trefwoorden naturalistic fallacy, duty, obligation, is/ought, contract, promise
Auteurs Jaap Hage
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    This article addresses the possibility of deriving ought from is. To that purpose it casts doubt on the very distinction between is and ought; distinguishes between duties, obligations, being obligated and owing to do something; revitalises Searle’s famous derivation of ought from is by replacing promises with contracts; and discusses some of the traditional objections against this derivation. The conclusions are that it is not problematic at all to ‘derive’ the existence of obligations from solely is-premises, and that it is not very problematic to ‘derive’ an ought from the existence of an obligation. The quotes around ‘derive’ signal that the nature of derivation also plays a role in this discussion.


Jaap Hage
Jaap Hage holds the chair for Jurisprudence at Maastricht University.
Artikel

Access_open ‘Down Freedom’s Main Line’

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2012
Trefwoorden democracy, radical freedom, free market economy, consumerism, collective action
Auteurs Steven L. Winter
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    Two waves of democratization define the post-Cold War era of globalization. The first one saw democracies emerge in post-communist countries and post-Apartheid South Africa. The current wave began with the uprisings in the Middle East. The first focused on the formal institutions of the market and the liberal state, the second is participatory and rooted in collective action. The individualistic conception of freedom and democracy that underlies the first wave is false and fetishistic. The second wave shows democracy’s moral appeal is the commitment to equal participation in determining the terms and conditions of social life. Freedom, thus, requires collective action under conditions of equality, mutual recognition, and respect.


Steven L. Winter
Steven L. Winter is Walter S. Gibbs Professor of Constitutional Law at Wayne State University Law School, Detroit, Michigan.
Artikel

Access_open The Collapse of the Rule of Law

The Messina Earthquake and the State of Exception

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2012
Trefwoorden Messina, earthquake, state of exception, rule of law, progress
Auteurs Massimo La Torre
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    Messina, a Sicilian town, was devasteted by an earthquake in1908. It was an hecatomb. Stricken through this unfathomable disgrace Messina’s institutions and civil society collapsed and a sort of wild natural state replaced the rule of law. In this situation there was a first intervention of the Russian Czarist navy who came to help but immediately enforced cruel emergency measures. The Italian army followed and there was a formal declaration of an ‘emergency situation.’ Around this event and the several exceptional measures taken by the government a debate took place about the legality of those exceptional measures. The article tries to reconstruct the historical context and the content of that debate and in a broader perspective thematizes how law (and morality) could be brought to meet the breaking of normality and ordinary life by an unexpected and catastrophic event.


Massimo La Torre
Massimo La Torre is Professor of Legal Philosophy at the University of Catanzaro in Italy and visiting Professor of Law at the University of Hull in England.
Artikel

Access_open Globalization as a Factor in General Jurisprudence

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2012
Trefwoorden general jurisprudence, globalization, global legal pluralism, legal positivism, analytical jurisprudence
Auteurs Sidney Richards
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    Globalization is commonly cited as an important factor in theorising legal phenomena in the contemporary world. Although many legal disciplines have sought to adapt their theories to globalization, progress has been comparatively modest within contemporary analytical jurisprudence. This paper aims to offer a survey of recent scholarship on legal theory and globalization and suggests various ways in which these writings are relevant to the project of jurisprudence. This paper argues, more specifically, that the dominant interpretation of globalization frames it as a particular form of legal pluralism. The resulting concept – global legal pluralism – comes in two broad varieties, depending on whether it emphasizes normative or institutional pluralism. This paper goes on to argue that these concepts coincide with two central themes of jurisprudence, namely its concern with normativity and institutionality. Finally, this paper reflects on the feasibility of constructing a ‘general’ and ‘descriptive’ jurisprudence in light of globalization.


Sidney Richards
Sidney Richards is Doctoral candidate in Law at Pembroke College at the University of Cambridge.
Artikel

Access_open De Drittwirkung van grondrechten

Retorisch curiosum of vaandel van een paradigmatische omwenteling in ons rechtsbestel?

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2012
Trefwoorden Drittwirkung, horizontal effect of human rights, constitutionalisation of private law
Auteurs Stefan Somers
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    This article discusses whether the horizontal effect of human rights marks a new paradigm in legal systems or is merely a new style in legal rhetoric. In doing so, much attention is paid to the differences between direct and indirect horizontal effect. Departing from social contract theory the article explains that the protection of human right values in horizontal relations is an essential feature of modern constitutionalism. It also analyses whether these values in horizontal relations should be protected by private law or by human rights. This question is looked at from a substantial, a methodological and an institutional perspective. In the end, because of institutional power balancing, the article argues in favor of an indirect horizontal effect of human rights.


Stefan Somers
Stefan Somers is a researcher at the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies at the VUB (Free University of Brussels) and prepares a PhD on the relationship between human rights and tort law.
Artikel

Access_open Transnational Fundamental Rights: Horizontal Effect?

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2011
Trefwoorden fundamental rights, societal constitutionalism, inclusionary and exclusionary effects, anonymous matrix
Auteurs Gunther Teubner
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    Violations of human rights by transnational corporations and by other ‘private’ global actors raise problems that signal the limits of the traditional doctrine of ‘horizontal effects’. To overcome them, constitutional law doctrine needs to be complemented by perspectives from legal theory and sociology of law. This allows new answers to the following questions: What is the validity basis of human rights in transnational ‘private’ regimes – extraterritorial effect, colère public or external pressures on autonomous law making in global regimes? Do they result in protective duties of the states or in direct human rights obligations of private transnational actors? What does it mean to generalise state-directed human rights and to respecify them for different social spheres? Are societal human rights limited to ‘negative’ rights or is institutional imagination capable of developing ‘positive’ rights – rights of inclusion and participation in various social fields? Are societal human rights directed exclusively against corporate actors or can they be extended to counteract structural violence of anonymous social processes? Can such broadened perspectives of human rights be re-translated into the practice of public interest litigation?


Gunther Teubner
Gunther Teubner is Professor of Private Law and Legal Sociology and Principal Investigator of the Excellence Cluster ‘The Formation of Normative Orders’ at the Goethe-University, Frankfurt/Main. He is also Professor at the International University College, Torino, Italy.
Artikel

Access_open When regulators mean business

Regulation in the shadow of environmental Armageddon

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2011
Trefwoorden ecological catastrophe, regulatory legitimacy, regulatory effectiveness, geo-engineering
Auteurs Han Somsen
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    This article considers the question how knowledge of an impending ecological catastrophe is likely to impact on regulatory legitimacy and regulatory effectiveness. If the ultimate aim to safeguard meaningful human life on earth is in acute danger, this is likely to translate into zero tolerance towards non-compliance with environmental rules designed to avert catastrophe. This, in turn, will persuade regulators to employ normative technologies that do not engage with the moral reason of regulatees at all, but leave no option but to comply. In addition, regulators may turn to panoptic surveillance techniques that allow no breaches of rules to remain undetected. Finally, it is argued that if and to the extent that impending ecological catastrophe marks the end of maintaining the status quo as a plausible policy goal, regulators will be more sympathetic towards potentially apocalyptic technologies that carry greater promise for future gain than otherwise would be the case.


Han Somsen
Han Somsen is Professor of Regulation & Technology at the Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology and Society, and Dean of Research of Tilburg Law School.
Artikel

Access_open Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: An Iterative Relationship

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2010
Trefwoorden constitutionalism, globalization, democracy, modernity, postnational
Auteurs Neil Walker
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    The complexity of the relationship between democracy and modern constitutionalism is revealed by treating democracy as an incomplete ideal. This refers both to the empirical incompleteness of democracy as unable to supply its own terms of application – the internal dimension – and to the normative incompleteness of democracy as guide to good government – the external dimension. Constitutionalism is a necessary response to democratic incompleteness – seeking to realize (the internal dimension) and to supplement and qualify democracy (the external dimension). How democratic incompleteness manifests itself, and how constitutionalism responds to incompleteness evolves and alters, revealing the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy as iterative. The paper concentrates on the iteration emerging from the current globalizing wave. The fact that states are no longer the exclusive sites of democratic authority compounds democratic incompleteness and complicates how constitutionalism responds. Nevertheless, the key role of constitutionalism in addressing the double incompleteness of democracy persists under globalization. This continuity reflects how the deep moral order of political modernity, in particular the emphasis on individualism, equality, collective agency and progress, remains constant while its institutional architecture, including the forms of its commitment to democracy, evolves. Constitutionalism, itself both a basic orientation and a set of design principles for that architecture, remains a necessary support for and supplement to democracy. Yet post-national constitutionalism, even more than its state-centred predecessor, remains contingent upon non-democratic considerations, so reinforcing constitutionalism’s normative and sociological vulnerability. This conclusion challenges two opposing understandings of the constitutionalism of the global age – that which indicts global constitutionalism because of its weakened democratic credentials and that which assumes that these weakened democratic credentials pose no problem for post-national constitutionalism, which may instead thrive through a heightened emphasis on non-democratic values.


Neil Walker
Neil Walker is Regius Professor of Public Law and the Law of Nature and Nations at the University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom.
Artikel

Access_open Constitutionele toetsing in een democratie zonder volk

Een kelseniaanse rechtvaardiging voor het Europees Hof van Justitie

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2010
Trefwoorden Kelsen, Democracy, Legitimacy, European Union, European Court of Justice
Auteurs Quoc Loc Hong
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    This article draws on Hans Kelsen’s theory of democracy to argue that, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the democratic legitimacy of either the European Union (EU) or the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The legitimacy problems from which the EU in general and the ECJ in particular are alleged to suffer seem to result mainly from our rigid adherence to the outdated conception of democracy as popular self-legislation. Because we tend to approach the Union’s political and judicial practice from the perspective of this democracy conception, we are not able to observe what is blindingly obvious, that is, the viability and persistence of both this mega-leviathan and the highest court thereof. It is, therefore, imperative that we modernize and adjust our conception of democracy in order to comprehend the new reality to which these bodies have given rise, rather than to call for ‘reforms’ in a futile attempt to bring this reality into accordance with our ancient preconceptions about what democratic governance ought to be. Kelsen is the democratic theorist whose work has enabled us to venture into that direction.


Quoc Loc Hong
Quoc Loc Hong was a FWO Postdoctoral Fellow from 2007 to 2009 at the University of Antwerp. He is currently an independent researcher.
Artikel

Access_open Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach: In Need of a Moral Epistemology?

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2009
Trefwoorden Martha Nussbaum, Capabilities Approach, moral epistemology, objectivity, residues of justice, Bernard Williams, political moralism
Auteurs Mr. Iris van Domselaar
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    Although Nussbaum’s “Capabilities Approach” (CA) clearly expresses a commitment to objectivity, this article argues that this commitment is rather ambiguous due to the conception of public reason it endorses. In particular, the CA cannot account for an objective justification of public reason, given certain characteristics of public reason. As a result, the CA jeopardizes the substantive aim it has set itself: to provide an objective justification for public choices regarding human capabilities and their specifications.


Mr. Iris van Domselaar
Iris van Domselaar is a Ph.D-student and lecturer at the Department of General Jurisprudence, Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam. The subject of her thesis is “Residues of Justice and Tragic Legal Choice in a Liberal Rule of Law”.
Artikel

Access_open Over de wetenschappelijkheid van de rechtswetenschap

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2009
Trefwoorden legal science, empirical science, law and astronomy, mathematical logic, game theory
Auteurs Mr. Boudewijn de Bruin
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    This article provides an outsider perspective on the scientificity of legal studies. First, I argue that the presence of controversies does not mean that legal studies lack the status of a genuine science. Astronomy, mathematics, and economics have their controversies, too. Second, I show that non-empirical, non-normative research is no less scientific than empirical research. This is illustrated by work in mathematical logic. Third, I demonstrate the same claim for non-empirical, normative research.Here the example is research on social contract theories by means of gametheoretic models.


Mr. Boudewijn de Bruin
Boudewijn de Bruin is assistant professor in the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Groningen.
Artikel

Access_open Het normatieve karakter van de rechtswetenschap: recht als oordeel

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2009
Trefwoorden legal theory, science, methodology, normativity, knowledge
Auteurs Prof. mr. Carel Smith
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    Propositions of law are based upon normative judgement. The interpretation and application of legal provisions rest upon a judgement that determines which weight must be attributed to some point of view or perspective. In this respect, legal theory has a normative character. Its normative character does not preclude legal theory from being a scientific discipline. The scientific character of legal theory is not located in the possibility of testing the correctness of its theories. Rather, legal theory owes it scientific character to the shared standards of production and evaluation of legal arguments: the grammar of justice.


Prof. mr. Carel Smith
Carel Smith is associate professor at the Department of Metajuridica, Faculty of Law, Leiden University.
Artikel

Access_open ‘The Soviet Union did not have a legal system’

An interview with Jeremy Waldron on the methodology debate, historic injustice and the citation of foreign law

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2009
Trefwoorden normative positivism, historic injustice, restitution of property rights, citation of foreign law, methodology debate
Auteurs Kees Quist en Wouter Veraart
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    This interview with Jeremy Waldron covers three topics. Firstly, we dealt with the methodology debate, that is, the discussion about how to proceed in analyzing the nature of law. Does the question ‘What is law?’ require a descriptive analysis of the concept of law or, rather, a normative exercise in political philosophy? Secondly, we spoke about the role of law in response to historic injustice, especially in relation to the restitution of property rights. On this topic Waldron vindicates the ‘supersession-thesis’, the idea that, due to changed circumstances and the passage of time, historic injustices become superseded. The third section of the interview is devoted to Waldron’s perspective on the citation of foreign law by national judges.


Kees Quist
Kees Quist is junior lecturer and PhD fellow at Utrecht Law School.

Wouter Veraart
Wouter Veraart is professor of Legal Philosophy at the VU University Amsterdam.
Artikel

Access_open Lettres persanes 11

Omstreden democratie in mondiaal perspectief

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2008
Trefwoorden democratie, idee, model, verkiezing, levering, baattrekking, discriminatie, noodzakelijkheid, voorwaarde, ambtenaar
Auteurs P.B. Hensbroek

P.B. Hensbroek
Artikel

Access_open Law's 'Uncanniness': A Phenomenology of Legal Decisions

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2008
Trefwoorden claim, contract, interest, character, making, binding, E-business, Europese gemeenschap, identiteit, leasing
Auteurs H. Lindahl

H. Lindahl
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