This article aims at elucidating some methodological dilemmas which should be taken seriously in legal education. It also aims at articulating the process of how these dilemmas emerged both historically and philosophically. The article starts with the observation that our Western legal systems are rooted in a specific theoretical tradition which can be described as being twofold. In a first already ancient (pre-philosophical) conception, theory finds its nexus both in experience and in narrativity, whereas a more modern conception of theory focuses on logical and conceptual coherence, building a system of professional knowledge. The author argues for a combination of both theoretical conceptions as complementary cornerstones of legal educational programs.The twofold theoretical background of our Western legal tradition can offer us a welcome and fruitful basis for dealing with some important methodological dilemmas: an anascopic (from action to institution) vs a katascopic (from institution to action) approach; deductive vs inductive reasoning; problem-oriented thinking vs systems thinking; case based/case oriented vs doctrinal/conceptual thinking. The author argues for a dialectical complementarity between the respective poles of these dilemmas.Finally, the author argues for introducing – already in an early stage of the program –European Union legal thinking as a challenging laboratory ‘in action’ for searching a reflective equilibrium in dealing with the aforementioned methodological dilemmas.

The central issue of this paper is to outline a scientifically oriented course in law. Most actual courses focus on positive law, and the main conclusion of this paper is that this is wrong. This conclusion is based on the premise that law is not by definition positive law, but the answer to the question which rules should be enforced by collective means. This premise is argued in the full paper.Positive law is law to the extent that it should be enforced by collective means, and not by definition. Therefore a scientific course in law should pay some attention to positive law, but should not assign it the dominant place in the curriculum which it presently tends to have.To make this abstract idea more concrete, some proposals are made for a law curriculum. The starting point is that the law bachelor should only address positive law where this is necessary for exercises in legal reasoning. Moreover it should address the viable fundamental visions on the nature of law, the main theories about normative reasoning (main currents in ethics), and the facts which are relevant in the light of these normative theories for the question which norms should be enforced by collective means. These facts include both positive law and the results of the different sciences (e.g. psychology, sociology, economy, and biology) which are relevant to answer the normative question. Because there are too many scientific results to take in during a bachelor course, the study of the sciences should be replaced by an introduction to scientific method, which allows lawyers to evaluate the outcomes of scientific research. Finally, the bachelor course should also address ‘generic positive law’, the main questions which must be answered by legal systems and the most viable answers to these questions.The master phase of the curriculum should, for those lawyers who want to practice the positive law of a particular jurisdiction, be filled with the detailed study of the relevant positive law.

A detailed description is offered of the debate concerning the question how – within the framework of a normative research question – relevant and operational test criteria can be formulated.

In this paper the author attempts to answer the intriguing question how judges think by providing a description of the context of judicial decision-making from the insider’s perspective of a judge trainee. This paper demonstrates that in judicial training socialization plays an important formative role. Looking at a standard model for judging civil cases the author stresses that judicial decisions are essentially arbitrary in the true sense of the word and can only be understood from within the legal system. What makes judicial decisions special is not the argumentative method, but their status. One way the judicial power of decision is restricted is by the membership of judges of a professional group with a shared culture and tradition. The author is under the impression that the influence of this context of judicial decision-making on judging is underexposed in legal studies. This paper tries to give the initial impetus to a further exploration.

In 2010 verscheen het rapport Kwaliteit & diversiteit van de Commissie Koers die het wetenschappelijk onderzoek van negen Nederlandse juridische faculteiten beoordeelde. De conclusie van het rapport is dat het ‘goed’ gaat met het rechtswetenschappelijk onderzoek in Nederland, maar tegelijkertijd ziet de Commissie ‘een discipline in transitie’. De Commissie dringt er bij de decanen van de faculteiten op aan om veel meer te gaan samenwerken. Als uitgesproken ‘zwak’ benoemt ze het gegeven dat er binnen de discipline geen algemeen gedeelde opvatting bestaat over de wetenschappelijke kwaliteit op grond waarvan onderzoeksresultaten beoordeeld kunnen worden. In deze bijdrage blikt de auteur aan de hand van de bevindingen van de Commissie Koers terug en trekt hij lijnen naar de toekomst. Volgens hem verdient vooral de externe oriëntatie aandacht: de wetenschappelijke verantwoording (peer review, ranking, impactmeting), de steeds belangrijker wordende maatschappelijke verantwoording, en de thematisering van het juridische onderzoek (de Europese ‘grand challenges’ en de Nederlandse topsectoren).

In dit artikel wordt de stelling verdedigd dat in een praktijkgericht juridisch onderzoek zowel juridische als empirische onderzoeksmethoden nodig zijn. De centrale onderzoeksvraag in een praktijkgericht juridisch onderzoek dient immers gerelateerd te zijn aan het recht en aan de praktijk, zodat het antwoord op de centrale vraag praktisch bruikbaar is. Vragen van het type ‘mag dat?’ of ‘werkt dit?’ kunnen die relaties met recht en praktijk goed over het voetlicht brengen en sturing geven aan de richting van het onderzoek. In het beredeneerde antwoord op de onderzoeksvraag komt de integratie van methoden en technieken uit de juridische en sociaalwetenschappelijke discipline tot uitdrukking. Het onderzoeksmodel dat in dit artikel wordt uitgebeeld en toegelicht, maakt deze integratie duidelijk en biedt een basis voor een methodologie van praktijkgericht juridisch onderzoek.