This article provides a theoretical analysis of the label ‘resistance’. It sets out from the premise that the notion of resistance, although it has been current in criminology for some time, is still vaguely defined. We argue that resistance is not just a negative term, but can also be seen as a positive and creative force in society. As such, the primary function of resistance is to serve as a solvent of doxa, to continuously question obviousness and common sense. In the process of resistance we distinguish three processes: invention, imitation and transformation. The third stage warrants deeper investigation within cultural criminology.

De spanning tussen de rol van de wetgever en die van de rechter bij het implementeren van mensenrechten kan niet worden opgelost door het geven van het laatste woord aan een van hen. Het Hof in Straatsburg heeft zo’n laatste woord, omdat wijziging van het EVRM zeer moeilijk is. De Raad van Europa heeft in de Brighton Verklaring van 2012 voorstellen gedaan om de interpretatieruimte van het Hof enigszins in te tomen. In Nederland wil het initiatiefvoorstel Taverne de bevoegdheid van de nationale rechter afschaffen om direct te toetsen aan het EVRM, dit door wijziging van artikel 93 en 94 Grondwet. De beide voorstellen worden in deze bijdrage besproken.

This paper reviews the status quo of immigration law in the Netherlands in regard to the human rights of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Based on a thorough reading of the literature, Dutch detention law and policies aimed at immigrants are reviewed in relation to articles 3, 5 and 6 ECHR and 9 ICCPR to see whether they are compatible and whether a breach of human rights takes place in Dutch detention centres. Even though the ECHR has not yet ruled that Dutch immigration detention breaches drawn conclusions as to a potential breach of human rights, the writers of this paper argue that Dutch policy does potentially violate some of them.

Two waves of democratization define the post-Cold War era of globalization. The first one saw democracies emerge in post-communist countries and post-Apartheid South Africa. The current wave began with the uprisings in the Middle East. The first focused on the formal institutions of the market and the liberal state, the second is participatory and rooted in collective action. The individualistic conception of freedom and democracy that underlies the first wave is false and fetishistic. The second wave shows democracy’s moral appeal is the commitment to equal participation in determining the terms and conditions of social life. Freedom, thus, requires collective action under conditions of equality, mutual recognition, and respect.

This article is a comment on Carel Smith’s paper. Smith rightly argues that the study of law has a hermeneutic character. But his interpretation of legal hermeneutics includes the thesis that in hard cases there is no right or true legal decision. This seems to have negative implications for the scholarly character of the study of law: in hard cases any solution goes. This paper argues, against Smith, that the study of law defends right answers for hard cases. It is also normative in another sense: legal answers, in easy cases as well as in hard cases, always presuppose a normative interpretation of the legal sources. This contributes to the differences of opinion under lawyers. But it is no obstacle to the scholarly character of the study of law, as long as a rational debate about these legal answers and the underlying values and principles is possible. Smith’s rejection of the right answer thesis, however, prevents the possibility of such a rational debate.