In the ruling on Lachiri/Belgium, commentators discern a new development in the ECHR’s jurisprudence on the relationship between the headscarf and freedom of religion. According to the author, that is not the case: in fact, he observes a continued bias of the Court towards the headscarf.

The decision of the Court that Muslims from the Greek province of West Thrace can choose in matters of family law between civil or Islamic law, is not surprising. However, much can be said about the way in which the Court came to that conclusion. Because in doing so it uses principles and considerations that show a lack of insight in the status and functioning of a unique legal system, namely that of interpersonal law, or the coexistence on equal basis of several family laws. Similarly, the Court seems biased towards Islamic family law, which it consistently refers to as ‘sharia’. A critical discussion of this judgment is therefore appropriate.

On 20 December 2017, the Court of Justice of the EU ruled that an extrajudicial unilateral divorce brought about in Syria does not come within the substantive scope of the European regulation on the law applicable to divorces (Rome III Regulation). In response to this decision, the inequality between men and women in the divorce law of Muslim countries, the developments that are going on in this area, as well as the role the non-discrimination-principle plays in the recognition policies in European states on Islamic repudiations, are discussed in this contribution.

Two new rulings by the European Court of Human Rights confirm earlier jurisprudence regarding the ‘burqa ban’, as such ban is justified on the basis of the principle of ‘living together’. Still, two points stand out in these rulings that need discussion. The first is that this is an example of how the Court applies its new ‘qualitative, democracy-enhancing approach’ that pays more consideration to domestic decision-making in the field of human rights. These rulings show the flipside of this laudable endeavour, however, as the Court sees no reason to evaluate, let alone critically assess, the outcome of these domestic decision-making processes. Second, the remarkable ‘concurring opinion’ by the president of the ruling judges, in which he states in very stern wordings that the ruling should not be considered a cart blanche for burqa bans elsewhere. Given the elaborate considerations why such ban would not be admissible, it is surprising that the Court has failed to elaborate why the burqa bans in France and Belgium are admissible.

In August 2016 the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) ruled that Scientology could not be recognised as a civil society organisation that can benefit from tax exemptions for donations (the so called: ANBI-status). The majority of the activities of Scientology consist of courses of auditing and training at high rates with the purpose of creating large financial buffers for Scientology. The Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeal, which adopted a comparative method using commercial rates, that these specific activities do not serve the general interest, but serve the individual interest of Scientology.

In a unanimous decision, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has accepted the refusal of an exemption of compulsory mixed swimming lessons for elementary school girls in Switzerland. The exemption was requested by the parents of the two girls as the requirement to let their daughters participate in those lessons was contrary to their religious conviction. The author discusses the decision in the light of national debates on integration and subscribes its outcome. Specific attention is paid to the ECtHR’s interpretation of the legitimacy of the aim of the Swiss authorities and the role of the numerical presence of Islam in the underlying Swiss court’s ruling which is upheld by ECtHR.

The French state council ruled that the mayor of Villeneuve-Loubet did not have the right to ban burkinis. The court found that the anti-burkini decrees were “a serious and manifestly illegal attack on fundamental freedoms”, including the right to move around in public and the freedom of conscience. The judges stated that local authorities could only restrict individual liberties if there was a “proven risk” to public order. It ruled that a proven public order risk had not been demonstrated.

The European Court of Human Rights has accepted the French ban on the wearing of a full face veil (burqa) in public based on the notion of ‘living together,’ which in the particular case of France is considered an essential part of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
In the author’s view, this ruling is problematic as it elevates local – in this case French – customs of the majority to a legal norm. The law is to protect general freedoms, including the freedom to be different from the majority; the law is not to protect certain majority customs. Prescribing what is or is not culturally suitable may be expected from a theocracy or dictatorship, but is not what a legislator in a democratic society should do.

In its ruling of June 12, 2014, the European Court on Human Rights (Grand Chamber) concluded that no violation of the right to private life and family life under the European Convention of Human Rights had taken place in the case of the non-renewal of an employment contract of a Roman Catholic teacher of religion and ethics. The reason for this non-renewal was the withdrawal of the required ecclesiastical approval of the teacher. According to the European Court, church autonomy prevailed in this case over the right to private life and family life of the teacher, a married priest with five children and an active member of an organization promoting voluntary celibacy. This contribution analyses and discusses the ruling of the ECHR, also in the light of the main dissenting opinion. It supports the Court’s conclusion, but criticizes some of its reasoning. It also states that regardless of the extent of church autonomy, a clear and correct procedural approach to employment issues also does honour ecclesiastical authorities.