Is online dispute resolution (ODR) the way to organise 100% access to justice? Or is it more of a bubble-solution looking for a problem? Experiences are mixed but there are reasons to be optimistic. A Dutch example of an online divorce platform show how technology can better serve the justice needs of citizens. But for that we need to stop thinking in terms of ADR, ODR and court litigation but rather design more hybrid processes.

‘I felt so sorry for you, such a lovely tool, and then you have no users!’ This was one of the comments after my presentation of the eKantonrechter at ODR 2016, organized by HiiL in The Hague in May 2016. ODR, online dispute resolution, was presented as a tool to solve all problems in the 4^th Trend Report by HIIL after the conference. Arno Lodder, in a weblog, commented that ODR had raised hopes in its early promoters, but had not really taken off.
ODR is a tool to help parties in the dispute resolve their problem. There are various examples of ODR tool: supporting double blind bidding to determine a sum of money, working out divorce settlements, negotiating a solution and taking a case to court.
Interesting research questions abound in the area of ODR and its users: What paths do people take when trying to resolve a problem? How can people have ownership of their court procedure? How can solutions, ODR and court procedures, best be tailored to the type of problem?
ODR and its users is a field in which law and society researchers can effectively contribute to improving digital problem solving and dispute resolution procedures in court.

Self-regulation not always implies autonomy. Spontaneous self-regulation should be distinguished from commissioned self-regulation. The latter form of self-regulation is nowadays widespread and the result of outsourcing governmental activities. Outsourcing can be conceptualized in terms of Principal-Agent relations, in which the P commissions an A to realize P’s aims. In commissioned self-regulation the A is often constituted by the P and required to make rules in order to advance P’s aims. However, rule-making is not an activity which remains unaltered if it changes hands. In a context of spontaneous self-regulation rules fulfill a variety of functions. They guide actions and decision-making, they serve as both justification and as criticism of actions and decisions, and will thereby limit arbitrariness. In commissioned self-regulation, these manifold functions tend to be reduced to one dominant function: justifying performances towards P. In the latter capacity rules tend to be formalized and presented in a format that enables the P to arrive efficiently at a decision. Moreover, for the P the content of the rules matters less than their existence. The degree in which the external function of rules prevails determines not only how rules are presented but also how they are drafted and selected. The more A anticipates the perspective of P, the more autonomy risks to be undermined.