During the recent ‘refugee crisis’, governments have been confronted with various problems concerning asylum reception. In several locations in the Netherlands, as well as elsewhere in Europe and beyond, new local forms of experimenting around the issue of asylum reception have begun. One example is Utrecht’s ‘Plan Einstein’. In Overvecht, a district of the city, an office building has been converted into an asylum shelter, where 400 asylum seekers live together with 38 non-refugee youngsters from Utrecht. The Centre runs courses and activities, offered to both asylum seekers (including those who do not yet have a residence status) and local residents. Employing the concepts of ‘multilevel governance’ and ‘experimental governance’, this article indicates why this initiative was able to be realized at this location and at this time.

This paper links the discussion on superdiversity and its call for multidimensional shifts in migration patterns and the ‘diversification of diversity’ this has led to, to the development of immigrant integration policies that tend to focus on traditional migrant groups. Considered from the superdiversity perspective these groups are an simplification of the diversity within and between the migrant population. Furthermore, the diversification of the society as a whole calls into question who should be targeted for immigrant integration policies at all, and in what direction they should point, in a society that has changed itself as a consequence of immigration (Crul, 2016). How do these questions speak to the world of immigrant integration policy making? This paper links this question to the trend of ‘mainstreaming’ in immigrant integration governance. Across Europe traditional immigrant integration policies have been replaced by universal policies, generic policies, targeted at the entire population, such as broad city-citizenship approaches or incorporating former immigrant integration policies in generic educational or community policies. This paper discusses material from different European cases between 2000-2014 to explore whether this broad, mainstreaming approach can be considered a policy-answer to the questions and challenges the superdiversity discussion raises for immigrant integration policies.

The ‘condition of superdiversity’ creates a dazzling perspective that matches the image of a networking society without unambiguous collective entities. Society consists of a caleidoscopic set of identities, relationships, languages and gods in a context of permeable geographic areas. That brings many problems, but the country that is aware of this diversity does have ultimately the best papers for the future.

Advocates of superdiversity have a potential blind spot for differences in symbolic power that affect integration. Thus, they quickly ignore class inequalities and racism. But the main point of criticism is that superdiversity neglects the mainstream, the dominant ways of thinking and doing in a society. The majority of the Netherlands has become more and more culturally homogenous: after a long time of cultural polarization (the long decade of the sixties), the majority has taken over consensually libertarian ideals. The implication of this is that cultural diversity is experienced as a growing problem. Citizens, including migrants, must show that they feel connected with the Netherlands.

Contemporary cities are increasingly characterised by ‘super diversity’. As Putnam’s thesis about the negative social consequences of ethnic diversity is correct, we may assume that growing diversity also negatively affects crime and fear of crime in cities. After all: the more diversity, the less social cohesion and the less collective efficacy, ultimately resulting in higher crime rates. More diversity also implies less (public) familiarity in neighbourhoods and more fear of crime. On the other hand, some qualitative studies show that particularly residents of relatively homogeneous districts perceive migrants as threatening. Migrants are seen as less threatening when neighbourhood residents are familiarized with ‘the other’ and when there are more interethnic contacts. Various foreign and Dutch studies show an independent effect of ethnic diversity in the neighbourhood on fear of crime. However, this effect disappears when other resident characteristics are included into the analysis. Residents of ethnically diverse and deprived districts are generally less satisfied with their neighbourhood, have less trust in the government and are more often victimized. Precisely these perceptions and experiences explain why they more often feel unsafe in their own neighbourhood.

How could positive security policies take shape? On what kind of empirical research should these policies be based? And what sort of concepts would we need for this development? If the starting point is to understand safety as a positive notion, it seems wise to avoid the terms of war that are prevailing in current policy programs on security and public safety (fighting, frontline and city-marines). On the other hand some type of decisive jargon might be unavoidable when one sets out to have an actual impact on youth crime policies and policy makers. Is it possible to keep using some type of military terminology in research benefitting the development of positive security policies and still emphasize a positive composition? This dilemma has arisen in recent research activities on positive, street-oriented role models in response to Dutch problematic youth groups and youth at risk. De Jong argues that with the sensitizing concept of the ‘liaison officer’ it might be possible to encourage a positive change through applied social science.

Positive security is a very promising development in criminology. The ‘movement’ reconnects the current debate on crime with the origins of ancient Greek thinking on the positive nature of politeia, policy and policing. Securitas - providing safety and security for the common good - has a long and rich tradition. Good governance is about many things, but foremost about providing security in society. Polizeiwissenschaft in 18th and 19th century Prussia made a distinction between Wohlfahrt- and Sicherheitspolizei.
The latter is outright dangerous because security becomes equated with negative connotations: the other, the enemies of the state, the drug war and more recently the war in terror. In times like these the positive qualities of securitas become inflated. Human rights, privacy and the rule of law are no longer viewed in positive terms. Therefore I advocate the positive security movement. But the author is worried about two things. Firstly, the current Zeitgeist which is charged with xenophobia and war like languages. And, secondly the fact that the ‘movement’ is limited to a few rebels with a cause. The mainstream of criminology is not really interested in reconnecting with the philosophical positive roots of securitas. Mainstream criminology fosters the status quo and is financially too depended on the state to actually follow the new heroes of positivity. The only way out is to develop a following but this requires academics to actually take a stand.

This contribution aims to discuss the main outcomes of the recent UNGASS (United Nations General Assembly Special Session) on Drugs that took place in New York from 19 to 21 April 2016. Based on my own participation in the preparatory discussions and political negotiations as civil society representative (through the work of NGO Transnational Institute), I argue that political divisions and entrenched institutional dynamics have transformed what could have been the beginning of the end of the war on drugs into a wasted opportunity for changing the status quo of the present world regime regarding the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs. Despite high initial expectations after several governments expressed a clear concern about the effects of purely repressive policies, and the UN decision to organize the session 3 years earlier than planned, very soon it was clear that the session would not imply real changes in the current policies. The agenda setting was non-transparent and controlled by the most conservative factions and countries, largely excluding the views from NGO’s and academics in the final adopted resolution. The final document poorly reflects the rich discussions and developments that are taking place in many countries of the world, particularly the debates and policy developments in ‘the Americas’. A positive note is that the unchanged international UN conventions on drugs can hardly cope with developments taking place on cannabis policies in countries such as Canada, Uruguay, United States or Jamaica. Also other countries are more and more prepared to push for change on other essential questions, including the application of death penalty for drug offences, the access to controlled medicines, or the explicit application of ‘harm reduction’ approaches.

Various studies show that the views on the drug problem and appropriate policy responses have undergone profound changes from the 1960s onward. This article is analysing one of these changes, the decriminalisation of drug use, reflecting a fundamental change of view: understanding drug use as a health issue and not as crime. A useful heuristic to understand this type of change is Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm concept. He sees a paradigm as a set of beliefs that are shared by a scientific community and accepted by a wider community. A paradigm change is therefore a socio-psychological process rather than rooted in new scientific or research facts.
The author analyses the change from the dominance of a crime to the dominance of a health paradigm reflecting its social-historic context, starting with the widely shared concerns about substance use related health problems in the 20th century. These concerns translated into two different views on the essence of these problems, a crime and a health paradigm. The first served as fundament of the international drug control efforts, resulting in the still governing drug prohibition. Yet, the health paradigm was also of influence from the start and gradually gained weight. From the 1970s onwards the health paradigm became more important as part of a wider reform movement. It started in the Netherlands and the UK as bottom-up process criticising criminalising the users of illicit drugs as inappropriate, detrimental for their health and inhumane. The health paradigm was seen as more appropriate.
The author reflects on the benefits and disadvantages of the health paradigm. Its primary benefit is that it helps to understand the health problems related to drug use. A key disadvantage is its close relationship with the disease paradigm. The latter fits well with the generally negative view on drugs as dangerous or evil. It is encompassing the risk of ‘pathologising’ all forms of drug use and denying phenomena of unproblematic use for, among other things, recreational or spiritual purposes. Like the crime paradigm it can serve for control purposes. The drug user remains subject of control or disciplining policies and is not in charge of his/her own life. An additional problematic issue is that ‘softening’ the approach towards the users seems to be mirrored by a harder, more punitive approach to the producers and sellers of the substances, which are seen as villains, making available the drugs which deserve harsh punishment for ‘devastating’ the lives of users.
The author concludes with a short discussion of the well-being paradigm as possible alternative for the health paradigm. It covers a broader spectrum than the health paradigm and helps to grasp the negative impact of (problem) drug use, reducing well-being, but is also useful in understanding the positive sides, enhancing well-being.

This essay argues that the breaking of taboos is an effective means to increase one’s definition-power and discredit the establishment. But rhetorical warfare and satire may also turn into its opposite: strengthening fanaticism. First, the author discusses the controversy surrounding the cartoons of Charlie Hebdo and the militant pleas for maximum artistic freedom, articulated by Salman Rushdie and others. In the second part of this essay the author argues that advocates of an inviolable right to freedom of expression, including the right to insult, may create their own taboos. Within the tabloid press and the outrage industry this ‘right’ gets more aggressive functions. Finally, some ambiguities about political correctness and the racism-taboo are discussed.

In this opinion piece the authors reflect upon the way in which applied research for law enforcement and safety management is valued within the prevailing academic culture. By drawing from the scholarship on public criminology, the authors introduce the democratic underlabourer as an important yet often undervalued and underrepresented figure capable to bridge potential gaps between academia and the practical field of law enforcement and safety management. By getting organized in the form of a guild, democratic underlabourers would increase their clout and visbility.

The author examines the thoughts of the originally Austrian author Jean Améry. After his concentration camp experiences Améry publicly acclaimed that he continued to resent the Germans. He felt abandoned and deeply overwhelmed and never recovered from these feelings. He refused to forgive and forget and practiced moral and physical rebellion.

The author points out that tribunals against war criminals are characterized by investigations of the broader military and social developments. By outlining the historical context of the violence the public is in a better position to make informed and balanced judgments. Criminal tribunals have a communicative character and great educational potential; they make clear why the Great Evil cannot be accepted and has to be punished.