In this article notions from literature on covert and illegal networks are applied to business cartels. Comparable to most criminal networks, cartel participants need to communicate in order to coordinate their activities, whilst under the risk of getting caught. Previous studies however show cartels can remain hidden from outsiders for long periods of time. Based on an analysis of fourteen Dutch cartel cases, this article addresses the question how cartels can remain hidden from outsiders for long periods of time. The analysis shows cartel participants communicate predominantly centralized and frequent. Moreover, the results show that not concealment but social embeddedness provides a strong explanation for the longevity of secrecy regarding cartels.

During the Second World War, a large number of prisoners were put to work in concentration camps in order to contribute to the development of Germany. As this labour became more important in economic terms during the years 1939 to 1945, the death toll in the camps also rose during the same period. This contribution aims at providing insight into the apparent contradiction (paradox) between the practices of extermination on the one hand and the German economic interests on the other hand. Not only has historiography paid relatively little attention to this phenomenon (it is not a main topic), criminology has also remained remarkably silent during this debate. Looking at the ‘plantation’ in Dachau concentration camp (1937-1945) we develop an exploratory analysis of the subject. Using Vaughan’s organizational criminology, we discuss the paradox and address the question of the extent to which criminology can offer explanations for phenomena of this kind.