Little is known about how ex-prisoners’ parole supervision experiences relate to desistance. The aim of this article therefore is to gain insight into the nature of release conditions and parole supervision of ex-prisoners and parolees’ perceptions of their supervision related to the desistance process. A total of 23 Dutch parolees were interviewed in depth at three waves starting in prison up to one year after their release, and the 69 interviews were combined with their parole files containing information about conditions, violations and sanctions. Parole files revealed the practice of highly engaged parole officers, who worked with parolees to strengthen factors known to foster desistance. However, the interviews showed that most parolees found their parole experience predominantly surveillance-oriented and not very helpful for desistance. Parole was experienced as most beneficial when parole officers used their discretionary power to adjust conditions creating ‘space’ for trial-and-error.

Various forms of organized crime are concentrated in the Dutch province of North Brabant, bordering Belgium. In this essay it is argued that specific historic, geographic, social economic, cultural and social psychological factors created an enduring window of opportunity in which criminality can flourish. Brabant is portrayed as a marginalized province that suffered from war, exploitation by the central government, rural gangs, a lack of law enforcement, extreme poverty as well as from discrimination because of its mainly catholic population. Against this background the population developed a mentality of solving problems on their own. Their survival strategies implied not only legal activities like agriculture and small-scale production in private houses, workplaces and factories, but also smuggling and illegal alcohol production. In more recent times the production of synthetic drugs, growing cannabis and transport criminality became widespread.

Soccer is the most important professional sport played in Europe. During the last two decades, both the flows of money and the institutional setting have changed dramatically. This paper provides an analysis of the Dutch professional league. How does that league compare to other European leagues? Especially as far as television revenue is concerned, the Dutch league lags the big leagues. This financial inequality has partially been caused by three important changes in the institutional environment: the introduction of the Champions League, the Bosman ruling and the liberalization of the players labour market, that accompanied that ruling. At the moment, an open European market for soccer talent exists, and a closed national product market for teams. Economies of scales exacerbates these problems, so in the near future, it is not to be expected that Dutch soccer teams will be able to compete successfully with their Spanish or British counterparts.

With the growing economic importance of sport in the past two decades there has been a massive increase in the investment of money in the football sector, and some of this has criminal connections. The FATF has carried out a study, Money laundering through the football sector, to analyze what makes the football sector attractive to criminals. The report examines case studies to identify vulnerabilities of the football sector for criminal money. Some of those relate to the financial fragilities of the sector as a whole. Other vulnerabilities involve the intransparant transfer market and the dubious role of football agents. There are also social-psychological vulnerabilities. Football has a long history of private individuals investing in clubs. These individuals do not expect profits, but hope to acquire prestige and gain access to the local or even national establishment. Football has changed from a popular sport into a global industry, but its regulatory structure has not yet caught up with these changes.