The structural vulnerability of the port of Rotterdam to organized crime is dealt with in this article from a broader, historical perspective. Using examples from ports in Italy and the United States, among others, the author shows how at the end of the last century local criminal groups managed to gain a dominant position in the handling of good flows. The author discusses various research reports that have been published over the years on the import of drugs into the port of Rotterdam and other European ports. Drug traffickers turn out to respond very flexible to stricter controls by simply moving to alternative ports or opting for transferring drug loads to small fast boats in open water. The author emphasizes that ports should not be studied as isolated transition points, but must be considered as nodes in networks that extend far inland and abroad. This is the only way to see the broader strategic and tactical options for stopping or reducing drug trafficking. In addition, attention must be paid to the problem of corruption among port workers, police and customs officers.

Recent figures indicate that certain drug markets, or at least parts of it, shift from the Netherlands to Belgium. However, it is still unclear whether it is a displacement of some parts of the illicit drug markets or whether it should be seen as a diversification of certain parts of some illicit drug markets in terms of spreading of risks and taking profit of new opportunities. In this respect, this article contributes to an ongoing research (DISMARK) by providing an overview of drug policy measures most recently taken by the Netherlands, from a Belgian point of view, and by trying to link these developments to drug-related trends in Belgium. It is clear that both countries will have to invest in a common approach of their common drug problems. However, it is not yet possible to draw any profound conclusions on the actual displacement of illicit drug markets.