This article aims to contribute to the public debate on the consequences and risks of the spreading of DNA data related to direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing. Market developments drive DTC companies to find new business models. As a result of mergers and acquisitions and of the developments of new products and services, DNA data are often used differently than what they were originally collected for. Since DTC DNA data are not protected as well as health-related data generally are, it is hard to keep track of these data. This is partly due to legal and ethical issues such as unclarity of who owns DNA and problems with informed consent. Risks are identified with regards to privacy, information security, the right not to know, (un)equal opportunities, and national security. The author calls for an investment in knowledge and awareness in order to allow for a fair balance between opportunity and risk of DTC DNA products and services.

This article provides insight into the approach of the Dutch police to the criminal trade in art, antiques and cultural goods. The authors begin with a brief historical sketch of the development of art crime, before examining the question of how the police in the Netherlands has organized itself in this field. The scope of art crime and how to determine it is also examined. Much information is available from various sources, but a thorough and adequate picture is lacking. Finally, a specific form of art crime is discussed, namely false art. Detecting false art is a tough process, because different parties involved often share the same interests, resulting in ‘walls of silence’.

Steering on public values in Dutch smart cities, let alone their regulation, is complicated. This article situates this difficulty in the vested interests that Dutch local authorities have in public-private smart city projects, and in the fact that public values are narrowly defined in relation to the technology; not in relation to a vision for the city in which its communities thrive. A way out of this deadlock, the article proposes, is to understand smart cities in the Netherlands beyond the typically Dutch consensus politics (the ‘polder’) and, instead, as part of a broader (urban) governance tendency to push urban technologies through the recital of fixed urban problems and public values. Consequently, state regulation of the (Dutch) smart city should principally enable (local) public and political involvement in defining urban problems and urban dreams, and thus in deciding the public values that are at stake.

The recently cancelled Quayside smart city project in Toronto by Sidewalk Labs is an example of a top-down, tech-driven, intransparant model of a smart city, where government and citizens got sidetracked in the planning process. This article analyses what went wrong and proposes an alternative approach. Experts in the field – from data scientists to philosophers, sociologists and activists – propose a different kind of smart city. The open smart city is based on principles of open data, public digital infrastructure, and civic participation. It uses technology to strengthen public values, civic participation and human rights, instead of undermining them.

The prevalence of online crime increases. Social engineering, such as email phishing, is often an important element in an attack. Several interventions have been developed to reduce the success of these types of attacks. The current study investigates whether interventions can help reduce vulnerability to social engineering attacks. The authors investigate which types of interventions and specific elements are most successful. They selected studies with an experimental design that tested at least one intervention. A total of 19 studies with 37 effect sizes, based on a total sample of N=23,146 subjects, were found. The available training courses, intervention materials and effect sizes were analysed. Overall, positive effects of interventions were found. However, there are substantial differences in effect for the different types of interventions. Effective interventions are relatively intensive and have a specific focus. The authors conclude with the design of the best possible intervention given the results of their research.

In the Internet era, banking fraud has become a common way of stealing money. According to victim surveys, this offense has already led to significant numbers of victims. In this article, the authors focus on illegal bank account withdrawals, which are an indication of identity fraud. For this they use data on 636 victims who were surveyed in the LISS panel. Using the concept of ‘capability to act’, as used in the WRR report Why knowing what to do is not enough (2017), the authors model which type of victim takes action to get the stolen amount reimbursed and which type of victim succeeds in doing so. They expect that the less educated and people with low self-control more often refrain from contact with authorities (bank, police) and therefore more often receive no compensation and remain with higher residual damage. The results show that approximately four in five victims of unauthorized bank debits are fully compensated. For the group of victims for whom this is not the case – remaining with residual damage – most of the hypotheses are confirmed.

The structural vulnerability of the port of Rotterdam to organized crime is dealt with in this article from a broader, historical perspective. Using examples from ports in Italy and the United States, among others, the author shows how at the end of the last century local criminal groups managed to gain a dominant position in the handling of good flows. The author discusses various research reports that have been published over the years on the import of drugs into the port of Rotterdam and other European ports. Drug traffickers turn out to respond very flexible to stricter controls by simply moving to alternative ports or opting for transferring drug loads to small fast boats in open water. The author emphasizes that ports should not be studied as isolated transition points, but must be considered as nodes in networks that extend far inland and abroad. This is the only way to see the broader strategic and tactical options for stopping or reducing drug trafficking. In addition, attention must be paid to the problem of corruption among port workers, police and customs officers.

This ethnography of everyday policing realities in the European ports of Rotterdam and Hamburg presents an understanding of policing spaces where protecting and supporting global commerce dominate. In undertaking this research, the author participated in the daily activities of 85 participants in Rotterdam (N=52) and Hamburg (N=33), consisting of 30 operational port police officers, 31 security officers, 10 customs officers and 14 others involved in port security-related matters (e.g. shipping agents, port authorities, boatmen and maritime engineers). These participants were collectively responsible for protecting the vulnerability of the just-in-time logistics by becoming the intervention, through which they become the very local threat to global commerce itself. A struggle that reveals itself in their (narrated) policing struggles with management, colleagues and multi-agency partners, as well as with the maritime business community and dangerous others.

This article focusses on the question whether quantitative modelling and simulation is useful for judicial forecasting, ex-ante testing of judicial policies, and (re)designing chains of organisations like the judicial chain. Specific attention is given to methods that can be used in the face of complexity and deep uncertainty. That is, when facing many substantial uncertainties. Complexity and uncertainty are first of all focused on. Subsequently, modelling methods for dealing with complexity and uncertainty are discussed in more detail, examples are given, and the process needed to build such models in a participatory way is discussed.

Living in a multicultural environment may be accompanied with an increased fear of crime. Residents may become alienated in a very diverse environment and withdraw themselves in their own social world. This ‘hunkering down’ may ensue feelings of unsafety. However, social scientists have done hardly any research on whether citizens who live in a multicultural environment in Western Europe actually feel more unsafe. This study seeks to contribute to fill in this knowledge gap. The authors’ research reveals that residents are more likely to feel unsafe in neighborhoods with a high degree of ethnic diversity. The aforementioned correlation is the most noticeable in neighborhoods consisting of people on medium incomes.

The security landscape has changed rapidly. New or revived threats have emerged, such as terrorism and cybercrime, bringing new or revived fears and anxieties as well. Actors in security policy feel a need to address these fears, but do not know how. Can the criminological subdiscipline of fear of crime studies provide the knowledge and understanding that is needed? A quick scan of the state of the art in this research domain, gives two reasons why it cannot: (1) fear of crime studies have yielded much knowledge on operationalization, measurement and determinants of fear of crime, but far less in mechanisms, trends, effects and influenceability, whereas insight in the latter issues is what is mostly needed in security policy; and (2) fear of crime studies are still mainly focused on the ‘traditional’ fear of crime, while fear of new crimes and threats remains under-researched. A shift of focus in fear of crime studies is urgently needed.

In this article the authors present the lessons learned from previous research efforts into dark markets. First the important features of dark markets are discussed, i.e. anonymity and trust, as well as the question how data on dark markets can be collected. Next, the authors illustrate how this data can be used to study the phenomenon of dark markets itself as well as the impact of police interventions on dark markets.

National and international security are becoming increasingly interdependent. The question is whether this leads to a certain level of militarization of the police and constibularisation of the military. In some of their operations and units, the Dutch police apply tactics, technologies and organizational principles that resemble those of the military. The police also contribute to international peace support operations and stability missions to train or monitor police in post-conflict areas. The Dutch army has been involved in some sort of interim policing during several stability missions and increasingly support the Dutch police in law enforcement operations by providing search and analytical support. Finally, as a police force with a military status, the Royal Marechaussee has acquired a structural and strong position in the Dutch police system. Although there is some sort of convergence, the authors conclude that the level of militarization of the police and constabularisation of the military remains limited.

To supplement recent debates concerning the expulsion of criminal foreigners and the repelling of poor refugees with longer-term insights, this contribution examines banishment practices in early modern and modern Northwest Europe. It argues that banishment, a sanction involving a person’s geographical and social exclusion, served both to punish deviants and to monitor mobile newcomers. Expulsion practices were shaped mainly by concerns about the regulation of access to the labor market and poor relief. The profile of the expellee displays remarkable continuity across time: the poor unwanted stranger, lacking social bonds and, in the case of female migrants, perceived as being prone to prostitution. Albeit banishment often proved only temporary and thus not effective, authorities continued to rely on it because of its symbolic function, displaying their diligence in purifying and protecting local society. This was much to the detriment of the expellees, who were driven into marginality and illegality.

Last year, Dutch parliament approved the proposal for a new Intelligence and Security Services Act (Wiv 2017). This law will replace the current Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wiv 2002). The Wiv 2017 should be considered feasible with effect from 1 May 2018. Before that time however, an advisory referendum on the new law will be held on 21 March. This article first discusses the nature of the law and the need for innovation. Subsequently, a comparison of both laws takes place in general terms, with regard to the powers of the intelligence and security services, the safeguards, the supervision, the complaint handling and the international cooperation between intelligence and security services. It is argued that the extension of the powers of the services in the Wiv 2017 is only limited in scope, while the safeguards have been considerably strengthened. The introduction of a binding judgment in complaint handling also contributes to a better and more effective legal protection for citizens.

The main goal of an interrogation is to elicit truthful information about the involvement of a suspect or witness in a criminal act. Some interrogation methods and techniques are useful for extracting information from otherwise unwilling suspects, but they can also elicit false confessions or statements from innocent (and vulnerable) suspects and witnesses. Multiple studies show that a large proportion of false confessions are made by suspects with an intellectual disability. Intellectual disabilities are often difficult to recognize, because of an individual’s streetwise behavior. This vulnerable group is extremely sensitive to suggestibility, compliance and acquiescence. Some interrogation methods and techniques used by the police can have a severe influence on these features and therefore on the reliability of statements. Given the overrepresentation of people with an intellectual disability in the Dutch criminal justice system, it is of great importance to prevent unwanted risks in the interrogation.

Drawing on material from her extensive study of Russian organized crime, the author sketches a portrait of Semjon Mogilevitsj. This Russian ‘godfather’ enjoys the reputation of being the smartest and highest educated mafia boss worldwide. Indeed Mogilevitsj obtained a master’s degree in Economics with good results, but this alone doesn’t explain his phenomenal successes in criminal as well as in legal business. Describing the steady expansion of his criminal activities from Russia into Israel, the United States, Eastern Europa, Italy and Canada, the author suggests that the social and economic circumstances in Russia just before and during the collapse of the Soviet Union might have served as an ideal playing ground for Mogilevitsj to develop the specific social intelligence and skills needed to successfully run a criminal organization.

While contract killings by organized crime groups are by no means new to the Netherlands (with around twenty to thirty cases a year over the last few decades), there is reason to believe that the nature of the killings has changed. The key question of this article is which recent developments can be identified in relation to the phenomenon of contract killings. The availability of new groups of hitmen and new means has led to a number of changes in modus operandi for contract killings within organized crime. On the one hand, there is a process of professionalization when it comes to methods of observation and counterstrategies, which involves the use of the latest technological tools. The digitization of resources and traces plays a significant part in this. On the other hand, the perpetrators are resorting to much coarser methods for the actual killings. This may be attributed to the abundance of heavy firearms available in the Netherlands and to new inexperienced homegrown hitmen, who are willing to kill in exchange for payment.

The authors reflect on ‘Handelen naar waarheid’ (Acting on truth), an assessment of the state of criminal investigations in The Netherlands, which appeared in May 2016. This report, assigned by the police and public prosecution service and written by four inside experts, caused substantial turmoil in the police organization and beyond. The report addresses six domains: professionalism, attitude and behavior, direction and leadership, capacity for change, organizational structure and business management. The critical and transparent self-reflection by the police received praise from policymakers, journalists and academic observers. It also met with recognition and appreciation in the law enforcement community, in particular among investigators and prosecutors. In the wake of the report, a reform program was organized to modernize both the police and the prosecution service in order to increase the quality and effectiveness of their work. Such reform is deemed necessary because crime problems have become ever more complex and citizens increasingly organize their own (counter-)investigations. The authors conclude that in spite of many recent initiatives, truly innovative practices remain scarce. Also, the crucial ambitions to increase the educational level of investigators and the organizational culture are still far from realized.

In 2013, the government of the Netherlands established a national police force, replacing a system of largely autonomous regional police organizations. This led to an extensive police reform. In this article, I explore the effects of this police reform on the internal dynamics within the police organization. I describe five ‘negative’ effects: anonymization, decoupling, formalization, confusion and de-owning. These effects lead to alienation between police offers and the police organization and hinder the development of the national police force. Beside these negative effects, there are also positive forces that shape the development of the national police force. The top leadership is changing the strategic leadership style and there are many innovative initiatives on the local level contributing to the goals of the reform. However, to make the ambitions of the reform feasible there are adjustments needed in the organizational structure and change approach. The operational core of the organization needs to be the central point of reference for these adjustments.