This article aims to clarify the phenomenon of iconoclasm and how it impacts today’s society, in spite of the lack of research on this topic. After establishing its complex and sensitive nature, a first assessment containing types of iconoclasm and various motives of iconoclasts is presented. Different forms of iconoclasm are distinguished, explained and illustrated using examples. Special attention is given to the subject’s sensitivity in modern society while establishing the connection of the topic with identity in multiple shapes and forms. The article aims at contributing to a future multi-disciplinary debate.

The smart city is the urban ideal of our time. Yet its high expectations often run counter against the performance of smart city projects in practice. The Rathenau Institute has studied a number of such projects in the municipality of Eindhoven, a leading city with respect to digital innovation in the Netherlands. To ensure that data is used in a proper manner with respect for public values Eindhoven has applied several strategies, such as privacy by design and the active involvement of its citizens. It has also set up a number of principles for the digital society which helped to negotiate contracts with private partners. Yet the authors’ analysis shows that important legal challenges remain. Some of the principles require more detailed specification. The authors also found that the law is not yet fully appropriated to the new digital context and needs to be adjusted accordingly.

This article deals with the relationship of smart security technologies to broader modes of exercising power and subjugating individuals. It claims that the notion of psychopower is precisely what is missing from post-Foucaultian accounts of the smart city. In the article psychopower is defined as the manipulation of our consciousness in order to channel our desires toward ‘normal’ social behavior, drawing a line between what is ‘acceptable’ and what is ‘unacceptable’. Psychopower raises a series of concerns related to its democratic legitimacy and accountability as behaviorally informed conditioning of the mind runs the risk of constant surveillance, where human agency is diluted in a techno-utopian vision that promises to improve city-wide efficiency, decision-making, and security.

Steering on public values in Dutch smart cities, let alone their regulation, is complicated. This article situates this difficulty in the vested interests that Dutch local authorities have in public-private smart city projects, and in the fact that public values are narrowly defined in relation to the technology; not in relation to a vision for the city in which its communities thrive. A way out of this deadlock, the article proposes, is to understand smart cities in the Netherlands beyond the typically Dutch consensus politics (the ‘polder’) and, instead, as part of a broader (urban) governance tendency to push urban technologies through the recital of fixed urban problems and public values. Consequently, state regulation of the (Dutch) smart city should principally enable (local) public and political involvement in defining urban problems and urban dreams, and thus in deciding the public values that are at stake.

The recently cancelled Quayside smart city project in Toronto by Sidewalk Labs is an example of a top-down, tech-driven, intransparant model of a smart city, where government and citizens got sidetracked in the planning process. This article analyses what went wrong and proposes an alternative approach. Experts in the field – from data scientists to philosophers, sociologists and activists – propose a different kind of smart city. The open smart city is based on principles of open data, public digital infrastructure, and civic participation. It uses technology to strengthen public values, civic participation and human rights, instead of undermining them.

The aim of this research was to examine how Dutch citizens behave online and to explain their online behavior. The results of an experimental survey (N=2,426) show that unsafe behavior is highly prevalent. For example, nearly 40% of the respondents use a weak password. However, it appears that there are major differences between self-reported behavior and objective behavior. The objective measurements in the survey show that people behave more unsafely than they self-report. The research further shows that there is no silver bullet for promoting more safe online behavior. Different online behaviors seem to stem from different sources. Nevertheless, the authors do see a lot of value in interventions that focus on adaptations to the technology that people use for online activities, such that the possibility of unsafe behavior is reduced and the possibility of safe behavior is increased – also known as security by design. There is a role here for policy measures encouraging technology manufacturers to make these adjustments.

The Netherlands functions as an important source and transit country for international organized drug trafficking. This is in part due to its large logistical nodes in the world economy, like the airport and the seaport. Based on in-depth analyses of sixteen cases of the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor, this article explores how drug traffickers operate at logistical nodes, in particular airports. The results demonstrate that organized crime groups deploy mainly three types of tactics to traffic drugs, namely defying, avoiding, and neutralizing security checks. Occupational embeddedness is manifested through several job-related factors. Autonomy, mobility, and the similarity between legitimate duties and criminal activities facilitate discrete engagement in organized crime activities during work time. Port employees are also attractive to organized crime groups because of their job-related social capital and knowledge.

This article relates the geographical allocation of Courts to access to justice. Travel distances within the Dutch system are higher than in surrounding countries, but still not extremely high. The scale of the Dutch Court organizations however, is extreme. On average, a Court location that handles small claims has jurisdiction over a territory with over half a million inhabitants. This large number of inhabitants automatically translates to large numbers of cases, and large bureaucracies, employing 500 to 1,000 people (judges, court staff, support) each. Do travel distances to the Courts actually have an impact on the use of the Court system? Two recent studies find no support for a popular belief that defendants will be less determined to defend themselves when the travel distance to the court is longer. They do show however that the number of cases brought to Court by local plaintiffs drops when ‘their’ local court closes down.

This study investigates the strategies people themselves use to deal with situations in which they fear crime. The authors see people as social agents who hold agency and (also) manage their own safety, instead of viewing people as powerless victims. Previous studies have emphasized people’s agency, often through a focus on avoiding dangerous spaces. Building on insights from the fear of crime literature that approaches fear of crime as situational, the authors illustrate how spaces in which people worry about crime can also be transformed (through action) into safe(r) spaces. The article focuses on the context of urban nightlife areas. Thirty students living in Utrecht, the Netherlands were interviewed. Results show that students perform a range of strategies to cope with their fear, including situational avoidance, arranging companionship, increasing alertness, and reasoning. In the discussion the authors reflect on how the application of such strategies is related to (erosion of) ‘mobility’ and individual freedom of movement.

The security landscape has changed rapidly. New or revived threats have emerged, such as terrorism and cybercrime, bringing new or revived fears and anxieties as well. Actors in security policy feel a need to address these fears, but do not know how. Can the criminological subdiscipline of fear of crime studies provide the knowledge and understanding that is needed? A quick scan of the state of the art in this research domain, gives two reasons why it cannot: (1) fear of crime studies have yielded much knowledge on operationalization, measurement and determinants of fear of crime, but far less in mechanisms, trends, effects and influenceability, whereas insight in the latter issues is what is mostly needed in security policy; and (2) fear of crime studies are still mainly focused on the ‘traditional’ fear of crime, while fear of new crimes and threats remains under-researched. A shift of focus in fear of crime studies is urgently needed.

In this article we analyze how organized crime offenders use IT to handle their money flows. How and to what extent do offenders use IT-facilitated possibilities, such as bitcoin, to launder their money? The empirical data consist of thirty large-scale police investigations. These thirty cases are part of the Organized Crime Monitor, an ongoing research project into the nature of organized crime in the Netherlands. One of the most striking findings is the fact that cash is still king – even for online drug dealers who get paid in digital currencies.

In 2018 the Dutch parliament accepted new cybercrime legislation (the Cybercrime III Act) that creates several new online criminal offences and gives law enforcement agencies new investigative powers on the Internet. This article describes the background of Dutch cybercrime legislation and the contents of the Cybercrime III Act. The newly introduced cybercrimes are discussed as well as the new investigative competences. Particularly the legitimacy and the necessity of the investigative power of the police to hack computer systems of suspects may significantly interfere with the right to privacy.

The last decades have shown a tendency in which tasks are transferred from the judge to other authorities, such as the police and public prosecutor, administrative bodies, administrative procedures, or private parties. The central question in this article is whether these authorities can really replace the court. A comparison is made between legal proceedings and procedures for other authorities on the following aspects: truth finding, openness and legal protection of the (vulnerable) citizen. The author also discusses a recent legislative proposal for an own budget for the Judiciary, which aims to strengthen the independence of the judge towards the two other state powers. It is argued that the courts should be also accessible in the case of relatively small offenses and for vulnerable citizens.

Under Article 13b (1) of the Dutch Opium Act, the mayor is authorized to impose an order under administrative coercion when drugs are sold, delivered, supplied or present in houses or premises This much-discussed article, also cited as the ‘Damocles Law’, gives the mayor the power to close drug shelters even before the suspect’s guilt has been established in legal proceedings. It is not necessary to show that the interests of public policy are at stake. Moreover, the means of defense against the closure are very limited. The author argues that the current application of Article 13b is exclusively punitive in nature, whereby in case of criminal prosecution, there is also a violation of the ne bis in idem principle.

This paper looks at the number of administrative sanctions for minor offences since 2005. Administrative sanction can be divided into two categories: restorative sanctions and punitive sanctions. Information is limited and dispersed. The number of offences handled by welfare agencies has decreased with 21% in the period 2005-2016. In the same period the number of administrative sanctions for traffic offences imposed by the police/public prosecutor have decreased with 14% (mainly originating from automated traffic cameras). Also administrative sanctions imposed by supervisory financial agencies have decreased with 58%. For some organisations the observation period is a shorter. In the period 2011-2016 the number of administrative sanctions for traffic offences imposed by municipalities has increased with 41% and the number of administrative sanctions imposed by supervisory non-financial agencies have decreased with 47%. There is no information available on administrative sanctions for tax fraud.

The Dutch Judiciary has only a very limited role in the imposition of sanctions with traffic offenses. With other minor offenses its role is rather limited and has decreased. There has been a striking shift from the imposition of penal sanctions to sanctions based on administrative law in this area. With major offenses (crimes) the role of the judiciary is still significant and has not diminished over the last 20 years. This despite policy efforts to boost out of court sanctioning.
The Judiciary is a fundamental pillar of the rule of law. It offers legal protection, by judging and, if necessary, penalizing violations of norms in a fair trial. In this way not only justice is done with individual cases. Case law has wider implications: confirmation and development of norms and thus general prevention. To fulfil this aim a certain volume of cases and openness of the judgment process is necessary.

For a century and a half, the Dutch police and the army cooperated in combating civil disturbances. It was common practice that soldiers were called from their barracks to assist in maintaining public order. However, to deploy the army against civilians raised fundamental questions about its legitimacy. As a result some Dutch police forces began implementing military tactics and using military equipment to do the job themselves. The high watermark of this development lies in the years between the two world wars, when revolution and civic unrest always seemed imminent. The post-war years were marked by the Cold War and fear of communist insurrection. Militarized units were always kept in reserve. Nowadays, the army still renders assistance, usually not ‘manu militari’, but on matters that require special expertise.

The Netherlands armed forces are increasingly involved in activities within the Netherlands as well as abroad, that can be characterized as law enforcement. Military personnel, however, are not trained as law enforcement officials and perform these non-military tasks based on their military skills and drills. Nevertheless, their efforts eventually must lead to a criminal persecution of a suspect. Therefore, it is important that military personnel are well aware of the particular requirements set out by criminal procedures while planning and executing a military action and, whenever possible, operate in close collaboration with authorized law enforcement officials.