The Netherlands functions as an important source and transit country for international organized drug trafficking. This is in part due to its large logistical nodes in the world economy, like the airport and the seaport. Based on in-depth analyses of sixteen cases of the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor, this article explores how drug traffickers operate at logistical nodes, in particular airports. The results demonstrate that organized crime groups deploy mainly three types of tactics to traffic drugs, namely defying, avoiding, and neutralizing security checks. Occupational embeddedness is manifested through several job-related factors. Autonomy, mobility, and the similarity between legitimate duties and criminal activities facilitate discrete engagement in organized crime activities during work time. Port employees are also attractive to organized crime groups because of their job-related social capital and knowledge.

This article relates the geographical allocation of Courts to access to justice. Travel distances within the Dutch system are higher than in surrounding countries, but still not extremely high. The scale of the Dutch Court organizations however, is extreme. On average, a Court location that handles small claims has jurisdiction over a territory with over half a million inhabitants. This large number of inhabitants automatically translates to large numbers of cases, and large bureaucracies, employing 500 to 1,000 people (judges, court staff, support) each. Do travel distances to the Courts actually have an impact on the use of the Court system? Two recent studies find no support for a popular belief that defendants will be less determined to defend themselves when the travel distance to the court is longer. They do show however that the number of cases brought to Court by local plaintiffs drops when ‘their’ local court closes down.

This study investigates the strategies people themselves use to deal with situations in which they fear crime. The authors see people as social agents who hold agency and (also) manage their own safety, instead of viewing people as powerless victims. Previous studies have emphasized people’s agency, often through a focus on avoiding dangerous spaces. Building on insights from the fear of crime literature that approaches fear of crime as situational, the authors illustrate how spaces in which people worry about crime can also be transformed (through action) into safe(r) spaces. The article focuses on the context of urban nightlife areas. Thirty students living in Utrecht, the Netherlands were interviewed. Results show that students perform a range of strategies to cope with their fear, including situational avoidance, arranging companionship, increasing alertness, and reasoning. In the discussion the authors reflect on how the application of such strategies is related to (erosion of) ‘mobility’ and individual freedom of movement.

The security landscape has changed rapidly. New or revived threats have emerged, such as terrorism and cybercrime, bringing new or revived fears and anxieties as well. Actors in security policy feel a need to address these fears, but do not know how. Can the criminological subdiscipline of fear of crime studies provide the knowledge and understanding that is needed? A quick scan of the state of the art in this research domain, gives two reasons why it cannot: (1) fear of crime studies have yielded much knowledge on operationalization, measurement and determinants of fear of crime, but far less in mechanisms, trends, effects and influenceability, whereas insight in the latter issues is what is mostly needed in security policy; and (2) fear of crime studies are still mainly focused on the ‘traditional’ fear of crime, while fear of new crimes and threats remains under-researched. A shift of focus in fear of crime studies is urgently needed.

In this article we analyze how organized crime offenders use IT to handle their money flows. How and to what extent do offenders use IT-facilitated possibilities, such as bitcoin, to launder their money? The empirical data consist of thirty large-scale police investigations. These thirty cases are part of the Organized Crime Monitor, an ongoing research project into the nature of organized crime in the Netherlands. One of the most striking findings is the fact that cash is still king – even for online drug dealers who get paid in digital currencies.

In 2018 the Dutch parliament accepted new cybercrime legislation (the Cybercrime III Act) that creates several new online criminal offences and gives law enforcement agencies new investigative powers on the Internet. This article describes the background of Dutch cybercrime legislation and the contents of the Cybercrime III Act. The newly introduced cybercrimes are discussed as well as the new investigative competences. Particularly the legitimacy and the necessity of the investigative power of the police to hack computer systems of suspects may significantly interfere with the right to privacy.

The last decades have shown a tendency in which tasks are transferred from the judge to other authorities, such as the police and public prosecutor, administrative bodies, administrative procedures, or private parties. The central question in this article is whether these authorities can really replace the court. A comparison is made between legal proceedings and procedures for other authorities on the following aspects: truth finding, openness and legal protection of the (vulnerable) citizen. The author also discusses a recent legislative proposal for an own budget for the Judiciary, which aims to strengthen the independence of the judge towards the two other state powers. It is argued that the courts should be also accessible in the case of relatively small offenses and for vulnerable citizens.

Under Article 13b (1) of the Dutch Opium Act, the mayor is authorized to impose an order under administrative coercion when drugs are sold, delivered, supplied or present in houses or premises This much-discussed article, also cited as the ‘Damocles Law’, gives the mayor the power to close drug shelters even before the suspect’s guilt has been established in legal proceedings. It is not necessary to show that the interests of public policy are at stake. Moreover, the means of defense against the closure are very limited. The author argues that the current application of Article 13b is exclusively punitive in nature, whereby in case of criminal prosecution, there is also a violation of the ne bis in idem principle.

This paper looks at the number of administrative sanctions for minor offences since 2005. Administrative sanction can be divided into two categories: restorative sanctions and punitive sanctions. Information is limited and dispersed. The number of offences handled by welfare agencies has decreased with 21% in the period 2005-2016. In the same period the number of administrative sanctions for traffic offences imposed by the police/public prosecutor have decreased with 14% (mainly originating from automated traffic cameras). Also administrative sanctions imposed by supervisory financial agencies have decreased with 58%. For some organisations the observation period is a shorter. In the period 2011-2016 the number of administrative sanctions for traffic offences imposed by municipalities has increased with 41% and the number of administrative sanctions imposed by supervisory non-financial agencies have decreased with 47%. There is no information available on administrative sanctions for tax fraud.

The Dutch Judiciary has only a very limited role in the imposition of sanctions with traffic offenses. With other minor offenses its role is rather limited and has decreased. There has been a striking shift from the imposition of penal sanctions to sanctions based on administrative law in this area. With major offenses (crimes) the role of the judiciary is still significant and has not diminished over the last 20 years. This despite policy efforts to boost out of court sanctioning.
The Judiciary is a fundamental pillar of the rule of law. It offers legal protection, by judging and, if necessary, penalizing violations of norms in a fair trial. In this way not only justice is done with individual cases. Case law has wider implications: confirmation and development of norms and thus general prevention. To fulfil this aim a certain volume of cases and openness of the judgment process is necessary.

For a century and a half, the Dutch police and the army cooperated in combating civil disturbances. It was common practice that soldiers were called from their barracks to assist in maintaining public order. However, to deploy the army against civilians raised fundamental questions about its legitimacy. As a result some Dutch police forces began implementing military tactics and using military equipment to do the job themselves. The high watermark of this development lies in the years between the two world wars, when revolution and civic unrest always seemed imminent. The post-war years were marked by the Cold War and fear of communist insurrection. Militarized units were always kept in reserve. Nowadays, the army still renders assistance, usually not ‘manu militari’, but on matters that require special expertise.

The Netherlands armed forces are increasingly involved in activities within the Netherlands as well as abroad, that can be characterized as law enforcement. Military personnel, however, are not trained as law enforcement officials and perform these non-military tasks based on their military skills and drills. Nevertheless, their efforts eventually must lead to a criminal persecution of a suspect. Therefore, it is important that military personnel are well aware of the particular requirements set out by criminal procedures while planning and executing a military action and, whenever possible, operate in close collaboration with authorized law enforcement officials.

There are different types of banning orders (criminal, administrative and private banning orders) and also various procedures for imposing these orders. According to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR) it is unlikely that the private banning orders can be labelled as a criminal charge. The nature of the private banning orders is not punitive. These orders are to be regarded as recovery sanctions. However, applying the ‘Engel criteria’ will lead to the conclusion that some criminal banning orders are to be considered as a criminal charge. Accumulation between criminal and private law banning orders might be troublesome, but it is possible. It is recommended that the Public Prosecution Service is cautious when it comes to demanding a criminal banning order, when a private banning order has already been imposed.

This article maps the current Dutch practice on statelessness, and tries to expose the current issues in particular. The published legislative proposal for a statelessness determination procedure in September 2016 is an attempt by the Dutch government to solve part of these problems after wide criticism from, among others, the Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (ACVZ) in 2013. The introduction of a statelessness determination procedure is a long awaited development and a step in the right direction with a view of improving current practice and law for stateless persons residing in the Netherlands. However, significant deficiencies in the legislative proposal risk to greatly undermine the operation and value of the new procedure, especially for those currently left in limbo and excluded from society. This article focuses on the shortcomings in the procedure and provides recommendations how to revise these to ensure that stateless persons are enabled to demonstrate their statelessness adequately and obtain the rights associated with it as intended in the Statelessness Conventions signed by the Netherlands.

To supplement recent debates concerning the expulsion of criminal foreigners and the repelling of poor refugees with longer-term insights, this contribution examines banishment practices in early modern and modern Northwest Europe. It argues that banishment, a sanction involving a person’s geographical and social exclusion, served both to punish deviants and to monitor mobile newcomers. Expulsion practices were shaped mainly by concerns about the regulation of access to the labor market and poor relief. The profile of the expellee displays remarkable continuity across time: the poor unwanted stranger, lacking social bonds and, in the case of female migrants, perceived as being prone to prostitution. Albeit banishment often proved only temporary and thus not effective, authorities continued to rely on it because of its symbolic function, displaying their diligence in purifying and protecting local society. This was much to the detriment of the expellees, who were driven into marginality and illegality.

The semi-public domain covers the places that are accessible to the public but which are controlled by private entities. Shopping malls, public transport, bars and sports events are examples of such places. In case of misconduct, the private manager may impose exclusion orders. This sanction relies on legal contracts and the exclusive nature of the right to property. The legal framework consists therefore primarily of private law. Exclusion orders may not be imposed without reason. Prevention of disorder and harm may be a legitimate reason. The length and range of the ban must relate to the gravity of the disruption. In addition to this, public laws on non-discrimination and privacy are applicable. The civil court is competent to check the exclusion orders in de semi-public domain. The author sees added value in complaints committees, in which both public and private actors partake. Complaint committees can thrive if their assessment frameworks are transparent.

The new Dutch Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 extends the (special) powers of the intelligence and security services and introduces a new system of checks and balances. In this article several of the most impactful changes and underlying issues are discussed. They include the technology neutral approach, the new bulk surveillance powers, oversight (its role, tasks, independence and the use of outside experts), complaints and whistleblowers procedure, the lack of appeal procedures and the exchange of information with foreign agencies.

Secrecy complicates the relationship between intelligence and security services and their responsible ministers on the one hand, and members of parliament on the other. How can parliament deal constructively with intelligence and security services, despite the secrecy involved? This article presents a novel conceptual framework to analyse political relations influenced by secrecy, based on four recurring types of parliamentary reactions to intelligence and security services. The focus is a case study of the Dutch parliament and Security Service (BVD) between 1975 and 1995. The analysis demonstrates that constructive parliamentary dealings with secret services depend both on party-political responses to secrecy and strategic responses on the part of the secret services to ambiguous relationships with parliament. The presented typology of four recurring parliamentary reactions to intelligence and security services and the model for constructive parliamentary debate contribute to a better understanding of reasons and consequences of political and societal reactions to the new Dutch Intelligence and Security Services Act (Wiv).