The introduction in the Netherlands of the SOV measure in 2001, followed by the ISD Order in 2004, opened the opportunity for the courts to incarcerate systematic offenders, mostly addicts, for a period of two years. During the period of imprisonment convicted are offered various programs to kick their habits and tackle their other problems. The article assesses the social costs and benefits of the SOV/ISD measure. The analysis takes account of the improvement in general health and productivity of the participants, and models the crime reduction effects through special prevention, incapacitation and general deterrence. Substituting results from the first effectiveness study of the SOV program, which by the way only covers one follow-up year, it is calculated that the SOV/ISD measure may yield a positive net result of as much as € 4 million per participant.

The Act introducing the Institution for Persistent Offenders Committal Order (ISD Order) took effect on 1 October 2004. The origins of the ISD Order are in safety policy. The order had a strong focus on imprisonment of persistent offenders. It can be seen as an exponent of the risk-oriented attitude towards safety, which has been predominant in recent years. At the start treatment of persistent offenders was of secundary importance and was only available for those who were motivated. But the ISD measure has had to deal with major problems in practice. The imprisoned ISD population proved to be one with complex problems like addiction, psychiatric illnesses and sometimes low intellectual abilities. The ISD institutions are ill-equipped for handling these people. The problems led to a slightly different attitude which is more oriented towards resocialization. Improvements are going on now, a process facilitated by a considerably improved co-operation between agencies around the ISD.

In the years 2000-2003 crime on Curaçao seemed to be going out of control and the economy was virtually stagnant with low growth and high unemployment. This situation has changed significantly since 2005. The author shows that a targeted approach by the authorities pushed back major crime problems like the smuggling of cocaine on passenger flights, armed robberies and homicides. However only a permanent effort can guarantee the continuation of this success. Corruption and nepotism are still vibrant, but mainly concern individuals, not institutions as a whole, while the judiciary actively prosecutes corrupt officials. In the long run not only repression, but preventive measures are needed as well. A major cause of corruption and nepotism is the small scale of island life, in combination with economic protectionism and state ownership of companies. Structural adjustments in economic institutions and policy in recent years heralded the return of economic growth and employment. More adjustments in economic policy and institutions could further reduce incentives for corruption; these might also lead to the opening up of Curaçao's rigid labour markets for the many unemployed youngsters. A more autonomous Curaçao faces serious challenges, but the island's record so far gives no reason for despondency.

In 1954 the Statute of the Kingdom of the Netherlands came into force. This document can be seen as an internal Treaty between the Netherlands (as a country in Europe) and its former colonies. Nowadays three countries are (internal) partners in the Kingdom of the Netherlands: the Netherlands, Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles. In 2005 new negotiations have begun for a new (internal) structure of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Netherlands Antilles will cease to be a country in the Kingdom and will be divided into two new countries Curaçao and Sint Maarten. The other remaining (small) islands Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba will be part of the territory of the Netherlands as specific judicial bodies as meant in article 134 Dutch Constitution. A huge diplomatic and judicial procedure has started. Although it is not certain yet, in 2009 it looks as though these plans and procedures will be realized in the very near future.

How to understand the disintegration of the Dutch Caribbean? The Kingdom of the Netherlands comprising three countries - the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba - will be reordered. The Netherlands Antilles will cease to exist as a separate country. Curaçao and Sint Maarten will acquire country status within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, just as Aruba did in 1986, though theirs will be of a different status and with less autonomy. The islands Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba, the so-called BES islands, will be integrated into the Netherlands as public authorities (openbare lichamen); as such the BES islands will be administered by the Netherlands while retaining local government functions (just as municipalities in the Netherlands).
This article outlines the history behind these changes and the factors that are at play. However improbable the Dutch Caribbean hypothesis, the Kingdom facilitates a connection of these islands with the international world. Against all odds and populist opponents, the Dutch Caribbean is a challenge to square the circle, a complex pact, impossible to balance, which will never come to a definitive conclusion.

This article focuses on the current measure for persistent offenders (ISD-measure), by taking into account three equivalent penal sanctions that have been developed in the Netherlands from 1886 onwards. First, the penalty of a labour colony for vagrants and the like for three years at most. Second, the measure to keep the habitual offenders in additional, preventive custody for five to ten years. Finally, the measure of two-year detention for drug addicted offenders. In the article it is argued that in spite of the differences in (judicial) elaboration, all three former existing sanctions have the same legitimating fundamental principle as the ISD-measure. That is, the notion that certain offenders are a danger to society, due to their persistent criminality and nuisance causing lifestyle. The primary objective of all these penal sanctions is therefore a long term protection of society from this danger. In this sense, the ISD-measure makes clear that present state-policy is above all one of sheer deprivation of freedom.

Using the concept of chronocentrism, the doctrine that what is current must somehow be superior to what went on before, that ideas, scholars and scholarship inevitably become stale and discredited over time, the author argues the rise and attraction of nodal governance and nodal security fits the definition of chronocentrism. The recent ‘discovery’ of a multitude of (semi-)public agencies and private sector actors performing police functions neglect the fact that many of these agencies and actors have a long standing history (sometimes more than a century) and have been subject of many academic studies. Moreover, these studies are richer in their theoretical foundations because of the explanations they give for different functions, goals, interests, cultures and operational styles of public policing, administrative policing and private policing than much of the current language. In many ways nodal governance and nodal security are new labels for ongoing processes of gradual interweaving of different forms of policing. For this reason the use of these concepts is useful in two ways. First, for policy makers and practitioners. For them the new concepts seem to have a function as a motivational strategy. For instance, what was called increasing cooperation in the justice system (ketensamenwerking) and public-private cooperation in the eighties and nineties are revitalized using new labels. Second, nodal governance and nodal security, in the academic community ‘forces’ us to rethink the very notion of policing. Policing increasingly takes place in hybrid organizations and processes in which boundaries between public administration, public policing, regulatory agencies and private security are blurring.

In recent years it has become popular in political discourse and academic literature to talk about the blurring boundaries between transnational terrorism and organized crime. In addition, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 have instigated a debate on the link between transnational terrorism and state failure. This article scrutinizes this so-called ‘black hole’ thesis and its relationship to the crime-terror nexus by addressing the political significance of such conceptual blurring within an international context that is increasingly characterized by uncertainty and uncontrollable risks.

This article analyzes the so-called political-criminal nexus in Italy, that is, the relationships of exchange and collusion between politicians and civil servants, on the one hand, and members of organised crime - and specifically Southern Italian mafia - groups on the other. Its main thesis is that the political-criminal nexus in Italy finds nowadays no parallel in any other Western, developed nation, with the possible exception of Japan. The extraordinary intensity of Italy's political-criminal nexus is related to the specificity of Italy's organised crime. This is discussed in the first section of the article. The following ones briefly sketch the evolution of the political-criminal nexus since Italy's Unification in 1861 and then focus on the last thirty years. The recognition of the recent law enforcement successes is complemented by a discussion of the factors that favour the perpetuation of mafia organisations and the political-criminal nexus in the future.

This article describes the relation between the murder on the Walloon social-democratic politician André Cools on 18^th July 1991 at Liege and the corruption case Agusta - dealing with the purchase of army helicopters - in order to reflect on typical Belgian criminological issues in this political organized crime topic. The murder committed by Tunisian hit-men was ordered through the influence of the personal cabinet of Van der Biest, a former minister. During the murder investigation a link with the Agusta corruption case was discovered and would tear down several ministers as well as the former NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes. Due to the existence of especially journalistic sources and a lack of scientific criminological material, the conclusions of this article are strictly personal. The murder and the corruption prove the fact that political organized crime was a reality in Belgium. This case can stand as a scholarly example in the study of political organized crime in Belgium.

The regulation regarding the law enforcement in the new construction of the Netherlands Antilles has to be adapted. The country of the Netherlands Antilles will be divided in three parts: two more or less autonomous countries (Curaçao and Sint Maarten) and the remaining islands (the third part) will fall directly under Dutch rule. In this article special attention is being paid to the law enforcement on the islands (and countries) Curaçao and Sint Maarten. Will it be possible (in the future) for the Dutch Minister of Justice to give guidelines or orders to the prosecution office based in Curaçao and Sint Maarten? It has been agreed that the countries of the Netherlands, Sint Maarten and Curaçao will consult regularly on prosecution policy in order to coordinate their actions. Also a new legal possibility is created for all three Ministers of Justice (including the Dutch minister) to give guidelines or orders to the prosecution, but in special cases only after approval of the Common Court of Justice.