This article seeks to provide an introduction to art theft today. It is divided into sections that look at the context in which art is stolen, definitions of key terms, an explanation as to why the field is understudied and under-reported, and a brief history of the phenomenon. It also contains sidelines on actual developments like the theft of a Van Gogh painting from the Singer Laren Museum in the Netherlands as well as on the drop of art theft since the start of the Corona pandemic.

This article aims to clarify the phenomenon of iconoclasm and how it impacts today’s society, in spite of the lack of research on this topic. After establishing its complex and sensitive nature, a first assessment containing types of iconoclasm and various motives of iconoclasts is presented. Different forms of iconoclasm are distinguished, explained and illustrated using examples. Special attention is given to the subject’s sensitivity in modern society while establishing the connection of the topic with identity in multiple shapes and forms. The article aims at contributing to a future multi-disciplinary debate.

This article provides a short overview of art crime policing and gives some insights as to why art crime policing is an especially arduous task while specifically providing examples from the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK). The article focuses first on the detection of art crime, exploring why many crimes do not enter the criminal justice system. Here, the fact that art crimes are often not detected at all or, if they are, not reported to the police is discussed in some depth in particular with a view to art theft and forgeries. The article then addresses the investigation and prosecution of art crime cases in the EU and how they are facilitated and inhibited in various member states. Finally, the challenges and possible improvements at the European level are discussed and future directions of the fight against art crime are debated.

Several countries in Europe are developing new policies for dealing with collections from colonial contexts. In October 2020, the Council for Culture also made a contribution to this matter commisioned by Minister Van Engelshoven with the Advice for dealing with colonial collections. This article makes two caveats to this advice. The first is about provenance research, about which the advisers have a lot to say, but clues are lacking as to how museums can balance this kind of time-consuming and costly research with the large number of dubiously acquired objects from colonial contexts awaiting investigation. Second, the author misses references to how claims for two other categories of looted art involving Europeans are handled: those of human remains and objects from the early inhabitants of European settler colonies (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USA and South Africa) and Nazi-looted art. Those early inhabitants and the descendants of the victims of the Nazi regime have made more progress with their restitution requests than the old colonies with theirs.

What is the current nature and extent of money laundering on the art market in times of an increasing financialization of art? This article introduces the problem of money laundering through art and reflects on the associated risks of financial crime. Drawing on two recently published research reports the article describes art market and art financialization practices that may facilitate money laundering. It presents an overview of relevant rules and regulations and points to the challenges of preventing art-based financial crimes.

This article provides insight into the approach of the Dutch police to the criminal trade in art, antiques and cultural goods. The authors begin with a brief historical sketch of the development of art crime, before examining the question of how the police in the Netherlands has organized itself in this field. The scope of art crime and how to determine it is also examined. Much information is available from various sources, but a thorough and adequate picture is lacking. Finally, a specific form of art crime is discussed, namely false art. Detecting false art is a tough process, because different parties involved often share the same interests, resulting in ‘walls of silence’.

The smart city is the urban ideal of our time. Yet its high expectations often run counter against the performance of smart city projects in practice. The Rathenau Institute has studied a number of such projects in the municipality of Eindhoven, a leading city with respect to digital innovation in the Netherlands. To ensure that data is used in a proper manner with respect for public values Eindhoven has applied several strategies, such as privacy by design and the active involvement of its citizens. It has also set up a number of principles for the digital society which helped to negotiate contracts with private partners. Yet the authors’ analysis shows that important legal challenges remain. Some of the principles require more detailed specification. The authors also found that the law is not yet fully appropriated to the new digital context and needs to be adjusted accordingly.

Public values and citizen participation are key terms in smart city discourse that are propagated by all its actors, from governments to corporations and civil society. Nevertheless, the design and development of smart cities are hardly ‘public’ as some publics and some forms of participation are never included. This is particularly visible in current protests against a key enabling technology for smart cities, 5G. These contestations tend to be considered ill-informed and irrational, while their methods are seen as conflictual rather than helpful. In this article the author argues that the public value approach to smart cities is rooted in a deliberative perspective of democracy, while the tensions that are produced by 5G and other forms of anti-technological protest are better understood as part of agonistic democracy. Such conflicts about the new smart technologies that are currently hidden from public sight need to be articulated and constructed as contentious issues for electoral politics, in order for the smart city to acquire its democratic legitimacy.

While smart city initiatives claim to be ‘citizen-focused’ or ‘citizen-centric’, there are several troubling aspects of how citizenship and social relations are produced within them. First, they prioritize technological solutions to social and urban problems from the perspective of businesses and states, rather than serving local communities. With a focus on digital technology, they also exclude a wide range of marginalized publics from the possibility to participate in the smart city and only rarely address issues of social differences in cities. The smart city thus creates new or exacerbates existing challenges to the possibility of all city dwellers to fully enjoy urban life with all of its services and advantages, as well as taking direct part in the management of cities – in other words, it creates challenges for ‘the right to the city’. In this article, the author thus explores the notion of the right to the city in order to inform and recast the smart city in emancipatory and empowering ways, one that would work for the benefit of all citizens and not just selected populations.

This article deals with the relationship of smart security technologies to broader modes of exercising power and subjugating individuals. It claims that the notion of psychopower is precisely what is missing from post-Foucaultian accounts of the smart city. In the article psychopower is defined as the manipulation of our consciousness in order to channel our desires toward ‘normal’ social behavior, drawing a line between what is ‘acceptable’ and what is ‘unacceptable’. Psychopower raises a series of concerns related to its democratic legitimacy and accountability as behaviorally informed conditioning of the mind runs the risk of constant surveillance, where human agency is diluted in a techno-utopian vision that promises to improve city-wide efficiency, decision-making, and security.

Steering on public values in Dutch smart cities, let alone their regulation, is complicated. This article situates this difficulty in the vested interests that Dutch local authorities have in public-private smart city projects, and in the fact that public values are narrowly defined in relation to the technology; not in relation to a vision for the city in which its communities thrive. A way out of this deadlock, the article proposes, is to understand smart cities in the Netherlands beyond the typically Dutch consensus politics (the ‘polder’) and, instead, as part of a broader (urban) governance tendency to push urban technologies through the recital of fixed urban problems and public values. Consequently, state regulation of the (Dutch) smart city should principally enable (local) public and political involvement in defining urban problems and urban dreams, and thus in deciding the public values that are at stake.

The recently cancelled Quayside smart city project in Toronto by Sidewalk Labs is an example of a top-down, tech-driven, intransparant model of a smart city, where government and citizens got sidetracked in the planning process. This article analyses what went wrong and proposes an alternative approach. Experts in the field – from data scientists to philosophers, sociologists and activists – propose a different kind of smart city. The open smart city is based on principles of open data, public digital infrastructure, and civic participation. It uses technology to strengthen public values, civic participation and human rights, instead of undermining them.

In this article, the authors draw on a netnographic study conducted between May and July 2019 on phishing on Telegram Messenger. The results indicate that Telegram, just like cryptomarkets and online forums, seems to function as a criminal marketplace. In the groups analyzed the authors see users who both offer and are looking for specific goods and services related to the crime script of phishing. Furthermore, the information on Telegram contains specific modi operandi that are offering comprehensive and step-by-step guides to successfully complete specific financial cybercrimes. Therefore, based on this explorative study the authors argue that Telegram can be seen as a digital offender convergence setting.

This contribution contains several concrete examples of ‘Corona crime’ thereby showing how the current crisis is creating new opportunities for committing crimes. The authors revert to an analysis framework that was previously used to interpret new forms of crime during the banking crisis. It consists of four scenarios that are briefly described. The future will have to show what effects the corona pandemic has had on fraud and other financial and economic crime.

The prevalence of online crime increases. Social engineering, such as email phishing, is often an important element in an attack. Several interventions have been developed to reduce the success of these types of attacks. The current study investigates whether interventions can help reduce vulnerability to social engineering attacks. The authors investigate which types of interventions and specific elements are most successful. They selected studies with an experimental design that tested at least one intervention. A total of 19 studies with 37 effect sizes, based on a total sample of N=23,146 subjects, were found. The available training courses, intervention materials and effect sizes were analysed. Overall, positive effects of interventions were found. However, there are substantial differences in effect for the different types of interventions. Effective interventions are relatively intensive and have a specific focus. The authors conclude with the design of the best possible intervention given the results of their research.

The aim of this research was to examine how Dutch citizens behave online and to explain their online behavior. The results of an experimental survey (N=2,426) show that unsafe behavior is highly prevalent. For example, nearly 40% of the respondents use a weak password. However, it appears that there are major differences between self-reported behavior and objective behavior. The objective measurements in the survey show that people behave more unsafely than they self-report. The research further shows that there is no silver bullet for promoting more safe online behavior. Different online behaviors seem to stem from different sources. Nevertheless, the authors do see a lot of value in interventions that focus on adaptations to the technology that people use for online activities, such that the possibility of unsafe behavior is reduced and the possibility of safe behavior is increased – also known as security by design. There is a role here for policy measures encouraging technology manufacturers to make these adjustments.

In the Internet era, banking fraud has become a common way of stealing money. According to victim surveys, this offense has already led to significant numbers of victims. In this article, the authors focus on illegal bank account withdrawals, which are an indication of identity fraud. For this they use data on 636 victims who were surveyed in the LISS panel. Using the concept of ‘capability to act’, as used in the WRR report Why knowing what to do is not enough (2017), the authors model which type of victim takes action to get the stolen amount reimbursed and which type of victim succeeds in doing so. They expect that the less educated and people with low self-control more often refrain from contact with authorities (bank, police) and therefore more often receive no compensation and remain with higher residual damage. The results show that approximately four in five victims of unauthorized bank debits are fully compensated. For the group of victims for whom this is not the case – remaining with residual damage – most of the hypotheses are confirmed.