The topic of this article is the legal philosophical foundation of John Griffiths’s sociology of law. Griffiths has developed his foundation of sociology of law in discussion with three positions: legal realism, Hart and Dworkin. These three positions give three different answers on the question ‘what is law?’. In the first part Griffiths’s discussion of legal realism is analyzed. From the outset, a legal realistic approach to law has the benefit of its strong focus on the empirical determinants of predicting the outcomes of cases. Problematic, according to Griffiths, is a naïve instrumentalism, often related to legal realism. The second part on Hart’s theory discussed Hart’s notion of rule-following as the core of Griffiths’s sociology of law. Also the different perspectives on law are discussed. According to Griffiths, Black’s extreme external perspective is problematic, but Hart’s moderate external perspective is also not suitable for the external comparative purpose of sociology of law. In the third part, Dworkin’s theory is discussed. Griffiths, in my opinion, unsuccessfully, tried to reconcile Dworkin’s theory with legal positivism. Dworkin’s theory is an interpretive theory from the participant’s point of view, which makes it hard to use it as an adequate foundation of an empirical theory of law. For a sociologist of law, choosing an adequate conception of law is just as important as the choice for an empirical method. The contribution of Griffiths to sociology of law is in this sense unique and of great value for the sociology of law.

Legislation as we know it is a recent phenomenon, and its quality has been under debate for 40 years. It is not surprising or problematic that the place and function of legislation evolve under the influence of societal changes. It is, however, important to change the mechanistic view of legislation. Instead of viewing it as an instrument of policy, we must search for structures and institutions that create room for diversity without breaking the unity of law. In our dealings with inevitable risks and damage to society, rules too often take the place of ethics or professional judgment. Rules are essential, but they should leave room to dissent from them if justified: rules as a point of departure, not rules that must be respected on pain of sanctions.

Since 1 January 2005, citizens in the Netherlands are obliged to show their ID if a police officer asks them to. The (extended) identification duty is meant to prevent crimes and to improve the enforcement of the law. Bart van Klink (Tilburg University) and Nicolle Zeegers (University of Groningen) have investigated how the identification duty is enforced in legal practice by interviewing 12 police officers in 4 different cities and looking at statistical data on enforcement. According to most of the police officers interviewed the identification duty helps to remove anonymity from citizens, which may keep them from committing crimes (in particular crimes in groups, e.g., hooligans). Moreover, the identification duty appears to be instrumental in normalizing citizens: by asking for an ID, police officers are able to discourage behaviour that conflicts with some (legal or moral) standard of normality. This small-scale empirical research indicates that police officers stress the law’s preventive effect. Although prevention may be a valuable goal, it may also constitute a pretext for far-reaching intrusions on citizens’ freedom. An important normative question is how to prevent the police from using this legal instrument too actively for the sake of prevention.