Hartendorp emphasizes in his contribution that a judge is a decision-maker bound by the law. He agrees with Klijn that this position makes it difficult to act as a problem solver. However, this does not alter the fact that, in order to act effectively, a judge must have a dual orientation on the conflict and the dispute between the parties. The Judiciary can only increase its social effectiveness if it manages to bring about a synthesis between its classic decisive task and an orientation aimed at effectiveness.

Four phases of the Corona crisis are distinguished: a first acute phase, the gradual transition to a new normal, the economic downturn and the long run. The article describes what happened in the courts in the first and in the beginning of the second phase, and what is subsequently likely to happen. In the acute phase the court buildings shut down, and adjudication came largely to a halt. The courts were late in opening up, and as a result backlogs of, in particular, criminal cases increased. The courts extended their use of digital tools (e.g. tele-hearings) that, while allowing cases to proceed, did not fully protect the rights of parties. While so far the volume of commercial cases and bankruptcies has not increased, a (rapid) increase is inevitable. Contract breach will be wide spread, and will give rise to fundamental legal issues. For economic recovery it is essential that the courts give clear and consistent guidance in these matters quickly. This requires the courts to reduce the currently long duration of civil cases, and to use the available procedures to get expeditious decisions of the Supreme Court. The courts will also need to develop their ICT-instruments rapidly to guarantee the rights of parties. After a difficult first phase, the courts now face the challenge to effectively guide society through the Corona crisis and its aftermath, and thereby play its role in the trias politica.

Het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie heeft baanbrekende uitspraken gedaan, vooral als gevolg van prejudiciële vragen van nationale rechters op grond van art. 267 VWEU. Het zijn vooral niet-verwijzingsplichtige lagere rechters geweest die voor deze aanvoer hebben gezorgd. Dit artikel onderzoekt hoe dit kan worden verklaard en kijkt naar de motieven van Nederlandse lagere rechters om al dan niet prejudiciële vragen te stellen aan het HvJ. Het doet dit op basis van interviews met 22 rechters en een uitgebreide juridische analyse van uitspraken. Dit artikel toont aan dat met name pragmatische en praktische overwegingen een rol spelen bij het besluit om te verwijzen. Daarnaast laat dit artikel zien dat er meer verschillen zijn binnen een lidstaat dan tussen lidstaten onderling, met name tussen gerechtelijke instanties en individuele rechters.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has rendered landmark cases, especially following references for a preliminary ruling from national courts on the basis of Art. 267 TFEU. Primarily lower courts that are not obliged to refer have been responsible for such cases. This article examines how these references of lower courts can be explained by focusing on the motives of the Dutch lower court judges to refer, or not to refer. It does so on the basis of interviews with 22 judges and an extensive legal analysis of judgments. This article shows that practical and pragmatic considerations play an important role in the court’s decision to refer. In addition, there are more differences within one Member States than between EU Member States, especially between particular courts and individual judges.

We investigate a recent development in the practice of the civil courts: judges increasingly devote attention to the underlying conflict of parties instead of only to their legal dispute. In administrative law, this development has already been codified and termed ‘de Nieuwe zaaksbehandeling’, but not so in other areas of law.
Lawyers know that social conflicts are transformed into legally viable disputes so that the court can decide on them. For a long time, the most important task for lawyers was to resolve those legal disputes. Nowadays, that does not seem to be enough: judges should become problem solvers. Civil judges seem to blend in with these new requirements, but the question is whether the new approach really works. Based on our empirical material of 100 observed cases in civil law, we answer the following questions. 1. What do judges actually do in civil cases when they address underlying conflicts and try to steer parties toward a settlement? 2. What effects do these interventions of judges have on the outcome of cases? 3. How are these interventions perceived by the parties in terms of procedural justice?

‘I felt so sorry for you, such a lovely tool, and then you have no users!’ This was one of the comments after my presentation of the eKantonrechter at ODR 2016, organized by HiiL in The Hague in May 2016. ODR, online dispute resolution, was presented as a tool to solve all problems in the 4^th Trend Report by HIIL after the conference. Arno Lodder, in a weblog, commented that ODR had raised hopes in its early promoters, but had not really taken off.
ODR is a tool to help parties in the dispute resolve their problem. There are various examples of ODR tool: supporting double blind bidding to determine a sum of money, working out divorce settlements, negotiating a solution and taking a case to court.
Interesting research questions abound in the area of ODR and its users: What paths do people take when trying to resolve a problem? How can people have ownership of their court procedure? How can solutions, ODR and court procedures, best be tailored to the type of problem?
ODR and its users is a field in which law and society researchers can effectively contribute to improving digital problem solving and dispute resolution procedures in court.

In the Netherlands, the way in which judges behave and communicate during hearings is increasingly being emphasized. This is related to the implementation of post-defence appearance in Dutch civil hearings (comparitie na antwoord) and a more general, albeit cautious, shift from dispute resolution, focused solely on resolving the legal aspects of a case, towards broader conflict resolution, in which other aspects of a case are considered too. This article compares how six judges managed a civil hearing of the same case. It seeks to explain the different outcomes that resulted from these judges’ hearings (i.e. settlement/judgement/referral to mediator) and seeks to identify what different ways of managing hearings imply for a possible shift from dispute resolution to conflict resolution. The empirical study found that the judges’ preparation of the case and their way of beginning and structuring the hearing were very similar; they also discussed similar subjects. Differences were found in how the judges interacted with the parties; the skills they used during hearings; how they used a specific skill; and in how they guided parties in the decision-making process about the outcome. No strong correlation emerged between a specific type of hearing management and the type of outcome selected. Interviews with the judges suggest that the explanation for the different outcomes lies partly in the judges’ personal views (on the appropriate outcome). Such beliefs influence how the judges manage a civil hearing, and indirectly the outcome of a case as well. These findings imply that for a shift from dispute resolution to conflict resolution to materialize, this will require judges to develop a common understanding of their responsibilities and to enhance their skills. They will also need to verify their assumptions more, so that the parties’ needs and the judge’s personal beliefs are better matched.